United States v. Seville Weathington ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •            Case: 15-11130    Date Filed: 12/21/2015   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-11130
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-00121-WSD-RGV-2
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    SEVILLE WEATHINGTON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (December 21, 2015)
    Before MARCUS, WILSON, and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 15-11130     Date Filed: 12/21/2015   Page: 2 of 4
    Seville Weathington appeals his total 40-month sentence, imposed after
    pleading guilty to one count of dealing firearms without a license, in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (a)(1)(A) and (2), and one count of possessing marijuana with
    intent to distribute, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(D). On
    appeal, Weathington argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable in
    light of the factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). He contends that, considering his
    disability and limited socio-economic background, the total 40-month sentence
    was excessive for the offense, even though his advisory guideline range was 108 to
    135 months. However, Weathington has not carried his burden of showing that his
    below-guidelines sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors. See United States v. Valnor, 
    451 F.3d 744
    , 750 (11th
    Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we affirm.
    Generally, we review the reasonableness of a sentence “under a deferential
    abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 591 (2007). We will not vacate a sentence as substantively unreasonable
    unless “left with the definite and firm conviction” that the sentencing court clearly
    erred in weighing the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors and issued a sentence “outside
    the range of reasonable sentences.” United States v. Rodriguez, 
    628 F.3d 1258
    ,
    1264–65 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    2
    Case: 15-11130     Date Filed: 12/21/2015    Page: 3 of 4
    The district court is required to impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater
    than necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2),
    including the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the
    law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect
    the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. In imposing a particular
    sentence, the district court should also consider, inter alia, the nature and
    circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and
    the applicable guideline range. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(1), (3)-(7).
    Weathington does not argue that the district court committed any procedural
    error, nor does the record reflect that it did. As to substantive reasonableness,
    Weathington, who was born with cerebral palsy, argues that the court failed to give
    due consideration to his disability and socio-economic background under
    § 3553(a). However, the court explicitly considered these factors, hearing from
    both Weathington and his mother with regard to his physical handicaps and stating
    that Weathington’s disability constituted “extenuating circumstances” in the case
    that merited consideration in the sentencing determination. We will not second-
    guess the weight that the sentencing judge accorded this factor; the record is clear
    that the court considered all the § 3553 factors and the particular circumstances of
    this case when sentencing Weathington. See United States v. Snipes, 
    611 F.3d 855
    ,
    872 (11th Cir. 2010).
    3
    Case: 15-11130     Date Filed: 12/21/2015   Page: 4 of 4
    Moreover, the 40-month sentence imposed was well below the 120-month
    statutory maximum, which is another factor demonstrating its reasonableness. See
    Valnor, 
    451 F.3d at
    751–52 (considering that a sentence was “appreciably below
    the length of the statutory maximum” in assessing its reasonableness); see also
    Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    , 
    128 S. Ct. at 597
     (noting that the substantive reasonableness
    of a sentence is determined in light of the totality of the circumstances). Therefore,
    upon review of the record, the relevant case law, and consideration of the parties’
    arguments, we affirm the sentence as reasonable.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-11130

Judges: Marcus, Wilson, Pryor

Filed Date: 12/21/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024