Marlon Francisco Vaz v. Felicia Skinner , 634 F. App'x 778 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-15791
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:12-cv-03959-JHH-JHE
MARLON FRANCISCO VAZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
FELICIA SKINNER,
Field Office Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Atlanta Division,
WARDEN,
ERIC HOLDER,
JANET NAPOLITANO,
Respondents-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(December 23, 2015)
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Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner Marlon Vaz, a detained alien represented by counsel, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner raises two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the
district court erred in determining that his continued detention without release to
seek medical treatment did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Second, he argues
that the district court erred by determining that his three-year detention while
awaiting removal was not unreasonable. After careful review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Brazil, entered the United States without
inspection at an unknown date, time, and place. He was subsequently convicted of
family violence battery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1, and theft by taking,
in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2. He received 12 months’ imprisonment as to
each conviction.
Pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1228,
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated expedited, administrative
removal proceedings against Petitioner. In February 2012, DHS served Petitioner
with a Notice to Issue a Final Administrative Order of Removal, charging him with
being an aggravated felon subject to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
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Petitioner was taken into custody by DHS on March 5, 2012, and the latter issued a
Final Administrative Order of Removal against Petitioner on March 19, 2012.
On May 8, 2012, DHS requested a travel document for Petitioner from the
Consulate General of Brazil (“Consulate”). Since that time, DHS has contacted the
Consulate on numerous occasions to ascertain the status of Petitioner’s travel
document. DHS also requested that Petitioner provide any documentation that
could expedite the removal process to Brazil, but Petitioner indicated that he will
neither advise the Consulate that he wants to return to Brazil nor request that a
travel document be issued for his removal. On March 21, 2014, the Consulate
informed DHS that a travel document could not be issued to Petitioner if he is
unwilling to sign for the document. Between December 2012 and January 2014,
DHS conducted numerous Post Order Custody Reviews after which it decided to
continue Petitioner’s detention.
Petitioner filed the § 2241 petition underlying this appeal in November
2012, seeking release from custody on two grounds. Specifically, Petitioner
alleged that he had not received adequate medical treatment for pain in his right
eye following the extraction of his wisdom teeth, in violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights. Although doctors had diagnosed him with Bell’s Palsy, he
disagreed with the diagnosis because he had not experienced any problems until
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after the dental procedure. Petitioner also contended that he had been detained in
immigration custody for a longer period of time than permitted.
The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”),
recommending that the petition be dismissed. Construing Petitioner’s inadequate
medical care claim as arising under the Fifth rather than the Eighth Amendment,
the magistrate judge determined that Petitioner’s claim was not properly raised in a
§ 2241 petition. In any event, the magistrate judge stated that release from
confinement was not an available form of relief for such a claim. The magistrate
judge further concluded that Petitioner could not show that his continued detention
was unreasonable given that he failed to rebut the evidence submitted by the
Government showing that he had refused to cooperate in the removal process.
Over Petitioner’s objections, the district court adopted the R&R and dismissed the
§ 2241 petition without prejudice.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s denial of a § 2241 petition de novo and the
district court’s findings of fact for clear error. Bowers v. Keller, 651 F.3d 1277,
1291 (11th Cir. 2011). Although district courts do not have jurisdiction to review
§ 2241 petitions filed by an alien challenging a final order of removal, jurisdiction
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exists over a § 2241 petition if the alien challenges the legality of his detention.
See Madu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1366–68 (11th Cir. 2006).
B. Inadequate Medical Care Claim
Claims challenging the fact or duration of a sentence fall within the “core”
of habeas corpus, while claims challenging the conditions of confinement fall
outside of habeas corpus law. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644 (2004); see
also Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 2003) (deliberate indifference
claim raised in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint); Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353,
1361 (11th Cir. 1999) (same).
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel
and unusual punishment when they are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s
serious medical needs. McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1254–57 (11th Cir.
1999). However, the protections of the Eighth Amendment do not attach until after
a person has been convicted and sentenced. Hamm v. DeKalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567,
1572 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 n.6 (1989).
Instead, a deliberate indifference claim raised by a pretrial detainee is governed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d
1559, 1564 (11th Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, the standard for providing adequate
medical care to pretrial detainees under the Due Process Clause is the same
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standard required for convicted persons under the Eighth Amendment. Hamm, 774
F.2d at 1573–74.
We have held that release from custody is not an available remedy, even if a
prisoner establishes an Eighth Amendment violation. Gomez v. United States, 899
F.2d 1124, 1126 (11th Cir. 1990). Instead, “[t]he appropriate Eleventh Circuit
relief from prison conditions that violate the Eighth Amendment during legal
incarceration is to require the discontinuance of any improper practices, or to
require correction of any condition causing cruel and unusual punishment.” Id.As an initial matter, the district court correctly identified Petitioner’s
inadequate medical care claim as arising under the Fifth Amendment rather than
the Eighth Amendment because the Eighth Amendment does not attach until after
a prisoner is convicted and sentenced. See Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1572; Jordan, 38
F.3d at 1564; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693–94 (2001) (“[T]he
Due Process Clause [of the Fifth Amendment] protects an alien subject to a final
order of deportation . . . .”).
The district court also properly determined that Petitioner’s claim did not
entitle him to habeas relief. Petitioner’s § 2241 petition is not the appropriate
vehicle for raising an inadequate medical care claim, as such a claim challenges the
conditions of confinement, not the fact or duration of that confinement. See
Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644; see also Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1238; Campbell, 169 F.3d at
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1361. And, in any event, even if Petitioner established a constitutional violation,
he would not be entitled to the relief he seeks because release from imprisonment
is not an available remedy for a conditions-of-confinement claim. See Gomez, 899
F.2d at 1126. Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining that
Petitioner was not entitled to relief on this claim.
C. Unreasonable Detention Claim
When an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General generally has 90
days to remove the alien from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). The
90-day period beings to run on the latest of the following: (1) the date the removal
order becomes administratively final; (2) the date of a reviewing court’s final
order, if the removal order was reviewed by a higher court and a stay of removal
was ordered; or (3) the date the alien is released from detention or confinement, if
the alien was detained or confined for reasons unrelated to the immigration
process. Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B). However, the 90-day removal period may be
extended and the alien may remain in detention, “if the alien fails or refuses to
make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to
the alien’s departure or conspires or acts to prevent the alien’s removal subject to
an order of removal.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(C).
In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court considered whether 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6)—which authorizes detention beyond the 90-day removal period if the
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alien is, among other things, removable for violations of criminal law—permitted
the Attorney General to indefinitely detain an alien. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682; 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). In that case, the aliens were detained pending removal, but
either every potential receiving country had refused to accept the alien, or there
was no repatriation treaty with the potential receiving country. Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 684, 686. The Court held that six months was a presumptively reasonable
time to detain an alien awaiting removal. Id. at 701. After the expiration of the
six-month period, if the alien puts forth “good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the
Government must present evidence to rebut that showing. Id. The Court,
however, emphasized that this did not mean that every detained alien must be
released after six months, as DHS may continue to hold the alien in detention until
it is determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future. Id.To state a claim under Zadvydas, we have held that an alien must show that:
(1) he has been detained for more than six months following the final order of
removal and (2) there is good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Akinwale v. Ashcroft,
287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002).
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Here, the district court did not err in determining that Petitioner’s three-year
detention while awaiting removal was not unreasonable. The parties do not dispute
that Petitioner has been in DHS custody awaiting removal since March 2012, or in
other words, more than three years. However, Petitioner’s own acts and failure to
make timely application in good faith for travel documents has prevented his
removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C). His refusal to voluntarily sign his travel
document or inform Brazil that he is willing to return has extended his removal
period beyond the 90 days following the issuance of his Final Administrative
Order of Removal. Id.Unlike the petitioners in Zadvydas, who could not be removed because all
potential receiving countries either refused to accept the alien or there was no
repatriation treaty, Brazil has not refused to accept Petitioner. See Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 684, 686. In fact, the Consulate has indicated that it cannot issue Petitioner
a travel document unless he voluntarily signs for it. It follows that the Consulate
would issue Petitioner a travel document if he signed for it and expressed his
willingness to return to Brazil. And, if Petitioner were issued a travel document,
he would be released from detention and removed.
In sum, it is Petitioner who prevents his removal from the United States.
Indeed, he even stated in his reply that he would follow the law and arrange for his
departure from the United States if he were released from confinement to seek
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medical treatment. Because Petitioner is responsible for thwarting his removal, he
cannot show that there is no reasonable likelihood that he will not be removed in
the reasonably foreseeable future if he cooperates with DHS and voluntarily signs
for the travel document. See Akindale, 287 F.3d at 1052; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
701. Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining that Petitioner’s
continued detention was not unreasonable.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the district court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is AFFIRMED.
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