Willie G. Smith v. Robyn A. Crittenden ( 2019 )


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  •               Case: 18-13424     Date Filed: 01/30/2019   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-13424
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-01083-MHC
    WILLIE G. SMITH,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    NATHAN DEAL, et al.,
    Defendants,
    ROBYN A. CRITTENDEN,
    The Commissioner of the Human
    Services in her individual capacity,
    GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES and
    the DIVISION OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES,
    DHS/DFCS EMPLOYEES IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Case: 18-13424      Date Filed: 01/30/2019   Page: 2 of 7
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (January 30, 2018)
    Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Willie Smith appeals pro se the dismissal of his amended complaint against
    Robyn Crittenden, the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Human
    Services; the Department and its Division of Family and Children Services; and
    unnamed employees of the Department and its Division. The district court
    dismissed Smith’s complaint for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We affirm.
    Smith complained about the methods that Division employees used to
    recover overpayments he received from the supplemental nutrition assistance
    program. Smith alleged that he received $1,570 in overpayments from the
    program. In 2004, Smith received notice of his obligation to refund that amount
    and the Division recovered $1,091.69 between November 2004 and July 2013 by
    withholding $10 monthly from his food stamp benefits. In August 2013, a Division
    employee terminated Smith’s repayment schedule even though he still owed
    $478.31. Smith also alleged that, in 2015, after he protested an error in the
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    administration of his Medicaid benefits, the Division filed a fraudulent claim for a
    “delinquent Food Stamp Collection Claim” with the Treasury Offset Program that
    resulted in one deduction of $49 from Smith’s social security benefits. In 2017, the
    Division sought another refund from Smith by notifying him of his outstanding
    balance and withholding $10 monthly from his food stamp benefits. Smith filed a
    claim against the Division with the Office of State Administrative Hearings, but he
    withdrew his request for a hearing and the Office dismissed his claim.
    Smith complained that the defendants’ collection practices were attributable
    to “race and disability discrimination as well as retaliation.” He alleged that an
    unnamed employee mishandled his application to renew his Medicare benefits, in
    violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794. Smith also
    alleged that an unnamed employee filed a false claim with the Treasury Offset
    Program, in violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, to retaliate for
    Smith’s complaint about the mishandling of his Medicare application. And Smith
    alleged that unnamed Division employees “violated the due process clauses and
    equal protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments” in 2004, 2015,
    and 2017 by “fail[ing] to give notice . . . of its settlement authority when
    demanding repayment” as required to “adequately inform [him] of his rights under
    the Food Stamp Act.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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    The district court dismissed Smith’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
    The district court ruled that the Department and its Division were not subject to
    suit and that Smith alleged no plausible facts from which to infer that Crittenden
    could be held liable, as a supervisor, for the conduct of her subordinates. The
    district court also ruled that, “[a]lthough [Smith] styled the Amended Complaint as
    a ‘retaliation and discrimination complaint,’ [he] fail[ed] to include any plausible
    factual allegations demonstrating that any adverse action [he] suffered . . . was
    linked to any racial or otherwise discriminatory animus on the part of Defendants”
    and he failed to “show a causal connection between any protected activity and any
    adverse action . . . [by] the Defendants.”
    We review de novo the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for failure to
    state a claim and accept the allegations in the complaint as true. Alba v. Montford,
    
    517 F.3d 1249
    , 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). A district court is obligated to dismiss an in
    forma pauperis complaint if it determines that the action is “frivolous” or “fails to
    state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To avoid
    dismissal, a complaint must contain facts sufficient to support a plausible claim to
    relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 679 (2009). We interpret pro se pleadings
    liberally, but we will not rewrite a deficient pleading to sustain an action. Campbell
    v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 
    760 F.3d 1165
    , 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).
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    Smith’s complaint failed to state a plausible claim against Crittenden.
    Supervisory officials cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for the
    actions of their subordinates unless the supervisor “personally participates in the
    alleged unconstitutional conduct” or “there is a causal connection between the
    actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”
    Cottone v. Jenne, 
    326 F.3d 1352
    , 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). Smith’s complaint did not
    allege that Crittenden personally participated in collecting Smith’s outstanding
    debt. Nor did Smith’s complaint allege that Crittenden directed her employees to
    act unlawfully or that she knew they would do so and failed to intervene. The
    district court did not err when it ruled that Crittenden could not be liable for her
    employees’ alleged unlawful acts.
    The district court also did not err in dismissing Smith’s complaint insofar as
    it alleged any claims against the Department and its Division. The allegations of
    wrongdoing by unnamed “DHS/DCFS employees” were deficient. See Richardson
    v. Johnson, 
    598 F.3d 734
    , 738 (11th Cir. 2010) (requiring a complaint to identify
    or describe defendants with specificity). And state agencies are not subject to suit
    under section 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 
    491 U.S. 58
    , 65–71
    (1989). Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any “person” acting “under
    color of state law” who deprives an aggrieved person of rights secured by federal
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    law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. State agencies are not persons under section 1983. See 
    Will, 491 U.S. at 65
    .
    In addition, Smith’s complaint failed to allege plausible facts of wrongdoing
    by any Division employees. Smith’s complaint admitted that, as of August 2013,
    he had yet to repay $478.31 in overpayments from the supplemental nutrition
    assistance program. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (stating that the Act prohibits the
    presentation of “a false or fraudulent claim for payment”). Smith’s complaint
    failed to allege any plausible facts about the submission of a false claim to the
    government. Smith’s complaint also failed to allege that an employee mishandled
    his Medicare application because of his disability. See Ellis v. England, 
    432 F.3d 1321
    , 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[U]nder the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must
    prove that he suffered an adverse employment action ‘solely by reason of’ his
    handicap.”). And Smith’s conclusory allegations that Division employees
    “intentionally treated [him] differently from other similarly situated” people of
    “other races and national origin” lacked any supporting facts necessary to state a
    plausible claim that he was denied equal protection of the law. See Bell Atl. Corp.
    v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555 (2007) (“[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the
    grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and
    a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”). Smith also
    complained that the employees reinstated his debt because he was black, but we
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    agree with the district court that his complaint failed to make “any plausible factual
    allegations demonstrating that any adverse action [he] suffered . . . was linked to
    any racial . . . animus on the part of Defendants.”
    Smith’s complaint also failed to state a claim that the employees violated his
    constitutional right to due process of law. Division employees did not violate
    Smith’s right to substantive due process by collecting an amount he owed to the
    government. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 
    881 F.2d 1570
    , 1577 (11th
    Cir. 1989) (“[A] deprivation of a property interest . . . [violates substantive due
    process] if it is undertaken ‘for an improper motive and by means that were
    pretextual, arbitrary and capricious, and . . . without any rational basis.’”). And
    Smith’s claim that he was denied procedural due process failed because he alleged
    that he received notice of his obligation to refund the overpayments and that he
    requested and later withdrew his requests for hearings to protest the collections.
    See Mathews v. Eldridge, 
    424 U.S. 319
    , 348 (1976) (“The essence of due process
    is the requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the
    case against him and opportunity to meet it.’”).
    We AFFIRM the dismissal of Smith’s complaint.
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