William L. Keller v. Commissioner of Social Security , 759 F.3d 1282 ( 2014 )

Case: 13-14321 Date Filed: 07/21/2014 Page: 1 of 6
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-14321
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:09-cv-00607-JBT
WILLIAM L. KELLER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(July 21, 2014)
Before WILSON, PRYOR and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
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Following a successful claim for Social Security disability benefits,
Appellant William Keller filed a motion asking the court to approve the
contingency fee arrangement he agreed to with his lawyer. The magistrate judge
who handled the motion determined that a fee in the amount of $11,876.65 was
reasonable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1), and Keller appealed. For the reasons
stated below, we affirm.
In 1998, Keller applied for disability insurance benefits, claiming his
disability began on September 18, 1997. On July 17, 2001, he received a partially
favorable decision from an administrative law judge (ALJ) entitling him to benefits
for the period of September 18, 1997 through October 1, 1999.1 Keller appealed
the decision and spent nearly ten years exhausting his administrative remedies and
pursuing his claims in the district court. During this process, Keller elected to
receive early retirement benefits. Ultimately, in July 2011, the Commissioner
determined that Keller had remained disabled throughout the course of his appeal
and issued a Notice of Award informing Keller that he was entitled to $83,374.00
in past-due benefits for the period of October 1999 through June 2011.
Following this favorable outcome, Keller filed a motion seeking an award of
attorney’s fees in the amount of $19,498.90, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A),
1
Keller received benefits in the amount of $17,451.91 for this period. Keller’s lawyer
received a fee of $3,279.50 (18.79%) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(a).
2
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based on his own calculation for the amount of past-due benefits—$113,863.00. 2
The Commissioner opposed the motion, arguing that the correct amount of past-
due benefits was $83,374.00.3 The magistrate judge excluded the early retirement
benefits Keller received when calculating the amount of past-due benefits owed
under the agreement and determined that a fee award of $11,876.65 was
reasonable.
Keller argues that the district court erred when it determined that a fee of
$11,876.65—which was calculated using a past-due benefit amount that had been
reduced to reflect the amount of early retirement benefits Keller received—was
reasonable. In support of this argument, Keller cites § 406(b), which he reads to
preclude such a reduction. But we need not reach Keller’s statutory argument
because the language found within the fee agreement controls the outcome of this
case.4
In Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, the Supreme Court considered 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)
and clarified its impact on the district court’s role in awarding a reasonable fee
2
The contingent fee agreement Keller entered into with his lawyer called for a fee
equaling 25 percent of any past-due benefits owed to Keller. The fee Keller actually requested
before the magistrate judge was less than 25 percent of $113,863.00 because Keller’s lawyer had
previously been awarded fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act and § 406(a), and
§ 406(b)(1)(A) caps the total fee at 25 percent of past-due benefits.
3
The discrepancy between the competing calculations of past-due benefits results from
Keller’s inclusion of early retirement benefits he received from the Social Security
Administration.
4
“[I]nterpretation of an attorney-client fee contract is a question of law subject to de
novo review on appeal.” Sweeney v. Athens Reg’l Med. Ctr., 917 F.2d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir.
1990).
3
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following a favorable claim for Social Security benefits. See 535 U.S. 789, 807,
122 S. Ct. 1817, 1828 (2002). Although § 406(b)(1)(A) gives district courts the
power to “determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee” following
a favorable claim for Social Security benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A), it does
not empower them to ignore the fee agreements entered into by parties when
determining what a reasonable fee would be, see Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807, 122
S. Ct. at 1828 (concluding that Ҥ 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee
agreements as the primary means by which fees are set”). Instead, courts must
look to the agreement made by the parties and independently review whether the
resulting fee is reasonable under the circumstances. Id. Accordingly, we must
look to the fee agreement made by Keller and his attorney.
The fee agreement states, in relevant part, that “[t]he Attorney’s fee will be
determined by the amount owed to the Client . . . for past due Social Security
benefits.” (Emphasis added.) It also mandates that the fee “shall never exceed
25% of the ‘past due’ benefits owed [to the] Client.”
The parties dispute whether, under the agreement, the amount of past-due
benefits owed includes the early retirement benefits Keller received. The
Commissioner conceded at oral argument that, as a result of Keller’s favorable
decision, the early retirement benefits he received are better characterized as
disability benefits. However, the Commissioner contends that those benefits were
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not “owed” to Keller, as required under the contract, because they had already been
paid. Keller counters by arguing that the amount “owed” is more properly viewed
as the total amount that he was ultimately entitled to receive for the relevant period
of disability. Receiving early retirement benefits did not reduce the amount he was
“owed;” it merely reduced the amount the government needed to pay to satisfy its
obligations.
The magistrate judge noted, and we agree, that the language found in the
contingent-fee arrangement is ambiguous. In these circumstances, we regularly
construe contracts against the drafting party. See Carneiro Da Cuhna v. Standard
Fire Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 581, 585 (11th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we interpret the
agreement between Keller and his attorney—which calls for a fee in the amount of
25 percent of past-due benefits owed—as providing for a fee of 25 percent of past-
due benefits that had not already been paid to Keller.
Keller claims that the magistrate judge should not have avoided the statutory
arguments presented. But avoiding those arguments was entirely appropriate in
these circumstances. The magistrate judge correctly noted that § 406(b)(1)(A)
prohibits fee agreements from providing for a fee “in excess of 25 percent of the
total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 406(b)(1)(A). He then clarified that the language of the fee agreement did not
track the language of § 406(b)(1)(A). Implicit in that clarification, of course, is a
5
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recognition that the agreement, not the statute, provides the “primary means by
which fees are set.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807, 122 S. Ct. at 1828.
Thus, the magistrate judge did exactly what was required of him under
§ 406(b)(1)(A) and Gisbrecht. He started with the fee agreement, and after
determining that the early retirement benefits were not past-due benefits “owed,”
went on to conduct an independent review of the resulting fee for reasonableness.
Because we agree with the magistrate judge’s interpretation of the contract and
find no error in his review of the fee, we affirm the fee award of $11,876.65. 5
AFFIRMED.
5
We acknowledge that this result may seem inequitable, particularly to Keller’s attorney,
who likely would have collected the fee sought here if not for the Commissioner’s erroneous
denial of disability benefits and Keller’s subsequent decision to receive early retirement benefits.
But such a result is best avoided by drafting contracts with more precision. At oral argument,
Keller’s attorney stated that he had already modified his contracts to avoid this problem going
forward. Other attorneys would be well-advised to do the same.
6