USCA11 Case: 20-14796 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2022 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 20-14796
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
PETER CHRISTIAN BOULETTE,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:06-cr-00131-RDP-HNJ-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 20-14796
Before JILL PRYOR, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Peter Christian Boulette, proceeding pro se, appeals the dis-
trict court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He argues that the district court abused
its discretion by applying the policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13,
which he argues is inapplicable to motions filed by prisoners, and
by finding that he did not present extraordinary and compelling
reasons for release and that release was not warranted under the
§ 3553(a) factors.
We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen-
tence reduction under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). United States v.
Giron,
15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). We will then review a
district court’s denial of a prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for an
abuse of discretion. Id. “A district court abuses its discretion if it
applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in
making its determination, or makes clearly erroneous factual find-
ings.” Id.
Before the First Step Act of 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132
Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21, 2018) (“First Step Act”),
18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) allowed the district court to reduce a prisoner’s
term of imprisonment upon motion of the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons (“BOP”), after considering the factors set forth in
§ 3553(a), if it found that extraordinary and compelling reasons
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20-14796 Opinion of the Court 3
warranted such a reduction.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (effective
November 2, 2002, to December 20, 2018). The First Step Act
amended
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow the court to reduce a
defendant’s term of imprisonment also upon motion of the defend-
ant, after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights
to appeal a failure of the BOP to bring a motion on the defendant’s
behalf, or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by
the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier. See
First Step Act § 603;
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A district court may
grant compassionate release if: (1) an extraordinary and compelling
reason exists; (2) a sentencing reduction would be consistent with
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; and (3) the § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of
compassionate release. United States v. Tinker,
14 F.4th 1234,
1237-38 (11th Cir. 2021). When the district court finds that one of
these three prongs is not met, it is not required to examine the
other prongs. Giron, 15 F.4th at 1348. Factors under § 3553(a) that
the district court may consider include the criminal history of the
defendant, the seriousness of the crime, the promotion of respect
for the law, just punishment, protecting the public from the de-
fendant’s crimes, and adequate deterrence.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The policy statements applicable to § 3582(c)(1)(A) are
found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, which, notably, has not been amended
since the First Step Act was passed and refers only to a sentence
reduction upon a motion from the BOP Director. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13 (stating that a court may reduce a prisoner’s sentence only
upon a motion from the BOP Director). The commentary to
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4 Opinion of the Court 20-14796
§ 1B1.13 states that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist un-
der any of the circumstances listed, as long as the court determines
that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person
or to the community, as provided in
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). See
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; id., comment. (n.1). The commentary lists a de-
fendant’s medical condition, age, and family circumstances as pos-
sible “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting a sen-
tence reduction. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, comment. (n.1(A)-(C)). A pris-
oner’s rehabilitation is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compel-
ling reason warranting a sentence reduction. Id., comment.
(n.3). The commentary also contains a catch-all provision for
“other reasons,” which provides that a prisoner may be eligible for
a sentence reduction if “[a]s determined by the Director of the Bu-
reau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant’s case an extraordinary
and compelling reason other than, or in combination with,” the
other specific examples listed. Id., comment. (n.1(D)).
In Bryant, we concluded that § 1B1.13 applies to all motions
for compassionate release filed under § 3582(c)(1)(A), including
those filed by prisoners, and thus a district court may not reduce a
sentence unless a reduction would be consistent with § 1B1.13’s
definition of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” United
States v. Bryant,
996 F.3d 1243, 1262-64 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
142
S. Ct. 583 (2021). Next, we concluded that the catch-all provision
in the commentary to § 1B1.13 did not grant to district courts, in
addition to the BOP, the discretion to develop other reasons out-
side those listed in § 1B1.13 that might justify a reduction in a
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20-14796 Opinion of the Court 5
defendant’s sentence. Id. at 1248, 1263, 1265. Thus, we rejected
Bryant’s argument that his situation presented extraordinary and
compelling reasons because he would not be subject to a 25-year
mandatory minimum sentence for his multiple § 924(c) offenses if
he had been sentenced after enactment of the First Step Act. Id. at
1251, 1257-58, 1265.
The weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is commit-
ted to the sound discretion of the district court. Tinker, 14 F.4th at
1241. A district court abuses its discretion when it “(1) fails to afford
consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight,
(2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or
(3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper
factors.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Where consideration of
the § 3553(a) factors is mandatory, district courts need not address
each of the § 3553(a) factors or all of the mitigating evidence. Id.
Instead, an acknowledgement by the district court that it consid-
ered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments is sufficient.
Id. The record must indicate that the district court considered a
number of the factors. Id.
Documents filed by pro se litigants are to be liberally con-
strued and must be held to less stringent standards than documents
drafted by attorneys. Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Issues not raised in an initial brief are deemed forfeited and will not
be addressed absent extraordinary circumstances. United States v.
Campbell,
26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, No.
21-1468 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2022).
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6 Opinion of the Court 20-14796
Here, this Court made clear in its intervening decision in
Bryant that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is the applicable policy statement for
all § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions, even those filed by prisoners, so the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in applying § 1B1.13 to Bou-
lette’s case. 996 F.3d at 1262. As to Boulette’s arguments for ex-
traordinary and compelling reasons for release, the district court
correctly determined that Boulette’s proffered reasons for release,
such as his post-sentencing rehabilitation and the harsh nature of
his sentence, arose under the “catch all” provision of U.S.S.G. §
1B1.13, Application Note 1(D). While the district court addressed
those reasons on the merits, this Court subsequently determined
in Bryant that the district court was not authorized to determine
that other extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief existed
beyond those listed in § 1B1.13. Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1248, 1263,
1265. The only argument Boulette made in his § 3582(c)(1)(A) mo-
tion that could be considered an extraordinary and compelling rea-
son under § 1B1.13 was his argument that he should be released
due to the health risks posed by COVID-19, but he did not address
this argument in his brief, and it is thus forfeited before this Court.
Campbell, 26 F.4th at 873. Thus, the district court correctly deter-
mined that Boulette failed to show an extraordinary and compel-
ling reason for release, and this Court may affirm on this basis
alone. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237-38.
Additionally, the district court also did not abuse its discre-
tion in determining that compassionate release was not warranted
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20-14796 Opinion of the Court 7
under the § 3553(a) factors. The district court considered Bou-
lette’s arguments that he had worked to rehabilitate himself while
incarcerated but determined that in light of the seriousness of his
conviction of 6 felony counts, including illegal possession of a fire-
arm and possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of
methamphetamine, releasing him early would not reflect the seri-
ousness of his offenses or the needs to promote respect for the law,
provide just punishment for his past behaviors, afford adequate de-
terrence to criminal conduct in the future, or protect the commu-
nity. Because the record reflects that the district court considered
Boulette’s arguments and mitigating evidence and the district court
had broad discretion in deciding what weight it would give to the
§ 3553(a) factors, Boulette has not shown that the district court
abused its discretion in determining that compassionate release
was not warranted under the § 3553(a) factors, particularly as Bou-
lette’s sentence had already been commuted to half its original
length. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Boulette’s motion for compassionate release. Accord-
ingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
