Centro Development Corporation v. Central Mutual Insurance Company ( 2018 )


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  •            Case: 17-13489   Date Filed: 04/27/2018   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-13489
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-04037-RWS
    CENTRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    CENTRAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (April 27, 2018)
    Before TJOFLAT, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 17-13489     Date Filed: 04/27/2018    Page: 2 of 4
    Centro Development Corporation (“Centro”) appeals the dismissal of its
    complaint against Central Mutual Insurance Company for failure to state a claim
    under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Centro filed suit against its
    insurer, Central Mutual, alleging that Central Mutual wrongly denied insurance
    coverage in reliance on the policy’s pollution exclusion. The district court
    dismissed the complaint, holding that the exclusion was unambiguous and that
    storm water qualifies as a pollutant under the policy.
    We review a district court’s grant of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure
    to state a claim de novo, “accepting the complaint’s allegations as true and
    construing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff.” Chaparro v. Carnival
    Corp., 
    693 F.3d 1333
    , 1337 (11th Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
    complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
    that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    129 S. Ct. 1937
    , 1949 (2009)
    (internal quotation omitted).
    Under Georgia law, “[a]n insurer's duty to defend turns on the language of
    the insurance contract and the allegations of the complaint asserted against the
    insured.” City of Atlanta v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
    498 S.E.2d 782
    , 784
    (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). “[I]t is only where the complaint sets forth true factual
    allegations showing no coverage that the suit is one for which liability insurance
    2
    Case: 17-13489     Date Filed: 04/27/2018    Page: 3 of 4
    coverage is not afforded and for which the insurer need not provide a defense.”
    Penn-Am. Ins. Co. v. Disabled Am. Veterans, Inc., 
    268 Ga. 564
    , 565 (Ga. 1997).
    “Where the contractual language unambiguously governs the factual
    scenario before the court, the court's job is simply to apply the terms of the contract
    as written, regardless of whether doing so benefits the carrier or the insured.” Reed
    v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
    284 Ga. 286
    , 287 (Ga. 2008). In the case of a pollution
    exclusion, the pollutant at issue need not be explicitly named in the policy for the
    exclusion to apply. See Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.Co. v. Smith, 
    298 Ga. 716
    , 720
    (Ga. 2016). The question in this case is whether storm water is unambiguously
    considered a “pollutant” under the insurance policy.
    The policy at issue in this case defined pollutants as: “any solid, liquid,
    gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, soot, fumes, acids,
    alkalis, chemicals and waste.” In Owners Ins.Co. v. Lake Hills Home Owners
    Ass’n, Inc., 57 F. App’x 415 (11th. Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion), we held that
    storm water qualifies as a pollutant under the exact same language that is at issue
    in this case. Additionally, we have previously held that under the Clean Water Act
    “[w]hen rain water flows from a site where land disturbing activities have been
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    Case: 17-13489       Date Filed: 04/27/2018       Page: 4 of 4
    conducted, such as grading and clearing,” it qualifies as a pollutant. Hughey v.
    JMS Dev. Corp., 
    78 F.3d 1523
    , 1525 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996)1.
    We agree with our prior precedent that the pollution exclusion is
    unambiguous and that storm water qualifies as a pollutant under the policy.
    Therefore, the district court’s dismissal of Centro’s complaint is
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    Apparently recognizing the binding precedent holding that storm water flowing from land
    where land disturbing activities are being conducted is a pollutant, Centro argues that storm
    water alone (i.e. uncontaminated by silt or other contaminants) is not a pollutant. However, the
    underlying Meeks litigation (for which Centro demanded that Central Mutual provide a defense)
    did not involve such uncontaminated storm water. Rather, the underlying Meeks litigation
    involved storm water that caused silt and other contaminants from the adjacent property on
    which Centro was conducting land disturbing activities to harm Meeks’s property.
    4