Dorene Disanto v. Thomas L. Thomas , 693 F. App'x 860 ( 2017 )

Case: 16-11522 Date Filed: 07/17/2017 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-11522
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:15-cv-00036-LGW-RSB
DORENE DISANTO,
a.k.a. Dorene E. Thomas,
KAREN LAWSON,
Honorable, Lake County Juvenile Court,
MARGARET CARTWRIGHT,
Support Officer, Child Support Enforcement,
STATE OF OHIO,
MIKE DEWINE,
Ohio Attorney General,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
THOMAS L. THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(July 17, 2017)
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Before TJOFLAT, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Thomas L. Thomas, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order
granting the plaintiffs’ motion to remand the action back to state court, following
removal by Thomas alleged under various statutes, including 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442,
1443. The underlying complaint, filed in an Ohio state court, sought to determine
the existence or non-existence of a parent-child relationship between Thomas, who
lived in Georgia, and a minor child (the “Child”). Thomas argues that the district
court erred in denying his motion for default judgment against two alleged parties,
motion for relief from judgment, and motion to hold in contempt or sanction the
appellees’ attorney. Thomas reiterates his arguments from his prior pleadings and
string cites various cases, recites his prior-asserted grounds for removal, claims
that he proved the appellees violated § 1443, and asserts that the appellees, or
possibly the Ohio state court, acted without subject matter jurisdiction in order to
alienate the Child, who is Native American, from his tribe, and alienate Thomas,
who is also Native American, in violation of “clearly established Federal Law,”
citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911–1922.
We must independently decide whether we have appellate jurisdiction,
which we review de novo. Birmingham Fire Fighters Ass’n 117 v. City Of
Birmingham, 603 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010). Generally, we lack
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jurisdiction to review an order remanding a case to the state court from which it
was removed, if the basis for the remand is a ground listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); see New v. Sports & Recreation, Inc., 114 F.3d 1092, 1095–
96 (11th Cir. 1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), review is barred for district court
remands based on: (1) a lack of subject matter jurisdiction; or (2) a motion to
remand, filed within 30 days of the notice of removal, alleging a defect in the
removal procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Whole Health Chiropractic &
Wellness, Inc. v. Humana Med. Plan, Inc., 254 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).
However, orders remanding a case to the state court from which it was
removed pursuant to the equal-civil-rights removal provision of § 1443 are
appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); Alabama v. Conley, 245 F.3d 1292, 1293 n.1
(11th Cir. 2001). For removal under § 1443, the petitioner must show that: (1) the
right upon which he relies arises under a federal law that provides for specific civil
rights stated in terms of racial equality, and (2) he has been denied or cannot
enforce that right in state courts. Conley, 245 F.3d at 1295. Further, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1) provides an independent federal jurisdictional basis, allowing for
removal of any civil action against a U.S. officer or agency. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1); Magnin v. Teledyne Cont’l Motors, 91 F.3d 1424, 1427 (11th Cir.
1996). We will independently review the grounds on which the district court based
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its decision to remand in order to determine appellate jurisdiction. Williams v.
AFC Enters., Inc., 389 F.3d 1185, 1188 (11th Cir. 2004).
We conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand
order, as review is barred by § 1447(d). Moreover, Thomas has failed to argue for
proper removal under either §§ 1442 or 1443. While the district court based its
remand decision on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and its conclusion that
removal was not proper under §§ 1442 or 1443, we permitted Thomas’s appeal to
proceed only as to proper removal under either §§ 1442 or 1443. Williams, 389
F.3d at 1188.
First, Thomas abandoned any argument that remand is proper under either
§§ 1442 or 1443. Thomas fails to argue any issue under § 1442, where he makes
no mention of the statute other than underlining it as one of his original grounds for
removal. Magnin, 91 F.3d at 1427. While Thomas cites precedent relating to
§ 1443, he fails to provide any application or argument as to his case, and he fails
to set out any argument as to whether 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911–1922 entitled him to a
right under a federal law providing for specific civil rights regarding racial
equality. Conley, 245 F.3d at 1295. Regardless of Thomas’s pro se status, his
citations to § 1443 fail to sufficiently argue whether we should review the district
court’s order of remand. Conley, 245 F.3d at 1295; Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760
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F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, he abandoned any arguments
under §§ 1442 or 1443. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).
Second, Thomas’s remaining arguments are outside of the scope of this
appeal. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s order to remand
Thomas’s case back to the state court, and his appeal is dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c), (d); Whole Health Chiropractic & Wellness, 254 F.3d at 1319.
Thomas’s appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
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