Michael Swain v. Florida Commission on Offender Review ( 2019 )


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  •           Case: 18-12156    Date Filed: 06/17/2019   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-12156
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-23395-CMA
    MICHAEL SWAIN,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW,
    Respondent-Appellee,
    TENA M. PATE,
    Chairperson,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (June 17, 2019)
    Case: 18-12156    Date Filed: 06/17/2019   Page: 2 of 6
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Michael Swain, a Florida prisoner, appeals pro se the denial of his petition
    for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Swain argues that the Florida
    Commission on Offender Review violated his right to due process under the Fifth
    and Fourteenth Amendments by breaching a regulation that barred it from denying
    parole based on criminal charges of which he had been acquitted. Because our
    precedent establishes that the failure of the Commission to “abide by its own rules
    and regulations does not allege a constitutional violation,” Jonas v. Wainwright,
    
    779 F.2d 1576
    , 1578 (11th Cir. 1986), and, in any event, the record controverts
    Swain’s contention that the Commission violated its regulation, we affirm.
    Swain challenged the denial of parole arising from his convictions in 1976 in
    a Florida court for one count of breaking and entering a dwelling with assault, two
    counts of armed sexual battery, and two counts of robbery and his sentence of three
    terms of life imprisonment and two terms of 99 years of imprisonment. After a
    state appellate court summarily affirmed Swain’s convictions and sentence, Swain
    v. State, 
    341 So. 2d 305
    (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), the Commission set Swain’s
    presumptive parole date as June 12, 2001. Later, the Commission adjusted the
    presumptive parole date to March 6, 1999.
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    Swain attached to his federal petition a copy of a letter that the State
    Attorney’s Office submitted to the Commission protesting Swain’s release in 1999.
    In the letter, the state prosecutor described the facts underlying Swain’s sexual
    battery convictions and the facts of three other cases in which Swain was
    implicated based on his fingerprints and a statement to the police. In the three
    cases, Swain allegedly broke into homes armed with a knife and sexually assaulted
    its female occupants. The prosecutor stated that Swain had been acquitted in one of
    the three cases and that the state had nol prossed the other two cases because “the
    State and the victims were satisfied the community would be protected in light of
    [Swain’s] sentence” in 1976.
    Swain also attached to his petition the decision of the Commission in 1999
    to suspend Swain’s presumptive date for parole. The Commission found that
    Swain’s “offense involved the use of a firearm or dangerous weapon,” his “offense
    of Sexual Battery and Robbery, . . . [was] particularly heinous and cruel,” and his
    victims had suffered severe trauma. The Commission also found that Swain’s
    release posed an “unreasonable risk to others”; his mental health treatment
    evidenced that he was “in need of continued observation and treatment in a
    structured environment”; his “parole risk [was] extremely poor” on account of his
    disciplinary reports for fighting and for attempting to incite a mutinous act; and “a
    significant risk existed . . . of [Swain engaging in] future criminal behavior that
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    [might] involve crimes of sexually deviant behavior . . . hazardous to others.”
    Based on those findings, the Commission “conclude[d] that [Swain’s] conviction
    . . ., his aggressive and assaultive behavior which [was] reflected in his sexually
    deviant-type convictions and disciplinary reports . . ., [and] his lack of adequate
    treatment . . . [for] behavior that resulted in his commitments . . . demonstrated his
    unsuitability for community based supervision and [were] not conducive indicators
    for successful parole.”
    In response to Swain’s federal petition, the Commission argued that Swain
    had no right to release on parole before the expiration of his sentence; that his
    argument about the violation of a regulation was foreclosed by 
    Jonas, 779 F.2d at 1578
    ; and that it had, in any event, complied with applicable regulations when
    denying him parole. The Commission submitted copies of its decisions in 2013 and
    in 2015 that left “intact the suspension of [Swain’s] assigned Presumptive Parole
    Release Date of 3/6/1999.” In its 2013 decision, the Commission stated that it was
    denying Swain parole based on his “lack of program participation since [his] last
    review” and “[t]he serious nature of the offense,” including his “[u]se of a knife,”
    the “[p]hysical and psychological trauma to [his] victim,” his “[m]ultiple separate
    offenses,” and the “[u]nreasonable risk” he posed to society. In 2015, the
    Commission denied Swain parole based on the reasons identified in its 2013
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    decision and “[t]he insufficient programming [he had] completed to assist with
    successful re-entry into society since the last review.”
    The district court denied Swain’s petition. The district court ruled that, given
    “[t]here is no constitutional right to parole in Florida” and the decision to grant
    parole rests in the “discretion of the Commission,” 
    Jonas, 779 F.2d at 1577
    , Swain
    had to prove the Commission knowingly relied on false information, Monroe v.
    Thigpen, 
    932 F.2d 1437
    , 1442 (11th Cir. 1991), but had failed to do so. The district
    court also ruled that Swain’s argument about the Commission allegedly violating
    its regulation was foreclosed by Jonas, 
    id., and it
    rejected his argument for relief
    based on Joost v. United States Parole Commission, 
    698 F.2d 418
    (10th Cir. 1983),
    in which the court concluded that the denial of parole based on murder charges for
    which the petitioner had been acquitted would “violate[] the Commission’s own
    regulations unless [it possessed] ‘reliable information’ of guilt not introduced at
    trial . . . .” 
    Id. at 419.
    The district court concluded that Joost “conflict[ed] with . . .
    Jonas” and issued a certificate of appealability to address “whether [the] reliance
    on charges for which [Swain] was acquitted—in violation of regulations governing
    the Commission—constitutes a violation of [his] due process rights.”
    We review de novo the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
    Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 
    898 F.3d 1314
    , 1320 (11th Cir. 2018).
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    Swain concedes that his argument that the Commission violated its
    regulation in denying him parole is foreclosed by binding precedent. In Jonas, we
    held that the failure of the Commission to “abide by its own rules and regulations
    [did] not allege a constitutional 
    violation.” 779 F.2d at 1578
    . We are bound to
    follow Jonas “unless and until [it is] overruled or undermined to the point of
    abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en banc.” Hylor v. United
    States, 
    896 F.3d 1219
    , 1224 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Deshazior,
    
    882 F.3d 1352
    , 1355 (11th Cir. 2018)), cert. denied, 
    139 S. Ct. 1375
    (2019).
    Even if we were not bound by Jonas, we would still affirm the denial of
    Swain’s petition because the Commission did not violate its regulation. The record
    establishes that the Commission denied Swain parole based on the “particularly
    heinous and cruel” nature of the crimes for which he had been convicted, his use of
    a knife during those crimes, the trauma inflicted on his victims, the “unreasonable
    risk” he posed to others, and his lack of participation in programs prerequisite to
    his release. Swain submitted no evidence that the Commission denied him parole
    based on criminal charges of which he had been acquitted.
    We AFFIRM the denial of Swain’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 18-12156

Filed Date: 6/17/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/17/2019