Colleen Teague v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2018 )


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  •               Case: 18-10648     Date Filed: 08/27/2018   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-10648
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cv-00461-JSS
    COLLEEN TEAGUE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (August 27, 2018)
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, BRANCH and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Colleen Teague appeals the judgment affirming the Commissioner’s denial
    of her application for disability insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Teague
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    argues that the administrative law judge erred by relying on the vocational expert’s
    testimony that she can perform a substantial number of jobs in the national
    economy. Because Teague presented no evidence to the contrary and no objection
    to the vocational expert’s testimony, we affirm.
    We review de novo whether substantial evidence supports the administrative
    law judge’s decision. Wilson v. Barnhart, 
    284 F.3d 1219
    , 1221 (11th Cir. 2002).
    We do not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our own
    judgment for that of the administrative law judge. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc.
    Sec., 
    631 F.3d 1176
    , 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). So long as the administrative law
    judge’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, we must defer to it even if
    the evidence may preponderate against it. See Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
    
    363 F.3d 1155
    , 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004).
    A claimant is disabled if she is unable to engage in substantial gainful
    activity by reason of a medically determinable impairment that can be expected to
    result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
    of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The claimant bears the burden of
    proving her disability. Ellison v. Barnhart, 
    355 F.3d 1272
    , 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).
    To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the administrative law judge uses a
    five-step evaluation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). That is, the administrative law judge
    determines whether the claimant (1) is unable to engage in substantial gainful
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    activity; (2) has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment;
    (3) has such an impairment that meets or equals a Listing of Impairments and
    meets the duration requirements; (4) can perform her past relevant work, in light of
    her residual functional capacity; and (5) can make an adjustment to other work, in
    the light of her residual function capacity, education, and work experience. 
    Id. § 404.1520(a)(4).
    At the fifth step, the Commissioner bears the burden of proving
    that a significant number of jobs that the claimant can perform exist in the national
    economy. 
    Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180
    ; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If a
    significant number of jobs exist, then the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R.
    § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
    The administrative law judge must identify specific jobs that the claimant
    can perform, and that finding must be supported by substantial evidence. 
    Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1227
    . An administrative law judge may make this finding by posing
    hypothetical questions to a vocational expert. See 
    Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180
    . A
    vocational expert is “an expert on the kinds of jobs an individual can perform
    based on his or her capacity and impairments.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 
    357 F.3d 1232
    , 1240 (11th Cir. 2004). For the testimony of a vocational expert to constitute
    substantial evidence, the administrative law judge “must pose a hypothetical
    question which comprises all of the claimant’s impairments.” Jones v. Apfel, 
    190 F.3d 1224
    , 1229 (11th Cir. 1999). After the administrative law judge identifies
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    specific jobs that the claimant can perform, “the claimant must prove that she is
    unable to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled.” 
    Id. at 1228.
    Work exists in the national economy when it exists in significant numbers
    either in the region where the claimant lives or in several other regions of the
    country. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(a). The administrative law judge, based on the
    vocational expert’s testimony, determines whether the number of jobs is
    significant. See 
    Jones, 190 F.3d at 1230
    . We have upheld a finding that 174 small
    appliance repairman positions in the area in which the claimant resided, 1,600
    general appliance repair jobs in Georgia, and 80,000 jobs nationwide established
    the existence of work in significant numbers. Allen v. Bowen, 
    816 F.2d 600
    , 602
    (11th Cir. 1987).
    Substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge’s finding that
    Teague could perform a substantial number of jobs in the national economy. At her
    hearing before the administrative law judge, Teague challenged neither the
    hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert nor the expert’s testimony that
    she could perform the jobs of parking lot cashier, hand packager, and bagger. The
    vocational expert identified nearly 2.5 million jobs that Teague could perform in
    the national economy. Teague offered no evidence to the contrary, and she raised
    no objection to the vocational expert’s qualifications. The vocational expert’s
    unrebutted testimony—based on her experience, practice, having completed onsite
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    job analyses for the specific jobs for which she found Teague qualified, and the
    Dictionary of Occupational Titles—constituted substantial evidence that a
    significant number of jobs in the national economy existed that Teague could
    perform. See 
    Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180
    ; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). Because
    substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge’s finding that Teague
    was not disabled, we affirm. See 
    Jones, 190 F.3d at 1228
    .
    AFFIRMED.
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