United States v. Sylvester Eugene Bennett ( 2016 )


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  •            Case: 15-12634   Date Filed: 02/10/2016   Page: 1 of 3
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-12634
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 8:02-cr-00259-RAL-TGW-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    SYLVESTER EUGENE BENNETT,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (February 10, 2016)
    Before WILSON, MARTIN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 15-12634        Date Filed: 02/10/2016       Page: 2 of 3
    Sylvester Bennett appeals the revocation of his supervised release pursuant
    to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e). Bennett’s supervised release was revoked because of his
    arrest for domestic battery. He argues on appeal that the district court abused its
    discretion by not inquiring into his mental health when accepting his guilty plea
    and waiver of the revocation proceeding.
    We review a district court’s failure to sua sponte order a competency hearing
    for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Williams, 
    468 F.2d 819
    , 820 (5th Cir.
    1972) (per curiam). 1 If, at any time after the defendant begins supervised release
    but before he completes his sentence, “there is reasonable cause to believe that [he]
    may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him . . .
    unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him,”
    then the district court must sua sponte conduct a competency hearing. 
    18 U.S.C. § 4241
    (a). The information the district court has must be “sufficient to raise a
    bona fide doubt regarding the defendant’s competence.” Tiller v. Esposito, 
    911 F.2d 575
    , 576 (11th Cir. 1990).
    The test for determining competence to plead guilty is “whether the
    defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
    degree of rational understanding and whether the defendant has a rational as well
    as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” 
    Id.
     (quotation and
    1
    Decisions of the Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981, are binding on this
    Court. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
    2
    Case: 15-12634     Date Filed: 02/10/2016    Page: 3 of 3
    alterations omitted). To determine whether the district court violated the
    defendant’s procedural due process rights by failing to hold a competency hearing,
    we consider evidence of: (1) “the defendant’s irrational behavior”; (2) “the
    defendant’s demeanor” during the proceeding; and (3) “any prior medical opinion
    regarding the defendant’s competence.” 
    Id.
    Bennett argues that the district court should have held a competency hearing
    because the court had evidence that family members believed he had a mental
    illness and that his probation officer had requested that he be put in a mental health
    program. Despite this information, there was no evidence that Bennett behaved
    irrationally around the time of the revocation hearing and his demeanor was
    unexceptional. The district court repeatedly asked Bennett if he understood the
    charges against him and Bennett confirmed that he did. Beyond that, there was no
    earlier medical opinion regarding his mental competency.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to sua sponte conduct
    a competency hearing because the information known to it did not raise a bona fide
    doubt regarding Bennett’s competence. Accordingly, upon careful review, we
    affirm the revocation of Bennett’s supervised release.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-12634

Judges: Martin, Per Curiam, Rosenbaum, Wilson

Filed Date: 2/10/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024