United States v. Cin Mun Tuang ( 2019 )


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  •              Case: 18-13620   Date Filed: 07/12/2019   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-13620
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20012-MGC-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CIN MUN TUANG,
    a.k.a. Kam Sian Lian,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (July 12, 2019)
    Before TJOFLAT, BRANCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 18-13620       Date Filed: 07/12/2019       Page: 2 of 4
    Cin Mun Tuang appeals his convictions for unlawful procurement of
    citizenship or naturalization and misuse of evidence of citizenship or
    naturalization. He argues that the admission of his applications for Lawful
    Permanent Residency (“LPR”) and asylum, the jury instructions, and the
    government’s closing argument constructively amended the indictment, in
    violation of the Fifth Amendment. After review, 1 we affirm.
    A constructive amendment to an indictment occurs when the theory or
    evidence presented by the government or the jury instructions alter the essential
    elements of the offense contained in the indictment to broaden the possible bases
    for conviction beyond what is charged. United States v. Leon, 
    841 F.3d 1187
    ,
    1192 (11th Cir. 2016). Reversal is required when a district court constructively
    amended the indictment and the defendant preserved the issue for appeal. 
    Id. 1 The
    parties dispute the standard of review—the Government asserts plain-error review
    applies because Tuang failed to properly preserve his argument that the admission of evidence
    concerning his LPR and asylum applications was improper, while Tuang maintains this Court
    should review his claims de novo. The record shows Tuang objected to the Government’s
    introduction of both his LPR and asylum applications, arguing they were not relevant because
    the indictment charged him only with making false statements in the procurement of
    naturalization, not in pursuing asylum or LPR status. He did not, however, specifically argue
    that the admission of these documents—as well as the subsequent reference to them in the jury
    instructions and the Government’s closing arguments—constructively amended the indictment.
    In any case, we need not definitively resolve whether Tuang’s objection to the admission of the
    applications was sufficient to preserve for appeal his argument that the indictment was
    constructively amended, as we would affirm his convictions even under de novo review. See
    United States v. Sammour, 
    816 F.3d 1328
    , 1335 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating we review de novo
    whether an indictment was constructively amended at trial).
    2
    Case: 18-13620     Date Filed: 07/12/2019    Page: 3 of 4
    Here, the jury instructions, closing argument, and evidence did not
    constructively amend the indictment because they did not expand the essential
    elements of the offense beyond what was charged. Tuang was charged under 18
    U.S.C. § 1425(a), which makes it a crime to “knowingly procure[] or attempt[] to
    procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person, or documentary or other
    evidence of naturalization or of citizenship.” 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a). The statute
    requires the government to prove that an illegal act by the defendant played some
    role in his acquisition of citizenship. Maslenjak v. United States, 
    137 S. Ct. 1918
    ,
    1923 (2017).
    Tuang’s asylum status was a required prerequisite to attaining LPR status,
    which in turn was a required prerequisite to attaining naturalization. See 8 U.S.C.
    § 1159, 1429. Thus, the district court’s inclusion in its jury instructions that the
    conviction could be based on a finding that Tuang lied on his asylum application,
    LPR application, or naturalization application did not add bases for conviction that
    were not charged in the indictment. See 
    Leon, 841 F.3d at 1192
    . Rather, the
    instruction explained the proper bases on which a conviction under § 1425(a) may
    be found. See United States v. Chahla, 
    752 F.3d 939
    , 947 (11th Cir. 2014)
    (indicating a conviction under § 1425(a) may be based on fraudulent statements
    made to obtain a statutorily required intermediate immigration status). Likewise,
    3
    Case: 18-13620     Date Filed: 07/12/2019   Page: 4 of 4
    the government’s closing argument did not constructively amend the indictment
    because it merely repeated the jury instructions’ correct statement of the law.
    As to the admission of Tuang’s LPR and asylum applications, because
    Tuang’s alleged illegal act was making false statements, the government was
    required to prove that he lied about facts that would have mattered to an
    immigration official because they would have justified denying naturalization or
    would have led the official to conduct further investigation that would have turned
    up facts justifying that result. See 
    Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1923
    . The
    government’s introduction of Tuang’s LPR and asylum applications was relevant
    to proving that element of the offense, and it therefore did not constructively
    amend the indictment. See 
    Leon, 841 F.3d at 1192
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-13620

Filed Date: 7/12/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/12/2019