Johnson Christopher Jamerson v. Secretary, Department of Corrections ( 2017 )

Case: 16-15422 Date Filed: 10/02/2017 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
No. 16-15422
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:16-cv-01283-CEM-DAB
JOHNSON CHRISTOPHER JAMERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
BENJAMIN T. WAPPLER,
Librarian, Tomoka Correctional Institution,
CAPTAIN GODDARD,
Captain of Security, Tomoka Correctional Institution,
Defendants - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(October 2, 2017)
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Before TJOFLAT, HULL, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Johnson Jamerson, a Florida inmate proceeding pro se, appeals the District
Court’s dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim. He based his action
on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging due process and equal protection violations.
Jamerson also challenged the constitutionality of a Florida regulation that
authorizes administrative confinement of prisoners who threaten prison security.
On appeal, Jamerson only challenges the dismissal of his challenge to the
regulation.
This appeal arises from a dispute outside a prison law library. Jamerson had
a dispute with other inmates in the library. The prison librarian, Benjamin
Wappler, called security to report a disorderly inmate. Jamerson claims that he
voluntarily left the library and waited for the security staff to arrive. When
security arrived, Jamerson attempted to explain the dispute to security personnel.
However, the security personnel decided that Jamerson threatened prison security.
Thus, Jamerson was placed into administrative confinement. He was released
following a disciplinary hearing nine days later, where the charges against him
were dropped.
We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo, and accept the
allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the
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plaintiff. Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). We liberally
construe pro se pleadings and hold such pleadings to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263
(11th Cir. 1998). Appellants must clearly and specifically identify issues in their
brief, or they waive them. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678,
680 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, plaintiffs must
establish the grounds for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009);
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiffs suing under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 must show that a person deprived him or her of a right while acting
under the color of state law. Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303
(11th Cir. 2001).
Section 1983 actions require proof of three elements: (1) deprivation of a
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, (2) state action, and (3)
constitutionally inadequate process. Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th
Cir. 1994). We recognize two situations in which prisoners require due process
before being deprived of a liberty interest. See Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285,
1290–91 (11th Cir. 1999). First, prisoners must receive due process when a
change in the condition of confinement “is so severe that it essentially exceeds the
sentence imposed by the court.” Id. at 1291. Second, prisoners have a liberty
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interest where the state has consistently provided a benefit to a prisoner and
deprivation of that benefit imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The Supreme Court has held that “discipline in segregated confinement did
not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might
conceivably create a liberty interest.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995).
It reasoned that discipline in segregated confinement mirrored the conditions
imposed on other inmates, “with significant exceptions.” Id. We have held that
disciplinary sanction for two months of administrative confinement did not
implicate a protected liberty interest. See Rodgers v. Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252,
1252–53 (11th Cir. 1998).
The Florida Administrative Code states that an inmate may be placed in
administrative confinement when “disciplinary charges are pending and the inmate
needs to be temporarily removed from the general inmate population . . . to provide
for security or safety until such time as a disciplinary hearing is held.” Fla. Admin.
Code Ann. R. 33-602.220(3)(a).
Here, Jamerson failed to argue on appeal that the District Court erred in
dismissing his claim that he did not receive due process and equal protection. He
has abandoned those claims and we decline to consider them. See Sapuppo, 739
F.3d at 680. Regarding his argument that Florida Administrative Code Chapter 33-
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602.220(3)(a) violates due process, Jamerson has not shown, nor could he, that the
regulation authorizes atypical or significant deprivation, or that the process
provided in the regulation is constitutionally inadequate. After all, Jamerson
received a disciplinary hearing nine days after the incident and prison officials
released him from administrative confinement following that hearing.
AFFIRMED.
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