Case: 18-10201 Date Filed: 09/19/2018 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-10201
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cr-00275-SDM-AAS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
YOSNEL BONET,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(September 19, 2018)
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 18-10201 Date Filed: 09/19/2018 Page: 2 of 3
Yosnel Bonet pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and
ammunition after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). During the plea colloquy, he admitted that the firearm and
ammunition were manufactured outside the state of Florida, where the offense
occurred. Bonet argues for the first time on appeal that his guilty plea is invalid
because § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional both on its face, because it exceeds
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, and as applied to him, because
his conduct did not “substantially affect” interstate commerce. As Bonet concedes,
his arguments are foreclosed by binding circuit precedent. We therefore affirm. 1
It is unlawful for a person who has been convicted of a felony to, among
other things, “possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.” 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have repeatedly upheld § 922(g)(1) as a facially
constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause because
“it contains an express jurisdictional requirement.” United States v. Jordan,
635
F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Wright,
607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Scott,
263 F.3d 1270, 1273–74 (11th Cir. 2001);
United States v. McAllister,
77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996). “[T]he
jurisdictional element of the statute, i.e., the requirement that the felon ‘possess in
1
We ordinarily review de novo both the constitutionality of a statute and the validity of a
guilty plea, but we review for only plain error when these issues are raised for the first time on
appeal. See United States v. Wright,
607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Frye,
402 F.3d 1123, 1126 (11th Cir. 2005). Regardless, Bonet has not established any error, plain or
otherwise.
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Case: 18-10201 Date Filed: 09/19/2018 Page: 3 of 3
or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition,’ immunizes § 922(g)(1) from .
. . facial constitutional attack.”
Scott, 263 F.3d at 1273. Accordingly, we reject
Bonet’s argument that § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional.
Bonet’s as-applied challenge is also foreclosed. Bonet maintains that
§ 922(g) is unconstitutional as applied to purely intrastate possession of a firearm
that does not “substantially affect” interstate commerce. Under binding circuit
precedent, however, Ҥ 922(g) only requires that the government prove some
‘minimal nexus’ to interstate commerce, which it may accomplish by
‘demonstrat[ing] that the firearm possessed traveled in interstate commerce.’”
Wright, 607 F.3d at 715 (quoting
Scott, 263 F.3d at 1274). Proof that the firearm
or ammunition was manufactured outside of the state where the offense took place
satisfies this burden.
Id. Here, a “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce was
established because Bonet admitted as part of his guilty plea that the firearm and
ammunition he possessed were manufactured outside of the state of Florida, where
the offense took place, and therefore traveled in interstate commerce. See
id.
Finally, the district court did not misinform Bonet of the statute’s “in or
affecting” commerce element during the plea colloquy. Because the government
was not required to prove a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the district
court was not required to say it was. Accordingly, we affirm Bonet’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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