Case: 17-15410 Date Filed: 05/03/2018 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-15410
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:13-cr-00005-ACC-PRL-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NORMAN WYNN LEVERETTE, JR.,
a.k.a. Norman Wynn Leverette,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(May 3, 2018)
Before TJOFLAT, NEWSOM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Norman Leverette, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his post-judgment motion for credit for time-served. On appeal,
Leverette contends he is entitled to credit for time-served during the 318-day
period between April 15, 2013, and February 27, 2014, the date he received his
sentence in federal court. Leverette also asserts the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is
violating his Eighth Amendment rights by refusing to award him the requested
credit. After review, we affirm. 1
Section 3585(b)(2) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides: “A defendant shall
be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has
spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences . . . as a result
of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of
the offense for which the sentence was imposed . . . that has not been credited
against another sentence.” But it is the Attorney General through the BOP, not the
district court, that § 3585(b) empowers to compute sentence credit awards after
sentencing. United States v. Wilson,
503 U.S. 329, 333–34 (1992) (“We do not
accept Wilson’s argument that § 3585(b) authorizes a district court to award credit
at sentencing.”).
1
“We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of a statute.” See Rodriguez v.
Lamer,
60 F.3d 745, 747 (11th Cir. 1995) (involving a
28 U.S.C. § 2241 petitioner’s claim under
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) that he was entitled to credit for time-served for pretrial home confinement).
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A prisoner “is free to urge the [BOP] to credit his time served in state court
based on the District Court’s judgment that the federal sentence run concurrently
with the state sentence for the new [federal] charges.” Setser v. United States,
566
U.S. 231, 244 (2012). “If the [BOP] initially declines to do so, he may raise his
claim through the Bureau’s Administrative Remedy Program.”
Id. (citing
28
C.F.R. § 542.10 et seq. (2011)). Under that program, an inmate may “seek formal
review of an issue relating to any aspect of his/her own confinement.”
28 C.F.R.
§ 542.10(a). Typically, a prisoner must first request a remedy from the institution
where the prisoner is confined. See
28 C.F.R. §542.14. If the inmate is not
satisfied with the Warden’s response, the inmate may submit an appeal to the
appropriate Regional Director.
28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). If the inmate is dissatisfied
with the Regional Director’s response, “[a]ppeal to the General Counsel [of the
BOP] is the final administrative appeal.”
Id.
Only once a prisoner has been denied administrative relief can he seek relief
from a district court via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. United States v. Nyhuis,
211 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2000). “It is no
longer the law of this circuit that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
jurisdictional requirement in a § 2241 proceeding.” Santiago-Lugo v. Warden,
785
F.3d 467, 474–75 (11th Cir. 2015). However, the “exhaustion requirement is still a
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requirement; it’s just not a jurisdictional one. What its non-jurisdictional nature
means is that a court need not inquire into exhaustion on its own.”
Id. at 475.
Leverette has failed to demonstrate that he exhausted the administrative
remedies available to him through the BOP. Therefore, the district court did not
err in concluding it lacked the authority to grant Leverette’s request for credit for
time-served. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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