Michael Jerome Files v. FCC Coleman - USP I Warden , 576 F. App'x 938 ( 2014 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-13535
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00323-JDW-PRL
MICHAEL JEROME FILES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
FCC COLEMAN – USP I WARDEN,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(August 14, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Michael Jerome Files, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, and its denial of his motion for reconsideration of that dismissal. In Files’s
petition, he asserted that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was inadequate and ineffective to
challenge the legality of his detention because he was foreclosed from obtaining
relief in a second or successive motion based on his argument that DePierre 1
announced a new statutory interpretation of law. His underlying claim was that the
district court imposed enhanced statutory penalties on him under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b) without first having the jury determine a drug type and amount.
The district court dismissed his petition, concluding that Files’s claim did
not satisfy the savings clause of § 2255(e). Files filed a motion for reconsideration
of the dismissal, which the district court denied.
On appeal, Files argues that DePierre is retroactively applicable because it
announced a new substantive rule by narrowing the interpretation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1). He asserts that he was previously foreclosed by United States v.
Hester, 199 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2000), from raising his argument that the type
and amount of drugs are elements of the offense. However, he contends that
Hester has since been overturned by DePierre. He submits that, based on our
holding in Williams v. Warden, 713 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2013), he was not
1
DePierre v. United States, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2225, 180 L. Ed. 2d 114 (2011).
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required to show that he was actually innocent of his offenses as articulated in
Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999). Files does not raise any
arguments specific to the denial of his motion for reconsideration.
We review de novo the availability of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Cook v. Wiley, 208 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000). We review the district
court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Farris v.
United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).
A federal prisoner must typically bring any collateral attack on the validity
of his conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d
1363, 1365 (11th Cir. 2003). Once he has filed his initial § 2255 motion, he is
barred from making second and successive motions except where his claim relies
upon the existence of newly discovered evidence or a new rule of retroactively
applicable constitutional law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); United States v. Diaz-
Clark, 292 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, pursuant to § 2255(e),
known as the “savings clause,” a prisoner may file a § 2241 petition if the § 2255
remedy “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28
U.S.C. § 2255(e); Bryant v. Warden, 738 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2013). The
burden is on the movant to establish the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of the
§ 2255 remedy. Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1262. The savings clause is a jurisdictional
provision that must be met in order for the claims to survive dismissal. Id. at 1271.
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The restriction against second and successive § 2255 motions, standing
alone, cannot render § 2255’s remedy inadequate or ineffective under the savings
clause in § 2255(e). Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2011)
(en banc). Rather, we have explained that a petitioner meets this burden only
where he shows that: (1) throughout his sentencing, direct appeal, and original
§ 2255 proceeding, his claim was squarely foreclosed by our binding precedent;
(2) his current claim is based on a Supreme Court decision that overturned the
precedent that had foreclosed his claim; (3) that Supreme Court decision is
retroactively applicable on collateral review; (4) as a result of the application of the
new rule, his sentences exceed the applicable statutory maximum penalties; and
(5) the savings clause reaches his pure-Begay2 error claim of illegal detention
above the statutory maximum penalty. Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274. We explained
that a claim of illegal detention above the applicable statutory maximum penalty
was a fundamental sentencing defect within the purview of the savings clause. Id.
at 1281-84.
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court stated that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147
2
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 170 L. Ed. 2d 490 (2008).
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L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). We have stated that Apprendi does not apply retroactively on
collateral appeal. McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001).
However, in light of Apprendi, we have explained that the enhanced penalties in 21
U.S.C. § 841(b) cannot be applied unless the jury determines the drug type and
quantity involved in the drug conspiracy offenses. United States v. Sanders, 668
F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2012). In DePierre, the Supreme Court held that the
term “cocaine base,” as used in § 841(b)(1), refers to not just crack cocaine, but
any cocaine in its chemically basic form. DePierre, 564 U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct.
at 2237.
Files has not shown that he has met the requirements of the savings clause
here. The problem for Files is that his argument regarding drug type and amount is
based on Apprendi at its core. Files has already raised this argument under
Apprendi on direct appeal, and in any event, Apprendi does not apply retroactively
on collateral appeal. See McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1258. As such, Files cannot show
that the claim he seeks to raise now was squarely foreclosed throughout his direct
appeal and original § 2255 proceeding. See Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274. As Files’s
claim could not proceed under the savings clause, and he has failed to make any
additional argument specific to the denial of his motion for reconsideration on
appeal, the district court correctly denied his motion. Accordingly, we affirm.
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AFFIRMED. 3
3
Files’ motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED as moot.
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