Joyce D. Higgs v. Costa Crociere S.P.A. ( 2017 )


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  •                 Case: 16-12919        Date Filed: 12/12/2017      Page: 1 of 9
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 16-12919
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 0:15-cv-60280-JIC
    JOYCE D. HIGGS,
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    Cross Appellant,
    versus
    COSTA CROCIERE S.P.A.,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Cross Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (December 12, 2017)
    Before HULL and DUBINA, Circuit Judges and RESTANI, * Judge.
    *
    Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade,
    sitting by designation.
    Case: 16-12919       Date Filed: 12/12/2017       Page: 2 of 9
    PER CURIAM:
    Defendant/Cross-Appellee, Costa Crociere (“Costa”), appeals the district
    court’s denial of its motion for new trial on Plaintiff, Joyce Higgs’s (“Higgs”)
    negligence claim. In its motion, Costa challenged the jury verdict and the award of
    damages for future medical expenses. Higgs cross-appeals challenging the district
    court’s failure to provide a jury instruction regarding the collateral source rule.
    After reviewing the record, reading the parties briefs and having the benefit of oral
    argument, we reverse the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict and remand this
    case for a new trial.1
    I.     BACKGROUND
    In December 2015, Higgs accompanied her family on a cruise aboard a
    Costa cruise ship, the Luminere. After getting her breakfast food from the buffet
    one morning, Higgs fell as she turned from the buffet to locate a seat. Higgs’s
    daughter, Christina Bartolo (“Christina”), testified that her mother tripped over a
    bucket full of cleaning water that was left in the area. Higgs landed on her left
    shoulder and was unable to rise to her feet. Christina called for help, and several
    Costa employees assisted Higgs to the ship’s medical bay. Ultimately, Costa
    transported Higgs ashore, where she went to a hospital at Grand Turk. The
    1
    Because of our disposition on Costa’s direct appeal, we need not reach the issue
    presented in the cross-appeal.
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    medical staff took X-rays, and the doctor told her she would be okay in a sling
    until she returned to the United States in a few days. Higgs opted to return to the
    ship with her family. (R. Doc. 141-4, p. 32-37.)
    Once Higgs returned to the United States, she went home with Christina,
    who resides in Georgia, and sought medical treatment. Following more x-rays and
    evaluations, doctors diagnosed her with a fractured humerus and a torn biceps
    tendon. Two weeks after the accident, an orthopedic surgeon inserted a plate and
    twelve screws into Higgs’s shoulder. Christina testified that the surgery went well,
    but her mother was in a lot of pain.
    Higgs filed suit alleging that Costa’s negligence proximately caused her
    injury. During discovery, Higgs testified about three or four prior trip-and-fall
    accidents she had over a span of one year preceding the accident at issue. Higgs’s
    counsel filed a motion in limine to have this evidence excluded based on Federal
    Rule of Evidence 403 and to have Costa not refer to prior falls or introduce
    evidence of them until the court ruled on the motion. Then at trial, the district
    court granted the motion and ruled that the prejudicial effect of prior falls
    substantially outweighed the probative value of that evidence. Because the district
    court ruled out the prior falls evidence, the references to the prior falls and
    treatment for them in the medical records were redacted from the medical records
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    evidence introduced at trial. At the close of Higgs’s case in chief, Costa moved for
    a directed verdict as to future medical care and future medical expenses. The
    district court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
    party, Higgs, denied the Civil Procedure Rule 50 motion. Finding Costa negligent,
    the jury attributed 85% comparative fault to Costa. The jury awarded a total
    amount of $1,316,326.01, which included $16,326.01 in past medical expenses
    paid, $500,000 in past general damages, and $800,000 in future general damages
    for pain and suffering, disability, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental
    anguish, inconvenience, and loss of capacity of enjoyment of life. Costa filed a
    motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Civil
    Procedure Rule 59 which the district court denied. Costa then perfected this
    appeal.
    II. ISSUES
    The issues presented on appeal are: (1) whether the district court erred in
    denying Costa’s motion for new trial; (2) whether the district court erred in
    limiting Costa’s corporate representative to testimony that involved only his
    personal knowledge; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the
    jury’s verdict.
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    The issue raised in the cross-appeal is whether the district court erred in
    failing to instruct the jury on the collateral source rule and its application in this
    case.
    III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    This court reviews a ruling on a motion for a new trial for abuse of
    discretion. McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 
    817 F.3d 1241
    , 1255
    (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Middlebrooks v. Hillcrest Foods, Inc., 
    256 F.3d 1241
    , 1247
    (11th Cir.2001)). This court reviews the district court's grant of a motion in limine
    for abuse of discretion. Mercado v. City of Orlando, 
    407 F.3d 1152
    , 1156 (11th
    Cir. 2005).
    “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard,
    applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper
    procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly
    erroneous.” Citizens for Police Accountability Political Comm. v. Browning, 
    572 F.3d 1213
    , 1216–17 (11th Cir. 2009).
    IV. DISCUSSION
    In her pre-trial deposition, Higgs testified about several prior trips and/or
    falls she had over a span of one year preceding the accident at issue. She attributed
    her tripping accidents to her failure to step high enough (pick up her feet). Her
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    medical records also document several falls, and her Facebook post notes that she
    has the ability to “trip over completely nothing.” Higgs’s counsel moved to have
    this evidence excluded, arguing that it was unduly prejudicial under Civil
    Procedure Rule 403. The district court agreed and granted the motion.
    A district court’s decision to exclude evidence is “an extraordinary remedy
    which should be used sparingly,” and the court may exclude relevant evidence
    “only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value.” United
    States v. King, 
    713 F.2d 627
    , 631 (11th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). Thus, “the
    balance should be struck in favor of admissibility,” and courts must “maximize[e]
    [the evidence’s] probative value and minimiz[e] its undue prejudicial impact,”
    United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 
    607 F.3d 720
    , 734 (11th Cir. 2010). Thus, a
    district court’s “discretion to exclude evidence under Rule 403 is narrowly
    circumscribed.” United States v. Smith, 
    459 F.3d 1276
    , 1295 (11th Cir. 2006).
    In our view, the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of
    Higgs’s prior falls because its probative value was greater than any possible
    prejudice. The evidence of prior falls provides a possible explanation for her harm
    other than Costa’s negligence. “The defendant’s ability to present alternate causes
    is of paramount importance in allowing for an adequate defense.” Aycock v. R.J.
    Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
    769 F.3d 1063
    , 1069-70 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that
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    because under Florida law, a plaintiff has the burden on all four elements of
    negligence, courts treat evidence presented by plaintiffs differently than evidence
    produced by defendants to rebut causation). The evidence was relevant and
    probative of Higgs’s knowledge with regard to the cause of her fall. Causation was
    an issue at trial, as well as the liability of each party, and the damages. Higgs had
    the burden of proving causation, and Costa was unable to challenge sufficiently her
    causative theory because it was unable to present this evidence to diminish its
    liability.
    We also conclude that the evidence of prior falls was relevant to the
    determination of comparative fault. The jury found Costa 85% liable and Higgs
    15% liable, and the jury’s allocation of fault would have been different if it had
    heard evidence of Higgs’s prior falls. This evidence was also relevant to damages
    because it would show her pre-existing conditions and her propensity to fall.
    The error committed by the district court was also compounded by the fact
    that, during his final rebuttal closing argument, Higgs’s counsel stated several
    times to the jury that Higgs had “never fallen before” and that “she didn’t fall
    down and stumble all the time.” Higgs’s counsel also told the jury: “Did you know
    Ms. Higgs has never fallen before, never been injured, never had an accident
    before?” Because Costa’s counsel was unable to rebut this, Costa suffered
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    substantial prejudice and did not receive a fair trial. Accordingly, we reverse the
    judgment entered on the jury’s verdict and remand this case for a new trial.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
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    DUBINA, Circuit Judge, concurring.
    I concur fully in the judgment of the court but write specially to add a
    second reason for reversing the district court’s judgment: the jury’s award of $1.3
    million substantially exceeds the evidence of damages presented at trial. Contrary
    to the district court’s findings, there was not “extensive evidence regarding
    Higgs‘[s] painful surgery, unsightly scar, months of therapy, persistent pain and
    discomfort, limitations on performing daily activities, impaired ability to play with
    her grandchildren and to enjoy her hobbies, and fear of needing future treatment.”
    (R. Doc. 153, p. 4.) Thus, I conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
    allowing such an excessive verdict based on the scant evidence of pain, suffering,
    past medical expenses, and future medical expenses. The award is more than 25
    times the amount of out-of-pocket expenses Higgs incurred as a result of the
    accident. Accordingly, I would also reverse the judgment of the district court
    based on the excessive verdict.
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