Olena Goncharenko v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD ( 2018 )


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  •             Case: 17-13069   Date Filed: 05/10/2018   Page: 1 of 8
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-13069
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-21461-RNS
    OLENA GONCHARENKO,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD.,
    a Liberian Corporation,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (May 10, 2018)
    Before WILSON, JULIE CARNES, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 17-13069      Date Filed: 05/10/2018   Page: 2 of 8
    In this cruise ship personal injury case, Plaintiff Olena Goncharenko appeals
    the district court’s order striking her expert witnesses and the subsequent order of
    summary judgment against her. We affirm.
    I. The Incident
    Goncharenko was a passenger on the Royal Caribbean cruise ship Anthem of
    the Seas. While aboard, she went to an upper deck to get some ice cream. There
    was a video camera on this upper deck. That camera captured the incident that
    gave rise to the suit. The recording is in the record, but for context, we give a brief
    overview of what it shows.
    As Goncharenko walked toward the ice cream machine, she encountered a
    crewman. The crewman began to open two small metal swinging doors at the top
    of the ice cream machine, both roughly at eye level. As the crewman began to
    open these doors, he paused when he saw Goncharenko, and he physically pointed
    at the doors. Then, another passenger tapped Goncharenko on the shoulder and
    likewise pointed to the doors. Goncharenko grasped one of the opening doors in
    unison with the crewman and assisted him in opening the door.
    Goncharenko then bent under the now-open doors and retrieved some ice
    cream from the container below. Ice cream in hand, she walked away from the ice
    cream machine. Then, as she walked toward the stairs to the side of the ice cream
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    machine, she struck one of the open doors’ corners with her head, allegedly
    causing injury.
    II. Striking Expert Witnesses
    We review a trial court’s “decision to admit or exclude expert testimony for
    abuse of discretion.” Tampa Bay Water v. HDR Eng’g, Inc., 
    731 F.3d 1171
    , 1178
    (11th Cir. 2013). A party must “disclose to the other parties the identity of any
    witness it may use at trial to present” expert testimony. Fed. R. Civ. P.
    26(a)(2)(A). At a minimum, this disclosure must also state (i) “the subject matter
    on which the witness is expected to present evidence,” and (ii) “a summary of the
    facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify.” 1 Fed. R. Civ. P.
    26(a)(2)(C).
    Here, the district court’s scheduling order required expert disclosures by
    February 8, 2017. On that day, Goncharenko sent an email purporting to be an
    expert witness disclosure. The email did not include the names of any witnesses,
    but stated: “At trial, the only witnesses whom I may ask to provide expert opinions
    are the medical providers whose records you have received through the discovery
    process.” As to subject matter, facts, and opinions, the email merely stated that
    1
    If the expert is “one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or
    one whose duties as the party’s employee regularly involve giving expert testimony,” the party
    must provide a written report from that expert. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Royal Caribbean
    insinuates that this elevated requirement applies in this case. It does not matter which Rule
    applies here, because the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Goncharenko
    did not meet the lower Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosure requirement.
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    such information “is contained in their records and reports that you have received
    through discovery. In addition, all these witnesses will testify that the accident on
    the Defendant’s ship . . . caused the injuries described in the medical
    records/reports.” Two days later (which was two days late under the scheduling
    order), Goncharenko sent a letter, stating: “This is our list of medical witness [sic]
    for trial.” It listed five people and their contact information and also listed
    “Anthems of the Sea Infirmary.” It contained no additional information.
    More than a month later, after Royal Caribbean moved to strike the expert
    witnesses, Goncharenko sent another email, this time purporting to amend her
    earlier expert disclosure. This email listed three people, and had one additional
    sentence: “In addition to what he wrote in his reports, Dr. Golzad will also testify
    that the Plaintiff’s traumatic brain injury is a permanent injury.”
    The magistrate judge granted Royal Caribbean’s motion to strike.
    Goncharenko objected to and appealed from the magistrate judge’s order, and the
    district court affirmed.
    We do not find an abuse of discretion in the district court’s striking of the
    expert witnesses. Goncharenko complied with neither the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure nor the district court’s scheduling order in her attempt to disclose her
    expert witnesses. The only timely purported disclosure did not even include
    names. In fact, it contained almost no information, except a reference to the
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    “records and reports that [Royal Caribbean] received through discovery.”
    Allowing this type of vague reference defeats the purpose of the Federal Rules, and
    “would invite a party to dump voluminous medical records on the opposing party,
    contrary to the rule’s attempt to extract a ‘summary.’” Jones v. Royal Caribbean
    Cruises, Ltd., No. 12-20322-civ, 
    2013 WL 8695361
    , at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2013).
    Therefore, we affirm the district court’s decision to strike the witnesses. See
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (“If a party fails to provide information or identify a
    witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that
    information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial,
    unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.”). 2
    III. Summary Judgment
    A. Failure to Warn
    Following its striking of the expert witnesses, the district court granted
    summary judgment in favor of Royal Caribbean. We review a grant of summary
    judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    nonmoving party. Jurich v. Compass Marine, Inc., 
    764 F.3d 1302
    , 1304 (11th Cir.
    2014) (per curiam); see also Am. Dredging Co. v. Lambert, 
    81 F.3d 127
    , 129 (11th
    Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as
    2
    We likewise find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to find a substantial
    justification or harmlessness.
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    to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    
    Jurich, 764 F.3d at 1304
    .
    Under federal maritime law, we rely on “general principles of negligence
    law,” under which a negligence plaintiff must show duty, breach, causation, and
    damages. Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 
    693 F.3d 1333
    , 1336 (11th Cir. 2012) (per
    curiam). A cruise ship operator owes its passengers a duty of “ordinary reasonable
    care under the circumstances.” Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 
    867 F.2d 1318
    ,
    1322 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). This includes a duty to warn of known
    dangers that are not open and obvious. Rocamonde v. Marshalls of MA, Inc., 
    56 So. 3d 863
    , 865 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011);3 see also Frasca v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd.,
    654 F. App’x 949, 952 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); Isbell v. Carnival Corp, 
    462 F. Supp. 2d 1232
    , 1237 (S.D. Fla. 2006). We apply an objective reasonable person
    test to determine whether a hazard is open and obvious. Frasca, 654 F. App’x at
    952.
    Here, the district court found that “a reasonable trier of fact could not find
    that Royal Caribbean had a duty to warn Goncharenko of the fact that the doors
    were open.” Regardless of whether it had a duty to warn, Royal Caribbean did
    3
    “Where a case arises in admiralty, we apply the general maritime law . . . . However, when
    neither statutory nor judicially created maritime principles provide an answer to a specific legal
    question, courts may apply state law provided that the application of state law does not frustrate
    national interests in having uniformity in admiralty law.” Sea Byte, Inc. v. Hudson Marine
    Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 
    565 F.3d 1293
    , 1298 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks
    omitted); see also Luby v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 
    633 F. Supp. 40
    , 41 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1986)
    (applying rule in similar case).
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    actually warn Goncharenko of the doors. The crewman stopped opening the doors
    when he saw Goncharenko, and he physically pointed out the opening doors. A
    personal warning surely satisfies any duty Royal Caribbean had on this matter. 4
    We therefore affirm on this issue.
    B. Other Issues
    We may affirm a grant of summary judgment for any reason supported by
    the record. Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 
    555 F.3d 949
    , 960 (11th Cir. 2009).
    “When the causal link between alleged injuries and the incident at issue is not
    readily apparent to a lay person, expert medical testimony as to medical causation
    is typically required.” Rivera v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 711 F. App’x 952,
    954 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
    As to all of her negligence theories, Goncharenko cannot show proximate
    causation, and this is fatal to her case.5 Even though she has a report of a doctor
    that appears to have been properly disclosed, see Doc. 53 at 7, Doc. 51-5 at 23, and
    even though that report opines that Goncharenko’s alleged injuries are “causally
    related to the injury of record,” we have already affirmed the district court’s ruling
    striking all expert witnesses. Thus, any such statement would be inadmissible.
    See, e.g., Gordon v. Wal-Mart Supercenter, No. 08-00527-CG, 
    2009 WL 3850288
    ,
    4
    We thus decline to reach the open and obvious issue.
    5
    She acknowledges as much in her brief. See Reply Br. at 14 (noting that striking the expert
    witnesses is an “extreme, case-ending sanction” (emphasis added)).
    7
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    at *8 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 12, 2009) (“However, since this court has established above
    that the treating physicians are not allowed to testify as experts, any statements in
    the medical records unrelated to the treatment of plaintiff, including any statements
    as to the causation of plaintiff’s injuries, is not admissible under Rule 803(4).”).
    Accordingly, Goncharenko cannot meet her burden as to medical causation
    for any of her claims. We therefore affirm the district court’s entry of summary
    judgment against her.
    IV. Conclusion
    For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district court’s order striking
    the expert witnesses and the district court’s entry of summary judgment against
    Goncharenko.
    AFFIRMED.
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