United States v. Jenny Mejia De Hernandez , 389 F. App'x 932 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-15116 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 27, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-20290-CR-JAL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JENNY MEJIA DE HERNANDEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 27, 2010)
Before EDMONSON, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jenny Mejia de Hernandez (“Mejia”) appeals her convictions and sentences
for conspiracy to deliver firearms to a common carrier without notice and to export
firearms, delivery of firearms to a common carrier without notice, and illegally
exporting firearms. Mejia makes three arguments on appeal. First, she challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to all of her convictions. Second, she
argues that the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument, which she did not
object to at the time, were improper because they referred to her right to remain
silent. Third, she challenges the application of U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2(a)(1) to set her
base offense level.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal on sufficiency of evidence grounds. United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d
1229, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007). In determining whether sufficient evidence supports
a conviction, we “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government and decide whether a reasonable fact finder could have reached a
conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Herrera, 931
F.2d 761, 762 (11th Cir. 1991). Furthermore, a “jury’s verdict cannot be
overturned if any reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed the
jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.2
To establish conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt “(1) an agreement among two or more persons to
achieve an unlawful objective; (2) knowing and voluntary participation in the
agreement; and (3) an overt act by a conspirator in furtherance of the agreement.”
United States v. Ellington, 348 F.3d 984, 989 (11th Cir. 2003). To prove
participation in a conspiracy, the government must have proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed and that the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily joined the conspiracy. United States v. Charles, 313 F.3d 1278, 1284
(11th Cir. 2002). The government need not prove that the defendants knew all of
the details or participated in every aspect of the conspiracy. Id. at 1284. Rather,
the government must only prove that the defendants “knew the essential nature of
the conspiracy.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Whether Mejia knowingly volunteered to join the conspiracy may be proven
by “direct or circumstantial evidence, including inferences from the conduct of the
alleged participants or from circumstantial evidence of a scheme.” United States v.
Garcia, 405 F.3d 1260, 1270 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation and quotations omitted).
“Indeed, because the crime of conspiracy is predominantly mental in composition,
it is frequently necessary to resort to circumstantial evidence to prove its
elements.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).
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In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to deliver or cause to be
delivered to any common or contract carrier for transportation or
shipment in interstate or foreign commerce, to persons other than
licensed importers, licensed manufacturers, licensed dealers, or
licensed collectors, any package or other container in which there is
any firearm or ammunition without written notice to the carrier that
such firearm or ammunition is being . . . shipped.
18 U.S.C. § 922(e).
Section 554(a) provides that:
Whoever fraudulently or knowingly exports or sends from the United
States, or attempts to export or send from the United States, any
merchandise, article, or object contrary to any law or regulation of the
United States, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner
facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such
merchandise, article or object, prior to exportation, knowing the same
to be intended for exportation contrary to any law or regulation of the
United States, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than
10 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 554(a).
Here, the evidence supports the jury’s guilty verdict with respect to all of the
convicted counts. The evidence presented at trial showed that Mejia worked
closely with others to purchase a number of firearms for export and to deliver
several of the purchased firearms to a common carrier without notice to the
common carrier that weapons were delivered, and that several of these firearms
were actually exported by the common carrier. Viewing this evidence in the light
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most favorable to the government, we hold that a reasonable construction of the
evidence would have allowed the jury to find the Defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Herrera, 931 F.2d at 762. We therefore reject Mejia’s argument
that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain her conviction.
II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Mejia argues that the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument
attempted to shift the burden of proof and constituted impermissible comment on
Mejia’s failure to testify. While we generally review a prosecutorial-misconduct
claim de novo, see United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 947 (11th Cir. 2006),
because Mejia did not object to the government’s statements during trial, we will
review her challenge only for plain error, see United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d
1298, 1302 n.5 (11th Cir. 1998). Under the plain error standard, “there must be (1)
an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States v.
Williams, 469 F.3d 963, 966 (11th Cir. 2006). “If these three conditions are met,
we may notice the error only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we examine the context of
the entire trial to determine whether the prosecutor’s statements (1) were improper,
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and (2) prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the defendant. Wilson,
149 F.3d at 1301. A direct reference to a defendant’s failure to testify clearly
violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, entitling
her to a new trial, but an indirect reference to such failure is not reversible error per
se. United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 612-14, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 1232-33 (1965) (prohibiting
comments that suggest that a defendant’s silence is “evidence of guilt”)). Instead,
the impact of the statement must be assessed in terms of the context in which it was
made. Norton, 867 F.2d at 1364. A comment will not be deemed an
impermissible reference to a defendant’s silence unless “(1) it was the prosecutor’s
manifest intention to refer to the defendant’s silence or (2) the remark was of such
a character that the jury would ‘naturally and necessarily’ take it to be a comment
on the defendant’s silence.” Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, it is not improper
to comment on the failure of the defense, as opposed to the defendant, to counter or
explain the evidence. United States v. Chirinos, 112 F.3d 1089, 1100 (11th Cir.
1997).
To meet the substantial prejudice prong, the improper comments must have
“so infect[ed] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial
of due process.” United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1206 (11th Cir. 1991)
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(quotation omitted). We have stated that “[a] defendant’s substantial rights are
prejudicially affected when a reasonable probability arises that, but for the
remarks, the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Eckhardt, 466 F.3d
at 947. “When the record contains sufficient independent evidence of guilt, any
error is harmless.” Id.
Here, the prosecutor’s remarks did not specifically reference Mejia’s failure
to testify, the statements do not show a “manifest intent” to refer to her silence, and
the statements could not be interpreted as such comments. Instead, the government
implicitly commented on the failure of the defense, rather than the failure of the
defendant, to counter or explain the evidence. As such, we discern no plain error
in the prosecutor’s comments.
III. BASE OFFENSE LEVEL
Third, Mejia argues that application of § 2M5.2(a)(1), which set her base
offense level at 26, was improper because only ten firearms were recovered from
the sofa and television and therefore her base offense level should have been 14.
U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2(a)(1) (directing that the base offense level for exportation of
arms, munitions, or military equipment or services without required validated
export licence shall be 26). We decline to address this argument because Mejia
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withdrew this objection before the district court and conceded that § 2M5.2(a)(1)
applied, thereby inviting any error. See United States v. Masters, 118 F.3d 1524,
1526 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that where, as here, a defendant raises and then
knowingly withdraws an objection to her sentence, the objection may be deemed
waived and will not be reviewed on appeal); United States v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970,
988 (11th Cir. 1997) (“It is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not
challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party.”). In any
event, her sentencing challenge lacks merit because the record shows that her
offense involved more than 10 firearms, and, in fact, involved more than 100,
which she readily conceded at sentencing. Thus, she is not entitled to application
of § 2M5.2(a)(2), which reduces the base offense level to 14 “if the offense
involved only non-fully automatic small arms (rifles, handguns, or shotguns), and
the number of weapons did not exceed ten.”
Accordingly, we affirm Mejia’s convictions and sentences.
AFFIRMED.1
1
Appellant’s request for oral argument is DENIED.
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