United States v. Brandon Keith Gallander ( 2015 )

Case: 14-15255 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-15255
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-14044-KAM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BRANDON KEITH GALLANDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 16, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 14-15255 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 Page: 2 of 6
Defendant Brandon Keith Gallander pled guilty to one count of receiving
and distributing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and
(b)(1). The district court imposed a sentence of 222 months, which was below the
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Defendant appeals, arguing that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable because his history and personal
characteristics justify a greater downward variance, because the district court gave
too little weight to the arbitrary nature of the child pornography guidelines, and
because the court placed undue emphasis on unsubstantiated acts of past
misconduct. After review, we affirm.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion using
a two-step process. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008).
We look first to whether the district court committed any significant procedural
error and then at whether the sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of the
totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. 1 Id. Although in
choosing the sentence, the district court must consider the § 3553(a) factors, the
district court is not required to address each factor separately. United States v.
1
The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9)
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to
victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
2
Case: 14-15255 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 Page: 3 of 6
Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 2006). The party challenging the sentence
bears the burden of showing that it is unreasonable. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1189. We
will reverse only if “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court
committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving
at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
facts of the case.” Id. at 1191 (quotation marks omitted).
Here, Defendant has identified no procedural errors nor has he shown that
his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Defendant’s 222-month sentence is
below his advisory guideline range of 240 months’ imprisonment. Our precedent
indicates that we ordinarily expect a within-guideline sentence to be reasonable.
See United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that,
while we do not apply a presumption, we ordinary expect a sentence inside the
advisory guidelines range to be reasonable). It logically follows then that
Defendant’s more lenient, below-guideline-range sentence enjoys an even more
robust expectation of reasonableness, at least with respect to his argument that his
sentence was too harsh. Additionally, Defendant’s sentence is below the 240-
month statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1). See United States v.
Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing the fact that the sentence
imposed was well below the statutory maximum as an indication of
reasonableness).
3
Case: 14-15255 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 Page: 4 of 6
In determining that only a 18-month downward variance was warranted
(instead of the 60-month variance Defendant had requested), the district court
specifically acknowledged Defendant’s disturbing behavior in connection with the
offense relating to his ten-year-old daughter, Defendant’s troubled past,
Defendant’s past actions involving his ex-wife, and the court’s general agreement
with the defense that the guidelines in child pornography cases were generally
greater than necessary to provide just punishment. Specifically, the district court
explained that it was “somewhat torn” between its normal practice of varying
downward in child pornography cases because it thought the guidelines were too
severe, and its concern that, in light of Defendant’s comments regarding his
daughter and his past actions involving his ex-wife, he posed a danger to the
community. However, the district court ultimately concluded that, in light of
Defendant’s troubled past, which probably contributed to his behavior, a sentence
that was slightly below the guideline range would be sufficient, but not greater
than necessary to comply with the § 3553(a) factors.
Defendant has certainly had a troubled past, which he says included being
regularly raped by his stepbrother while Defendant was between the ages of two
and twelve years old, with his parents doing nothing more than seek counseling;
drug abuse by both Defendant and his mother; abandonment by his mother; and
subsequent sexual abuse at the hands of an older man. But we discern no abuse of
4
Case: 14-15255 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 Page: 5 of 6
discretion in the district court’s determination that these facts, as well as the
severity of the child pornography guidelines, did not warrant a greater downward
variance when balanced against Defendant’s willingness to involve his daughter in
the present offense and his past actions involving his ex-wife, which raised
concerns for the district court regarding Defendant’s future danger to the
community. See United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating
that “[t]he weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed
to the sound discretion of the district court.” (quotation marks omitted)).
Specifically, Defendant exploited his minor daughter in order to obtain child
pornography. In chats with people with whom he was seeking to share child
pornography, Defendant discussed “playing with” his daughter, but not penetrating
her; sent her picture to other people; offered that an individual could do whatever
he wanted with Defendant’s daughter, including have rough sex with her; and
sought help accessing his old email address so that he could find a naked picture of
his daughter that he had previously shared. Defendant also solicited eight or nine
individuals to come to his house and rape his then-wife, whom he planned to first
drug. When arrested for the offense involving his wife, Defendant admitted his
action and was allowed to complete a pretrial diversion program. As the district
court acknowledged, Defendant’s chats regarding his daughter were probably
fantasy, and he perhaps did not have the ready ability to subject his daughter to that
5
Case: 14-15255 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 Page: 6 of 6
type of abuse because her mother had custody. However, such behavior
understandably raises concerns about Defendant’s mental state and his potential for
future criminal conduct.
Contrary to Defendant’s argument, a greater downward variance is not
needed to avoid disparities in sentencing similarly-situated defendants. Defendant
points to United States v. Riley, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (applying a
downward variance to 60 months from a range of 210-240 months in part because
the offender had no criminal history and had a low risk of reoffending), and United
States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding a downward
variance to 84 months from a guideline range of 151-188 months when the
defendant had a “clean criminal record,” even though he previously molested
several children). While these cases are similar and demonstrate that we will
uphold a term less that that imposed in the present case, they do not show that
Defendant’s sentence is outside of the reasonable range of sentences. Moreover,
unlike the defendants in Riley and McBride, Defendant had several previous
convictions, placing him in criminal history category III, and, as the district court
noted, his fantasies about his daughter created a realistic potential for future harm.
For all these reasons, Defendant has not met his burden to show that his 222-
month sentence is substantively unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
6