USCA11 Case: 21-10463 Date Filed: 09/14/2021 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 21-10463
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-14381-BB
DARRELL MARK BABCOCK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ANDREA L. OLSON,
Deputy, Martin County Sheriff's Office in individual capacity,
WAYNE R. TROCAN,
Deputy, Martin County Sheriff's Office in individual capacity,
MARTIN COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, SHERIFF,
William D. Snyder, Sheriff in individual and official capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(September 14, 2021)
USCA11 Case: 21-10463 Date Filed: 09/14/2021 Page: 2 of 7
Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Darrell Babcock appeals the sua sponte dismissal of his pro se
42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 complaint against Deputies Andrea Olson and Wayne Trocan and Sheriff
William Snyder of the Martin County Sheriff’s Office. He asserts that the district
court erred in finding that his amended complaint failed to raise allegations that
state a plausible claim that defendants Olson and Trocan violated his Fourth
Amendment right to privacy when they entered his property without a warrant in
response to an anonymous call reporting an ongoing fight. The district court
dismissed Babcock’s claim under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). After careful
review, we affirm.1
A failure-to-state-a-claim analysis under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
governed by the same standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mitchell v. Farcass,
112 F.3d 1483,
1490 (11th Cir. 1997). A complaint fails to state a claim when it fails “to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
1
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim.
Brown v. Johnson,
387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004). When an appeal arises from a motion
to dismiss, we accept the allegations in the complaint as true, construing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Taylor v. Polhill,
964 F.3d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 2020). We liberally
construe pro se pleadings and hold them to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by
attorneys but require them to conform to procedural rules. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007); Albra v. Advan, Inc.,
490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
2
USCA11 Case: 21-10463 Date Filed: 09/14/2021 Page: 3 of
7
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). The Federal Rules don’t require that specific facts be pleaded for
every element of every claim, but complaints must “contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a
recovery under some viable legal theory.” Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens,
Inc.,
500 F.3d 1276, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2007).
In order to state a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plead that
he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States
and that the alleged deprivation was committed under the color of state law. Am.
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,
526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999). We have held that a Fourth
Amendment claim for an illegal search is cognizable under § 1983. See Hughes v.
Lott,
350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003).
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The police may not conduct a warrantless
search or arrest in one’s home absent exigent circumstances. Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). Exigent circumstances exist when there is “no time to
secure a warrant” and a “compelling need for official action,” such as “risk of harm
3
USCA11 Case: 21-10463 Date Filed: 09/14/2021 Page: 4 of 7
to the public or the police.” United States v. Holloway,
290 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th
Cir. 2002). The most urgent of these exigencies is “the need to protect or preserve
life” in an emergency.
Id. at 1335. For the exception to apply, the government
must demonstrate that the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that an
individual in the home was either seriously injured or threatened with such an
injury. See Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 402–03, 406 (2006).
We have found “police officers’ belief that someone inside a home needs
immediate assistance [is] objectively reasonable” where there are “indicia of an
urgent, ongoing emergency,” as where “officers have received emergency reports
of an ongoing disturbance, arrived to find a chaotic scene, and observed violent
behavior, or at least evidence of violent behavior.” United States v. Timmann,
741
F.3d 1170, 1179 (11th Cir. 2013). The exigent-circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement applies even where police, in responding to an emergency,
must act based on hurried, incomplete, or “ambiguous information concerning
potentially serious consequences.” Holloway,
290 F.3d at 1339 (quoting 3 Wayne
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(a), at 391 (3d ed.1996)). While anonymous tips
without indicia of reliability may not be reliable enough to justify investigatory
stops in the absence of an emergency, Florida v. J.L.
529 U.S. 266, 270–71 (2000),
“when an emergency is reported by an anonymous caller, the need for immediate
4
USCA11 Case: 21-10463 Date Filed: 09/14/2021 Page: 5 of 7
action may outweigh the need to verify the reliability of the caller.” Holloway,
290
F.3d at 1339.
Here, the district court didn’t err in dismissing Babcock’s complaint with
prejudice. The court properly concluded that the facts that Babcock alleged
demonstrated that Deputies Olson and Trocan acted under exigent circumstances in
entering Babcock’s backyard. The amended complaint describes an anonymous
call detailing a “full on fight” originating in Babcock’s backyard and a woman
repeatedly yelling “stop” along with the presence of banging noises. Even though
Deputies Olson and Trocan didn’t see evidence of violence when they arrived six
minutes later, they had an objectively reasonable belief based on this anonymous
call that a woman was in danger of serious bodily harm. The caller’s description
of the scene as a “full on fight” combined with the woman repeatedly yelling stop
and the presence of banging noises provided a sufficient basis for the deputies to
reasonably conclude that there was a serious threat to the woman’s life constituting
an ongoing emergency. Cf. Brigham City, 547 U.S.at 406. Acting on their
reasonable belief that someone was in serious danger, Deputies Olson and Trocan
swept the backyard for evidence of violence and found the pop-up camper.
Babcock asserts that Olson and Trocan had a duty to corroborate the
anonymous call prior to entering the curtilage of his home. But when an
emergency involving a serious threat to human life has been reported by an
5
USCA11 Case: 21-10463 Date Filed: 09/14/2021 Page: 6 of 7
anonymous caller, officers may be justified in taking immediate action even
without corroborating the report. See Holloway,
290 F.3d at 1339. Moreover, the
banging noises audible on the phone call corroborated the existence of a physical
fight. Overall, this situation required the deputies to act based on a prompt
assessment of hurried and incomplete information concerning potentially serious
consequences, in a close parallel to the situation in Holloway, which upheld the
constitutionality of the warrantless search.
290 F.3d at 1339. “Although the
Fourth Amendment protects the sanctity of the home, its proscription against
warrantless searches must give way to the sanctity of human life.”
Id. at 1337.
Finally, Babcock argues that the deputies violated his Fourth Amendment
rights by remaining on his curtilage and questioning him for four hours, after the
exigency had passed. This argument fails. It’s true that “a warrantless search must
be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.” Mincey v.
Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978). But here, the deputies discovered, shortly after
arriving at Babcock’s property, a teenage girl with a bloodied leg, and Babcock
showed the deputies a video of the girl holding a knife to her own throat while
Babcock berated her. See United States v. Babcock,
924 F.3d 1180, 1185 (11th
Cir. 2019). The deputies were therefore justified in remaining on the property to
investigate further by questioning Babcock and the girl.
* * *
6
USCA11 Case: 21-10463 Date Filed: 09/14/2021 Page: 7 of 7
In sum: Because the facts as alleged by Babcock describe exigent
circumstances that justify warrantless entry into the curtilage of his home, and the
deputies didn’t exceed the scope of the exigency, his amended complaint fails to
plead a facially plausible case that Deputies Olson and Trocan violated his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. Therefore, the district court properly concluded that Babcock’s
complaint didn’t adequately state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Accordingly, the court did not err in dismissing the complaint under
28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
AFFIRMED.
7
