Christopher Lawrence v. Governor of Georgia ( 2018 )


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  •            Case: 17-11564   Date Filed: 01/02/2018   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-11564
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-02406-LMM
    CHRISTOPHER LAWRENCE,
    OLIVIA M. PONTOO,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    GOVERNOR OF GEORGIA,
    ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF GEORGIA,
    PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (January 2, 2018)
    Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 17-11564     Date Filed: 01/02/2018    Page: 2 of 5
    Christopher Lawrence and Olivia Pontoo, both proceeding pro se, appeal the
    district court’s dismissal without prejudice of their action under the Truth in
    Lending Act (“TILA”), 
    15 U.S.C. § 1601
     et seq., and the Real Estate Settlement
    Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 
    12 U.S.C. § 2601
     et seq., against federal government
    officials and judges, Georgia state government officials and judges, and Aldridge
    Pite LLP (“AP”). Lawrence and Pontoo argue that the magistrate judge usurped
    his authority granted by the United States Constitution by issuing a Report and
    Recommendation (“R &R”) on the appellees’ motions to dismiss. Lawrence and
    Pontoo further argue that the district court abused its discretion by granting AP’s
    motion to stay pretrial deadlines and procedures while motions to dismiss were
    pending. We address each of Lawrence and Pontoo’s arguments in turn.
    I.    The Magistrate Judge’s Involvement
    We review de novo questions of law. See Thomas v. Whitworth, 
    136 F.3d 756
    , 758 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that the issue of whether a magistrate judge may
    conduct jury selection in a civil case without the parties’ consent is a “question[] of
    law that must be examined de novo.”).
    Title 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (b)(1)(A) provides that a district court “may designate
    a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the
    court, except a motion . . . , for summary judgment, . . . , [and] to dismiss for
    failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 28 U.S.C.
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    § 636(b)(1)(A). Section 636(b)(1)(B) permits the district court to “designate a
    magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit
    to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the
    disposition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph (A).”
    § 636(b)(1)(B). This structure of review is constitutionally permissible because the
    district court retains “total control and jurisdiction” and “exercises the ultimate
    authority to issue an appropriate order.” Thomas v. Arn, 
    474 U.S. 140
    , 153 (1985)
    (quotations and citations omitted).
    Moreover, Northern District of Georgia Standing Order 14-01 provides that,
    as relevant here, in claims brought under TILA and RESPA, district court judges
    must designate magistrate judges to “hear and determine any pretrial matters
    pending before the Court and to conduct hearings and submit reports and
    recommendations to the full extent allowed by 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (b)(1)(A) and (B).”
    N.D. Ga. Standing Ord. 14-01.
    At the outset, we note that because Lawrence and Pontoo failed to object to
    the magistrate judge’s R&R in a timely fashion after being given notice and
    warnings of the consequences of their failure to object thereto, they have waived
    appellate review of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of
    law. 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (b)(1); 11th Cir. R. 3-1. Thus, to the extent that Lawrence
    and Pontoo make arguments of that nature, we will not consider them.
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    Case: 17-11564     Date Filed: 01/02/2018    Page: 4 of 5
    Here, the district court did not err in referring this TILA and RESPA case to
    the magistrate judge to consider pretrial matters. The magistrate judge was
    authorized, under § 636(b)(1)(B), to submit proposed findings and
    recommendations in this case. The district court reviewed the magistrate judge’s
    findings for clear error, as Lawrence and Pontoo had failed to object to the R&R;
    the district court found no clear error in the R&R, and then adopted it. Thus, the
    district court made the ultimate decision in regards to the motions, and the
    magistrate judge did not lack jurisdiction or usurp judicial authority by issuing the
    R&R. Thomas, 474 U.S. at 153. Further, N.D. Ga. Standing Order 14-01 required
    the automatic referral of the complaint to a magistrate judge because the complaint
    included claims under TILA and RESPA. See N.D. Ga. Standing Ord. 14-01.
    Therefore the magistrate judge acted within his statutory authority in issuing the
    R&R, and thus no error occurred. Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.
    II. AP’s Motion To Stay Discovery, Pretrial Deadlines,
    And Pretrial Procedures
    Matters pertaining to discovery are committed to the sound discretion of the
    district court, and therefore, we review such issues under the abuse of discretion
    standard. Patterson v. U.S. Postal Service, 
    901 F.2d 927
    , 929 (11th Cir. 1990). In
    Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 
    123 F.3d 1353
    , 1368 (11th Cir. 1997), we
    warned of the dangers of allowing a case to proceed through the pretrial processes
    with a potentially invalid claim, stating “[t]hus, when faced with a motion to
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    dismiss a claim for relief that significantly enlarges the scope of discovery, the
    district court should rule on the motion before entering discovery orders, if
    possible.” We further concluded that, “[t]he court’s duty in this regard becomes all
    the more imperative when the contested claim is especially dubious.” 
    Id.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted, in part, AP’s
    motion to stay discovery and pretrial deadlines. In partially granting AP’s motion,
    the court specifically identified our warnings in Chudasama, and heeded them.
    The complaint itself supports the district court’s reluctance to allow the relevant
    pretrial procedures to begin, as its 73 pages fall short of, among other pleading
    requirements, complying with the demand that a complaint include a short and
    plain statement showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
    Many other issues were apparent from the face of the complaint, such as the
    district court’s likely lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but in any event, the
    problematic nature of the complaint gave the district court a sufficient basis upon
    which to grant AP’s motion to stay, and thus it did not abuse its discretion in
    granting that motion. Accordingly, we affirm.
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is
    AFFIRMED.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 17-11564

Filed Date: 1/2/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021