Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice ( 1996 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals,
    Eleventh Circuit.
    No. 95-3339.
    The FUND FOR ANIMALS, INC., Defenders of Wildlife, Florida
    Biodiversity Project, Maynard L. Hiss, Holly Jensen, Sierra Club,
    Environmental Confederation of Southwest Florida, Plaintiffs-
    Appellants,
    v.
    Terry R. RICE, Colonel, District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of
    Engineers, Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, Department of the Interior,
    Mollie Beattie, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, John
    Wesley White, County Administrator, Sarasota County, Sarasota
    County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    Carol Browner, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency,
    Defendant.
    June 13, 1996.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of Florida. (No. 94-1913-CIV-T-23E), Steven D. Merryday,
    Judge.
    Before KRAVITCH, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    DUBINA, Circuit Judge:
    The Plaintiffs-Appellants ("the Plaintiffs"), seek to prevent
    the construction of a municipal landfill on a site in Sarasota
    County, Florida, that the Plaintiffs claim is an indispensable
    habitat for the highly endangered Florida Panther and also home to
    the threatened Eastern Indigo Snake.      The Plaintiffs bring this
    case before us to challenge the district court's grant of summary
    judgment in favor of the Defendants-Appellees ("the Defendants").
    The district court's challenged judgment has thus far allowed
    Sarasota County to proceed with construction of the landfill.   For
    the reasons stated below, we affirm the district court's judgment.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. The Florida Panther and the Eastern Indigo Snake
    The Florida Panther (Felis concolor coryi ) was listed as
    endangered in 1967.       See 32 Fed.Reg. 4001.       This panther, which is
    a subspecies of the cougar, "is a large, slender cat, tawny above
    and whitish below."       David S. Maehr, The Florida Panther, in 1 Rare
    and Endangered Biota of Florida 176 (Stephen R. Humphrey et al.
    eds., 1992) (hereinafter "Maehr").            According to the Fish and
    Wildlife Service ("the F.W.S."), the Florida Panther is "one of the
    most endangered large mammals in the world."              F.W.S. Biological
    Opinion for the Sarasota Landfill Project at 10 (April 3, 1995)
    (hereinafter "F.W.S. Opinion").1 Although the Florida Panther once
    ranged throughout the Southeastern United States, it has been
    reduced to a single population in south Florida.              The "geographic
    isolation, habitat loss, small population size, and associated
    inbreeding"    of   the   remaining      population    have   resulted   in   a
    significant loss of health and genetic variability in Florida
    Panthers.      F.W.S.     Opinion   at   10-11.       According   to   current
    estimates, there are only 30-50 adult Florida Panthers left in the
    wild.2   Id.   However, the record in this case indicates that there
    1
    "F.W.S. Opinion" refers only to the 1995 Biological
    Opinion. As discussed infra, the F.W.S. completed three separate
    Biological Opinions for the Sarasota landfill project. However,
    the first one, completed in 1990, did not concern either the
    Florida Panther or the Eastern Indigo Snake. The second one,
    completed in 1994, addressed concerns regarding the Florida
    Panther and the Eastern Indigo Snake, but was superseded by the
    third opinion, the "F.W.S. Opinion," completed in 1995.
    2
    It is unknown how many Florida Panthers once roamed the
    Southeastern United States. Theoretical estimates place
    approximately 1,360 Panthers in what is now Florida. Ken
    Alvarez, Twilight of the Panther 35 (1993). Anecdotal evidence
    from early American history suggests the presence, at one time,
    of large panther populations in the American South. For example,
    have been no confirmed sightings of the Florida Panther in the area
    in which the landfill is to be built.3
    The Eastern Indigo Snake (Drymarchon corais couperi ) was
    listed as threatened in 1978.         See 43 Fed.Reg. 4028.     Measuring up
    to 81/2 feet, this docile, nonpoisonous snake is the longest found
    North America.       Paul E. Mohler, The Eastern Indigo Snake, in 3 Rare
    and Endangered Biota of Florida 181 (Paul E. Mohler et al. eds.
    1992) (hereinafter "Mohler"). Although this iridescent black snake
    once       ranged   throughout   Florida,    Georgia,   southeastern    South
    Carolina, southern Alabama, and southern Mississippi, its known
    populations are now restricted to certain areas in Florida and
    Georgia.      F.W.S. Opinion at 24.     The F.W.S. has not yet designated
    any critical habitat for the Eastern Indigo Snake.
    B. The Landfill
    On    November   22,   1989,   the   United   States   Army   Corps   of
    a narrative of Hernando deSoto's 16th Century expedition to
    Florida told of "many lions and bears ..." Id. at 36 (citations
    omitted). While traveling through Georgia during Colonial times,
    naturalist William Bartram observed that "bears, tygers
    [panthers], wolves and wild cats ... are numerous enough." Id.
    (citation omitted).
    3
    The landfill site is located fifty miles north of the
    Caloosahatchee River. Florida Panthers have not been documented
    north of this river, which proceeds inland from Fort Myers and
    then generally northeast. The Plaintiffs' allegation that
    anecdotal evidence proves that there are now Florida Panthers
    north of the Caloosahatchee River is not persuasive. While
    anecdotal sightings of Florida Panthers have been reported, such
    information is generally unsupported by verifiable documentation.
    Florida Panthers by nature are "secretive and illusive and seldom
    observed," and "confusion and misidentification with the more
    widely distributed bobcat" is common. F.W.S. Opinion at 18. The
    very expert upon whom the Plaintiffs rely has indicated to the
    F.W.S. that "the fact that there are no records of road kills is
    compelling evidence that Panthers are not present [in or around
    the landfill site]." F.W.S. Opinion at 17 (referencing Maehr,
    D., emphasis supplied).
    Engineers ("the Corps") received an application from Sarasota
    County, Florida ("Sarasota County" or "the County") for a permit
    under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 
    33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
    .      The proposed project for which Sarasota County sought
    a permit consists of constructing an 895-acre landfill and required
    ancillary structures on a 6,150-acre site known as the "Walton
    Tract."      The Walton Tract is located in west central Sarasota
    County, north of the Caloosahatchee River, west of the Myakka
    River,    and     just   southwest   of   the    Myakka      River   State   Park.
    According    to    current   projections,       the   fill    material   for   the
    landfill will impact approximately seventy-four acres of isolated
    wetlands.4      The project also includes construction of a roadway
    extension ("the Knights Trail Road extension"), consisting of
    approximately 2.5 miles of new road and impacting 0.47 acres of
    wetlands.
    During June of 1990, the Corps dispersed notice of Sarasota
    County's application to government agencies, private organizations,
    and other interested persons. The notice invited public comment on
    the landfill proposal.         Two months later, the F.W.S. issued a
    4
    For purposes of the CWA, the Corps defines wetlands as:
    [T]hose areas that are inundated or saturated by
    surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
    sufficient to support, and that under normal
    circumstances do support, a revalence of vegetation
    typically adapted for life in saturated soil
    conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps,
    marshes, bogs, and similar areas.
    
    40 C.F.R. § 232.2
    (r); see Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds.,
    Environmental Law Institute, 2 Law of Environmental
    Protection § 12.06[1][b] (1994).
    Biological     Opinion    consenting       to   the   project.5       However,   the
    Environmental Protection Agency ("the E.P.A.") recommended denial
    of the permit under Section 404(b)(1) of the guidelines promulgated
    pursuant to the Clean Water Act.                At that time, Sarasota County
    projected that the landfill would affect 120 acres of wetlands.
    The following year, Sarasota County submitted an alternative
    analysis, which included modifications of the project calculated to
    reduce the prospective effect on wetlands.               Four Sites, labeled D,
    E, F (the Walton Tract), and G, were proposed for the landfill.
    During September of 1993, Sarasota County submitted a revised plan
    that would reduce the landfill's effect on wetlands from 120 acres
    to approximately seventy-four acres.                  In February of 1994, the
    E.P.A. notified the Corps that it no longer objected to the
    issuance of the permit.
    At the end of May 1994, the Corps completed an Environmental
    Assessment     and     Statement     of     Findings,    determining      that   no
    environmental impact statement was required.                    In addition, the
    Corps     announced    that   a   public    hearing     would   not    benefit   the
    decision-making process. After nearly five years of administrative
    review, the Corps approved the requested permit on June 3, 1994.
    On   August   10,     1994,   the   Corps    verified    the    applicability     of
    Nationwide Permit No. 26 to Sarasota County's proposal to fill 0.47
    acre of wetlands as part of the Knight's Trail Road extension
    project.
    5
    In consenting to the project in 1990, the F.W.S. indicated
    that the landfill would not affect the Wood Stork (Mycteria
    americana ). The F.W.S. did not, at that time, consider the
    effects that the landfill would have on the Florida Panther and
    the Eastern Indigo Snake.
    On June 17, 1994, the Plaintiffs submitted a sixty-day notice
    of intent to sue.    The Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Clean
    Water Act and the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), 
    16 U.S.C. §§ 1534-44
    .   Two months later, the F.W.S. requested resumption of § 7
    consultation under the ESA to allow consideration of any potential
    effect on the Florida Panther and the Eastern Indigo Snake.6
    In October of 1994, the F.W.S. issued its first Biological
    Opinion addressing concerns regarding the Florida Panther and the
    Eastern Indigo Snake.     The Opinion concluded that the project was
    unlikely to jeopardize further the existence of either the Florida
    Panther or the Eastern Indigo Snake.     However, it did include an
    "incidental take" statement for the Eastern Indigo Snake and
    recommendations     for   Florida   Panther   conservation,   wetland
    preservation, and a monitoring program. The Corps incorporated the
    F.W.S.'s recommendations and modified Sarasota County's permit on
    6
    Section 7 of the ESA requires that federal agencies consult
    with the F.W.S. to ensure that actions the agency authorizes are
    not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of species
    listed as "threatened" or "endangered," or adversely modify or
    destroy habitat designated as critical to the survival of a
    listed species. 
    16 U.S.C. § 1536
    . If the proposed action may
    affect a listed species, formal consultation between the agency
    and the F.W.S. is required. Id.; 
    50 C.F.R. § 402.14
    . When
    formal consultation is initiated, the agency is required to
    provide the F.W.S. information about the proposed project and the
    "best scientific and commercial data available." 
    50 C.F.R. § 402.14
    (d). The F.W.S. then prepares a biological opinion
    including: (1) a conclusion regarding whether the proposed
    action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a
    listed species or adversely modify critical habitat; (2) when
    necessary, an "incidental take" statement regarding animals
    likely to be killed by the project; and (3) reasonable and
    prudent alternatives to the action if the proposed action is
    likely to jeopardize a species. 
    Id.
     The phrases "jeopardize the
    continued existence of," "destruction or adverse modification,"
    and "incidental take" are defined by regulation at 
    50 C.F.R. § 402.02
    .
    November 14, 1994.    Two weeks later, the Plaintiffs commenced an
    action in federal district court against the Corps, the F.W.S., the
    E.P.A.,7 and the Sarasota County Administrator.
    In response to the suit, the F.W.S. requested that the Corps
    resume § 7 consultation on the permit.          The Corps suspended
    Sarasota County's permit the next day, and on February 7, 1995, the
    Corps also suspended its verification of coverage for discharge of
    fill associated with the Knight's Trail Road extension project. In
    April of 1995, the F.W.S. issued to the Corps its second Biological
    Opinion addressing concerns regarding the Florida Panther and the
    Eastern Indigo Snake.    The Opinion included both an "incidental
    take" statement for the Eastern Indigo Snake8 and conservation
    recommendations for the Florida Panther.        This Opinion, which
    superseded   the   F.W.S.'s   previous   Biological   Opinion,   again
    concluded that the proposed project was unlikely to jeopardize the
    continued existence of either the Florida Panther or the Eastern
    Indigo Snake.   See F.W.S. Opinion at 1.9
    7
    The E.P.A. was later omitted from the Plaintiffs' Second
    Amended Complaint.
    8
    This "incidental take" statement permits Sarasota County to
    kill up to fifty-two snakes within "the footprint of the
    landfill" and to "take" an additional two snakes per year in
    connection with the construction and use of the access road
    during the life of the project. Assuming the life of the project
    is thirty-nine years, as projected, the F.W.S. will thus allow
    the County to kill up to 130 Eastern Indigo Snakes as
    "incidental" to the landfill project. However, the F.W.S.
    specifically determined that this level of take would not
    jeopardize the existence of the Eastern Indigo Snake due to the
    remaining level of population elsewhere in the snake's range.
    See F.W.S. Opinion at 26, 28-29.
    9
    This Opinion, as well as the previous one, are referred to
    as "no jeopardy" opinions. A "no jeopardy" biological opinion is
    a scientific determination by the F.W.S. that the proposed action
    On April 12, 1995, the Plaintiffs submitted comments to the
    Corps on the F.W.S.'s new Biological Opinion.          The next day, the
    Corps determined, based on the F.W.S.'s Biological Opinion and the
    Corps' independent environmental assessment, that reinstatement of
    the permit to dredge and fill seventy-four acres of wetlands with
    additional modifications was in the public interest.              Thus, the
    modified permit was reinstated on April 13, 1995.
    Following final issuance of the permit, the Plaintiffs filed
    their Second Amended Complaint, which raised claims under the Clean
    Water    Act,   the    Endangered   Species    Act,   and   the    National
    Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 4321
    -70d.                 The
    Complaint requested declaratory and injunctive relief.             Sarasota
    County   agreed   to   halt   construction    temporarily   to    allow   the
    district court time to reach a considered decision after full
    briefing on the merits.       In return, the Plaintiffs consented to
    expedite the process of district court review.        In particular, the
    parties agreed to submit the case to the court on cross-motions for
    summary judgment.      The district court heard oral argument on June
    29, 1995.
    During oral argument, the Plaintiffs requested leave of the
    court, should their summary judgment motion be denied, to pursue
    discovery on the issue of whether United States Senator Bob Graham
    (D-Florida) had improperly intervened on Sarasota County's behalf.
    is "not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed
    species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
    critical habitat." 50 C.F.R. 402.14(h)(3). A "jeopardy" opinion
    can be issued only when the proposed federal action is expected
    "to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and
    recovery" of a listed species. 
    Id. at 402
    .02.
    The Plaintiffs based their discovery request on a memorandum that
    indicated that Senator Graham had contacted the Attorney General
    regarding the litigation and was working to see if the Department
    of   Justice     would     withdraw   a   recommendation       that    a   draft
    environmental assessment of the project be made available for
    public comment.
    On October 12, 1995, the district court granted summary
    judgment in favor of Sarasota County and denied the Plaintiffs'
    contingent request for discovery. The Plaintiffs filed a notice of
    appeal and asked this court to grant an emergency injunction
    prohibiting Sarasota County from commencing construction of the new
    facility until resolution of the appeal.              This court denied the
    Plaintiffs' emergency motion for an injunction pending appeal in an
    order    dated   October    26,   1995,   and   set   an   expedited   briefing
    schedule.
    II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
    (1) Whether the district court erred in finding that the Corps
    did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in making the
    following three decisions:
    A. to grant a permit to fill seventy-four acres of
    wetland on the Walton Tract for a county landfill;
    B. not to hold its own public hearing on the project;
    and
    C. not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
    under NEPA.
    (2) Whether the district court erred            in finding that the
    F.W.S. did not violate the ESA by         issuing "no jeopardy"
    Biological Opinions and in finding        that the Corps did not
    act arbitrarily or capriciously           in relying on those
    Opinions.
    (3) Whether the district court erred in denying the Plaintiffs
    an opportunity to take discovery on the extent to which
    the Corps' decision may have been inappropriately
    influenced by Senator Graham's intervention.
    III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    The standard of review applicable to the main issues in this
    case is provided by the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    , which states that a court may set aside agency action
    that   is   "arbitrary,   capricious,   an   abuse   of   discretion,   or
    otherwise not in accordance with law."       
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A).      On
    appeal, this court, in reviewing the administrative record, applies
    the same arbitrary and capricious standard of review utilized by
    the district court.       North Buckhead Civic Ass'n v. Skinner, 
    903 F.2d 1533
    , 1538-39 (11th Cir.1990). As we recently explained, this
    standard is exceedingly deferential:
    To determine whether an agency decision was arbitrary and
    capricious, the reviewing court "must consider whether the
    decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors
    and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.' This
    inquiry must be "searching and careful,' but "the ultimate
    standard of review is a narrow one.' Along the standard of
    review continuum, the arbitrary and capricious standard gives
    an appellate court the least latitude in finding grounds for
    reversal; "[a]dministrative decisions should be set aside in
    this context ... only for substantial procedural or
    substantive reasons as mandated by statute, ... not simply
    because the court is unhappy with the result reached.' The
    agency must use its best judgment in balancing the substantive
    issues. The reviewing court is not authorized to substitute
    its judgment for that of the agency concerning the wisdom or
    prudence of the proposed action.
    Skinner, 903 F.2d at 1538-40 (footnotes and citations omitted)
    (emphasis added).    See also Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 
    490 U.S. 360
    , 
    109 S.Ct. 1851
    , 
    104 L.Ed.2d 377
     (1989).
    The standard of review applicable to the district court's
    decision regarding discovery is the abuse of discretion standard.
    See, e.g., Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 
    744 F.2d 1464
    , 1466
    (11th Cir.1984).
    IV. DISCUSSION
    This court recognizes that, with respect to both the Florida
    Panther and the Eastern Indigo Snake, "[t]he most insidious and far
    reaching threat to the survival of [the] species is habitat loss or
    degradation."        Mohler at 184 (regarding the Eastern Indigo Snake);
    accord Maehr at 180 (regarding the Florida Panther).                The present
    case,     however,    involves   a   challenge    to   administrative         action
    governed by the APA.          Therefore, we can set aside the federal
    agencies' actions here only if we find that the agencies abused
    their discretion, or acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary
    to law.     See Skinner, 903 F.2d at 1538-39.            In this case, it is
    readily apparent that in approving the landfill location the
    Federal agencies acted in a manner that was not an abuse of
    discretion,      arbitrary,       capricious,     or     contrary        to     law.
    Accordingly, we will not set aside the federal agencies' actions.
    A. Challenges Under The Clean Water Act
    The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants, including
    10
    dredged spoil, into the waters of the United States,                     except in
    compliance with various sections of the CWA, including Section 404.
    
    33 U.S.C. § 1311
    (a).        Section 404(a) authorizes the Secretary of
    the Army, acting through the Corps, to issue permits for the
    discharge of dredge or fill material into waters of the United
    States.      
    33 U.S.C. § 1344
    (a).        The Corps may issue individual
    permits on a case-by-case basis, or it may issue general permits on
    a state, regional, or nationwide basis.           
    33 U.S.C. § 1344
    (a), (e).
    10
    "Waters of the United States" is defined by regulation to
    include wetlands. 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a), (b).
    The Plaintiffs allege that the Corps violated the substantive
    and procedural requirements of the CWA in three ways:             (1) by not
    choosing an alternative site where the landfill would have a less
    adverse impact on wetlands;       (2) by not considering the cumulative
    impact of the permitting decision;         and (3) by not giving notice
    and an opportunity for a public hearing on the permit.            We consider
    each of these contentions in turn.
    1. Alternative Sites
    The Plaintiffs' primary argument is that the Corps ignored
    alternative sites where the landfill would have had less of an
    impact on the aquatic ecosystem.          Under applicable Section 404
    guidelines, a discharge of dredge or fill will not be permitted if,
    among other things, there is a "practicable alternative" to the
    proposed discharge that would have a less adverse impact on the
    aquatic ecosystem. 
    33 U.S.C. § 1344
    (b)(1); 
    40 C.F.R. § 230.10
    (a).
    An alternative is considered practicable if "it is available and
    capable   of   being   done   after   taking   into    consideration   cost,
    existing technology and logistics in light of overall project
    purposes."     
    40 C.F.R. § 230.10
    (a)(2).        The guidelines create a
    rebuttable presumption that practicable alternatives are available
    where the activity associated with a proposed discharge would occur
    on a wetland and is not water dependent.         40 C.F.R. 230.10(a)(3).
    If the Corps finds that the permit complies with the Section
    404(b)(1) guidelines, the permit "will be granted unless the
    district engineer determines that it would be contrary to the
    public interest."      
    33 C.F.R. § 320.4
    (a)(1).        The public interest
    review    evaluates    "the   probable   impacts,     including   cumulative
    impacts, of the proposed activity and its intended use on the
    public interest."         
    Id.
    According to the Plaintiffs, Sarasota County itself identified
    three such practicable alternatives, and use of any of these sites
    would result in less harm to the environment than use of the Walton
    Tract.     The Plaintiffs rely heavily on a particular section of a
    1991   study    performed       by   Sarasota     County   in    which   the   County
    considered alternatives to the Walton Tract.                      As part of this
    study, Sarasota County assigned a numerical "environmental score"
    to each of the four potential sites.                   The scoring system was
    designed to give higher scores to those sites most suited for a
    landfill.      As the following point totals illustrate, the Walton
    Tract received the lowest numerical score of the four tracts in the
    analysis:      Site D—39 points;              Site E—39 points;         Site F, (the
    Walton Tract)—34 points;             and Site G—41 points.
    Nonetheless, the Plaintiffs' argument that an alternative to
    the Walton Tract should have been chosen is meritless for two
    reasons.    First, the ranking was done by Sarasota County and not
    the Corps, and the Corps is not bound by an applicant's ranking
    system.        In     fact,   the     Corps    conducts    its    own    independent
    evaluation,     and     its     practicable      alternative     analysis      is   not
    susceptible      to     numerical      precision,    but    instead      requires    a
    balancing of the applicant's needs and environmental concerns. See
    Sylvester v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 
    882 F.2d 407
    , 409
    (9th Cir.1989);         Louisiana Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. York, 
    761 F.2d 1044
    , 1048 (5th Cir.1985) (per curiam).
    Second, the Corps and Sarasota County point to numerous
    reasons to explain why, although the Walton Tract received the
    lowest environmental score, it was nonetheless the most suited for
    placement of a landfill.      Specifically, our review of the record
    persuades us that the Corps did not act contrary to, but instead
    adhered   to   the   sequencing   preference   expressed   in   the   CWA
    regulations: (1) avoidance, (2) minimization, and (3) compensatory
    mitigation.    See 33 C.F.R. 320.4(r);    40 C.F.R. 230.10.
    As its first task, the Corps determined that there was no
    alternative site available that would avoid any impact on wetlands.
    Had a suitable upland site existed, such a site would have been
    entitled to a presumption that it was a practical alternative. See
    
    40 C.F.R. § 230.10
    (a)(3).11    Each of the four highest ranking sites
    contain scattered, isolated wetlands: Site D is 19% wetlands, Site
    E is 22% wetlands, Site G is 13% wetlands, and the Walton Tract is
    22% wetlands.    A landfill of 895 acres in Sarasota County would
    involve impacts on aquatic ecosystems (i.e., filling of wetlands)
    and raise the same Section 404 permitting concerns no matter which
    of the four sites was chosen.         Since the Plaintiffs have not
    identified an 895-acre parcel of contiguous uplands in all of
    Sarasota County, it is not clear that the presumption established
    by 
    40 C.F.R. § 230.10
    (a)(3) would ever apply in this case.
    The absence of a suitable upland site required the Corps to
    analyze all suitable alternatives.        In this case, each of the
    alternative sites poses its own environmental problems which led
    the Corps to determine that it was less suitable for the landfill
    11
    The Corps also considered a no-action alternative, which
    was rejected because the County's existing landfill capacity is
    expected to be reached by 1999.
    than the Walton Tract.       Site D contains wetlands across its
    southern boundary, including the headwaters for a stream know as
    South Creek. The site contains ninety-two acres of wetlands, which
    is eighteen more acres of wetlands than would be filled by the
    project if done on the Walton Tract.       Most notably, Site D is
    confirmed to be a nesting site for the Bald Eagle (Haliaeetus
    leucocephalus ).12   Site E borders the Myakka River State Park and
    contains two large wetland systems that drain to both the Myakka
    River and a waterway called the Cow Pen Slough.      Site E contains
    sixty-one acres of wetlands.    Presence of a state listed species,
    the Florida Sandhill Crane (Grus canadensis ), was confirmed on the
    site.     Moreover, any landfill located on Site G would have been
    within the Myakka River watershed.     The Corps noted the probable
    presence of the Eastern Indigo Snake on Site G, and Site G was also
    designated a "Priority 1 Florida Panther habitat."13
    By contrast, the Walton Tract possesses characteristics that
    the Corps considered to be significant environmental advantages.
    Each of the other sites is considerably smaller than the Walton
    Tract:    Site D is 2,130 acres, Site E is 3,360 acres, and Site G is
    2,100 acres.    The Walton Tract is 6,150 acres.   Thus, the site is
    large enough to provide a broad natural vegetative buffer around
    12
    At the time the prospect sites were being evaluated, the
    Bald Eagle was listed as an endangered species. However, on July
    12, 1995, the Bald Eagle was formally removed from the endangered
    species list and is classified as threatened.
    13
    "Priority 1 Panther habitat" means that the F.W.S. has
    identified the areas as containing "those lands that should be
    preserved first and are characterized as areas most frequently
    used by panthers and/or land of high quality suitable native
    habitat." F.W.S. Opinion at 13.
    all sides of the landfill.        The large size of the tract also allows
    a substantial buffer between the landfill and adjoining areas.
    Sarasota County has zoned approximately 2,971 acres on the site as
    a conservation area, which includes the most valuable areas of
    upland wetland habitat on the Walton Tract and adjoins other
    preserve areas off-site.           These preserved lands combine with
    adjacent properties to form a continuous unit of potentially
    suitable Florida Panther habitat and serve as a barrier between the
    Myakka River ecosystem and further development from the west.
    Where, as here, filling of wetlands cannot be avoided, then
    "appropriate and practicable steps" must be taken to minimize the
    potential adverse impacts of the discharge on wetlands.              
    40 C.F.R. § 230.10
    (d).      While the original design of the landfill would have
    impacted approximately 120 acres, Sarasota County subsequently
    scaled down the project so that wetland impacts would be reduced to
    approximately      seventy-four    acres.      Furthermore,      although   the
    project will eliminate approximately seventy-four acres of isolated
    wetlands,   the    large   size   of   the   Walton   Tract    allows   on-site
    mitigation.     Sarasota County is replacing the lost acreage with
    approximately seventy acres of wet prairie habitat in the northeast
    corner of the tract and enhancing and restoring an additional 262
    acres of wetlands.     While wetlands will be lost, a greater acreage
    of higher quality wetlands will be restored and enhanced, resulting
    in no net loss of wetland resources.          See, e.g., National Wildlife
    Fed'n v. Whistler,      
    27 F.3d 1341
    , 1346 (8th Cir.1994) (affirming
    permit where no net loss of nation's wetlands);               see also Town of
    Norfolk, 968 F.2d at 1449;        Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 
    800 F.2d 822
    , 836 (9th Cir.1984).
    In discussing the alternatives analysis, the district court
    did not suggest, nor do we, that practicable alternatives may be
    ignored because of the mitigation potential of a site, as the
    Plaintiffs claim.       To the contrary, the district court recognized,
    as   do    we,   that   the   Corps   had   taken   into   account   all   the
    considerations which factor into the alternatives analysis.            There
    is no substantial question as to whether Sarasota County needs a
    new landfill, because the County's current landfill must close in
    1999.      Sarasota County, the Corps, the F.W.S., and the E.P.A. all
    scrutinized the project for over five years, and all agree that the
    Walton Tract is the most suitable site for the new landfill.
    Accordingly, insofar as the CWA practicable alternatives analysis
    is concerned, we hold that the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
    that the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously in granting a
    permit to fill seventy-four acres of wetlands on the Walton Tract.14
    2. Cumulative Impacts
    Secondarily, the Plaintiffs claim that the Corps failed to
    take into account the impact of its decision on the survival and
    recovery of the Florida Panther "in light of the many other
    projects that are currently under way or planned in South Florida."
    Appellant's Br. at 40-41.        This argument is meritless.     The Corps'
    Statement of Findings clearly indicates that the Corps gave full
    14
    The Plaintiffs argue that the Okeechobee landfill, which
    is outside Sarasota County, is a practical alternative. The
    Corps disagrees. It appears that the Okeechobee landfill lacks
    sufficient capacity to handle the amount of waste anticipated to
    be generated in Sarasota County and, indeed, even today has not
    been expanded by its developers and cannot yet accommodate
    inter-county waste.
    consideration to all pertinent cumulative impacts. See A.R. 149 at
    48-51.     While recognizing that the project will eliminate some
    potential Florida Panther habitat, the Corps also determined that
    the "proposed project will not have an adverse impact on this
    unoccupied habitat" because the "preservation of 2,970 acres of
    land as part of the compensation for wetland impacts will preserve
    the option to provide for future Florida Panther habitat [should
    Florida Panthers be relocated there]."            
    Id.
       The Plaintiffs'
    assertion that destruction of Florida Panther habitat south of the
    Caloosahatchee River increases the need to preserve it in another
    region is thus met by the commitment of the 2,970 acres for future
    Florida Panther habitat.      In sum, the Plaintiffs have failed to
    demonstrate that the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
    analyzing the cumulative effects of the proposed landfill.
    3. Public Hearings
    The Plaintiffs' third argument under the CWA is that the
    Corps violated requirements by failing to provide the public "any
    hearings" on the landfill project and by failing to provide the
    public with information regarding possible effects of the project
    on the Florida Panther and the Eastern Indigo Snake.               The CWA
    mandates an "opportunity for public hearings."          See 
    33 U.S.C. § 1344
    (a). However, the statute does not state that the Corps itself
    must hold its own public hearings regardless of how many other
    hearings have been held on a project.      The applicable regulations
    provide    the   Corps   discretion   to   hold    hearings   on    permit
    applications on an "as needed" basis.      
    33 C.F.R. § 327.4
    .       If the
    Corps determines that it has the information necessary to reach a
    decision and that there is "no valid interest to be served by a
    hearing," the Corps has the discretion not to hold one.                
    Id.
     at §
    327.4(b).
    Here, the Corps recognized that two public hearings on the
    project had already been conducted under the state process.              Given
    the information generated from these hearings and the voluminous
    written information submitted to the Corps by opponents of the
    project, including the Plaintiffs, the Corps concluded that holding
    its own additional public hearing was unlikely to generate any new
    information    that    was   not   already   in   the   Corps'    possession.
    Moreover, the Plaintiffs point to no such information. Under these
    circumstances,    we   are   persuaded    that    the   Corps    did   not   act
    arbitrarily or abuse its discretion in deciding to forego further
    public hearings on the matter.
    The Plaintiffs also argue that the public notice provided by
    the Corps was defective because:          (1) it failed to specifically
    state that the project could potentially affect the Florida Panther
    and the Eastern Indigo Snake;            and (2) it did not mention or
    illustrate the creation of a three-mile access road on the Walton
    Tract.     These arguments are meritless.         First, the notice of the
    permit application was widely disseminated in June of 1990 as
    required by 
    33 C.F.R. § 325.3
    (a).         The notice informed the public
    that "several threatened or endangered species may be expected to
    be present on the site" and invited comment.                Nothing in the
    applicable statutes or regulations requires a species-by-species
    listing in the notice, and no further notice is required by statute
    or regulation.
    Second, while the Plaintiffs are correct that the public
    notice did not mention the access road, the applicable regulations
    give the Corps discretion about whether to issue supplemental
    public notice about such matters. Such notice is to be distributed
    by the district engineer "if in his view there is a change in the
    application data that would affect the public's review of the
    proposal."   33 C.F.R. 325.2(a)(2).     The Corps considered the road
    to be a minor change in the application data and declined to issue
    supplemental notice.     Given that the road's construction affects
    less than one-half acre of additional wetlands, this conclusion was
    not arbitrary or capricious.
    B. Preparation of Environmental Impact Statement Under the National
    Environmental Policy Act.
    The Plaintiffs allege that the Corps' decision not to prepare
    an   Environmental     Impact    Statement   violated     NEPA     and   its
    implementing regulations by ignoring evidence of the project's
    harmful effects.     The NEPA requires a federal agency to prepare an
    Environmental Impact Statement if the agency proposes to undertake
    a "major federal action[ ] significantly affecting the quality of
    the human environment."         
    42 U.S.C. § 4332
    (2)(C).      The statute
    imposes procedural but not substantive requirements on the agency.
    "NEPA does not work by mandating that agencies achieve particular
    substantive environmental results."          Marsh   v.   Oregon    Natural
    Resources Council, 
    490 U.S. at 371
    , 
    109 S.Ct. at 1858
    .             Instead,
    NEPA "works" by requiring that the environmental consequences of an
    action be studied before the proposed action is taken.           
    Id.
    In deciding whether to prepare an Environmental Impact
    Statement for a proposed action, an agency must initially determine
    if    the   action   is    of     a   type       that    (1)    normally      requires   the
    preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement, or (2) normally
    does not require either an Environmental Impact Statement or an
    Environmental Assessment.                 
    40 C.F.R. § 1501.4
    (a).            If the proposed
    action falls into neither category, the agency must prepare an
    Environmental Assessment 
    40 C.F.R. § 1501.4
    (b).                        The Environmental
    Assessment      is   expected         to    be    a     brief   and    concise    document
    containing sufficient evidence and analysis for the agency to
    determine whether to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement or
    a Finding of No Significant Impact ("FONSI").                         "The purpose of an
    [Environmental Assessment] is to determine whether there is enough
    likelihood of significant environmental consequences to justify the
    time and expense of preparing an environmental impact statement."
    River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of U.S. Army, 
    764 F.2d 445
    , 449 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 
    475 U.S. 1055
    , 
    106 S.Ct. 1283
    , 
    89 L.Ed.2d 590
     (1986).
    The role of the court in reviewing the sufficiency of an
    agency's consideration of environmental facts is limited both by
    the time in which the decision was made and by the statute
    mandating review.          Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat'l
    Resource Defense Council, Inc., 
    435 U.S. 519
    , 555, 558, 
    98 S.Ct. 1197
    , 1217, 1219, 
    55 L.Ed.2d 460
     (1978).                        Moreover, this Circuit
    has stated that a court's "only role [under NEPA] is to ensure that
    the    agency    has      taken       a    "hard      look'     at    the    environmental
    consequences of the proposed action."                     Druid Hills Civic Ass'n v.
    Federal Highway Admin., 
    772 F.2d 700
    , 709 (11th Cir.1985) (citing
    Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 
    427 U.S. 390
    , 410 n. 21, 
    96 S.Ct. 2718
    , 2730
    n. 21, 
    49 L.Ed.2d 576
     (1976)).
    The Plaintiffs contend that the Corps' decision not to
    prepare an Environmental Impact Statement in this case fell short
    of the requisite "hard look" and that the Corps' actions were a
    mere "paperwork exercise."            Appellants' Br. at 43.         In response,
    the   Corps    and    Sarasota    County    argue     that     the   Environmental
    Assessment prepared in this case satisfied the need for a hard look
    at the project and that the Environmental Assessment supported the
    Corps' FONSI, which obviated the need to prepare an Environmental
    Impact Statement.
    The   Corps     prepared    its   Environmental        Assessment     for   the
    project in April of 1995. The Environmental Assessment resulted in
    a FONSI, meaning that the Corps concluded that no Environmental
    Impact Statement was required for the project.                 At this point, the
    Corps    had   the   benefit     of   two   separate     "no    jeopardy"    F.W.S.
    Biological Opinions regarding the Florida Panther and the Eastern
    Indigo    Snake,     approval    by   the   E.P.A.,    voluminous      information
    (including     expert    opinions)      provided    by   the     Plaintiffs,      and
    information resulting from the two public hearings the state had
    held on the project.            In light of the five preceding years of
    extensive administrative review, it would be difficult for us to
    conclude that the Corps failed to take a hard look at the project
    before deciding to forego the time and administrative costs of
    preparing an Environmental Impact Statement. Instead, we hold that
    the Corps did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by concluding
    that it had before it sufficient information to determine that the
    project would not significantly affect the quality of the human
    environment   and   that   preparation    of    an    Environmental   Impact
    Statement was therefore unnecessary.          As explained by the Supreme
    Court:
    [O]nce an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's
    procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to
    insure that the agency has considered the environmental
    consequences; it cannot interject itself within the area of
    discretion of the executive.
    Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 
    444 U.S. 223
    ,
    227, 
    100 S.Ct. 497
    , 499, 
    62 L.Ed.2d 433
     (1979) (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted).
    C. Challenges Pursuant to the Endangered Species Act
    The Plaintiffs claim that § 4(f) of the ESA requires the Corps
    and the F.W.S. to implement the 1987 Recovery Plan for the Florida
    Panther and that the Corps and the F.W.S., in violation of the ESA,
    15
    are failing in that regard.          The Plaintiffs' reasoning can be
    summarized as follows:     (1) the ESA requires that recovery plans
    shall be developed and implemented for endangered species; (2) the
    F.W.S.'s 1987 Recovery Plan for the Florida Panther includes a
    "Habitat   Preservation    Plan"    stating    that   "areas   proposed   for
    habitat preservation," which include the Walton Tract, "should be
    monitored to the maximum extent possible to obviate adverse habitat
    modifications;" (3) the F.W.S. fails to "implement" the Recovery
    Plan if it issues a "no jeopardy" opinion for a suitable Florida
    Panther habitat as specified by the Recovery Plan;              and (4) the
    15
    Section 4 of the ESA addresses "recovery plans," which
    formulate actions designed to enhance species recovery to the
    point where ESA protection is no longer needed. 
    16 U.S.C. § 1533
    (f). The Secretary is required to "develop and implement"
    such plans "unless he finds that such a plan will not promote
    conservation of the species." 
    Id.
    Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously in relying on the F.W.S.
    "no jeopardy" Opinions in granting a permit to Sarasota County.
    The Plaintiffs' line of reasoning is flawed in several
    respects.    First, the practical effect of the Plaintiffs' position
    would be to elevate the 1987 Recovery Plan into a document with the
    force of law.    We cannot take such an approach.          Section 1533(f)
    makes it plain that recovery plans are for guidance purposes only.
    See 
    16 U.S.C. § 1533
    (f).   By providing general guidance as to what
    is required in a recovery plan, the ESA "breathe[s] discretion at
    every   pore."    Strickland   v.   Morton,   
    519 F.2d 467
    ,   469   (9th
    Cir.1975).
    Second, the Plaintiffs' position cannot be reconciled with the
    Corps' statutory duty under § 7 of the ESA to consult with the
    F.W.S. about the environmental impact of proposed agency actions
    and the F.W.S.'s duty to arrive at a biological opinion based upon
    the best scientific data available.      There would be absolutely no
    point to the consultation and preparation of a biological opinion
    if the F.W.S.'s opinion were predetermined based upon whether
    proposed project lands fell within the borders of properties
    discussed in one of any number of recovery plan documents.               The
    Plaintiffs thus misconstrue the interrelationship and legal effect
    of the 1987 Recovery Plan on the 1995 F.W.S. Biological Opinion.
    Third, the F.W.S. identified reasonable justifications for
    issuing its "no jeopardy" Biological Opinions.             To begin with,
    there have been no verified Florida Panther sightings either on the
    Walton Tract or near it within the last ten years.           According to
    the Florida Panther Habitat Protection Plan ("HPP"), there is no
    16
    occupied Florida Panther territory anywhere in Sarasota County.
    The HPP concludes, some anecdotal evidence notwithstanding, that no
    occupied Florida Panther habitat exists in Sarasota County or, for
    that matter, anywhere north of the Caloosahatchee River. Moreover,
    the contested land has not been designated as critical habitat
    under the ESA.   It is a major flaw in the Plaintiffs' argument to
    assume that the project will destroy or adversely modify the
    Florida   Panther's   "critical   habitat"   when   it   has   not   been
    determined that this particular site is a critical habitat.           The
    land included in the HPP's recommendation for a critical habitat
    designation area is not anywhere in Sarasota County.       In addition,
    the Walton Tract has not been identified as a reintroduction site
    for Florida Panthers, nor is it adjacent to any such sites.           See
    F.W.S. Opinion at 20-21.      Because the Walton Tract is not in
    proximity to areas of known Florida Panther use, it does not
    possess an important characteristic of areas suitable for Florida
    Panther reintroduction.
    In summary, because the Recovery Plan is not a document with
    the force of law divesting all discretion and judgment from the
    F.W.S., and because the F.W.S. identified reasonable justifications
    for issuing "no jeopardy" Biological Opinions with respect to the
    Walton Tract, we hold that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet their
    burden of demonstrating that the F.W.S. acted arbitrarily and
    capriciously by issuing the Opinions.    Likewise, we hold that the
    Plaintiffs have failed to show that the Corps acted arbitrarily and
    16
    The HPP was developed and approved in November, 1993, to
    implement the Florida Panther Recovery Plan.
    capriciously by relying on these Opinions when consultation with
    the F.W.S. is exactly what is required by the relevant statutory
    scheme.
    D. Disallowing Discovery
    At oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment,
    the   Plaintiffs      presented    a    government     document    demonstrating
    contact between Senator Bob Graham and the United States Department
    of Justice.     The document is a memorandum providing an account of
    a meeting that was held between the Corps and Sarasota County
    during the time that the landfill permits were suspended while the
    F.W.S. and the Corps completed the new § 7 consultation that was
    initiated as a result of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit.                 The memorandum
    states that Senator Graham "had contacted the Attorney General"
    with regard to the litigation, and that "Sen. Graham was working to
    see     if   [the     Department       of]   Justice    would     withdraw    [a]
    recommendation" that a draft environmental assessment be made
    available for public comment.                See # A.R. Tab 137.        At oral
    argument, the Plaintiffs' counsel brought this document to the
    attention of the district court and requested that, should the
    court    deny   the   Plaintiffs'       motion   for   summary    judgment,   the
    Plaintiffs be permitted to take discovery on the extent to which
    Senator Graham's involvement may have influenced the agencies'
    decisions in this case, particularly the Corps' decision not to
    prepare an environmental impact statement.                 The district court
    denied this discovery request.               The Plaintiffs claim that this
    denial was improper.       We conclude that the district court's order
    denying discovery must stand because it was not an abuse of
    discretion.
    None of the cases upon which the Plaintiffs rely provides a
    basis    for     permitting        discovery      on    the    issue       involving         the
    memorandum from Senator Graham.                 For example, in             ATX, Inc. v.
    United States Department of Transportation, 
    41 F.3d 1522
    , 1527
    (D.C.Cir.1994), members of Congress strongly voiced opposition to
    ATX's airline application to the Department of Transportation
    ("D.O.T.").        Several members of Congress wrote letters directly to
    D.O.T.      Secretary      Federico      Pena   urging        him     to   deny     the      ATX
    application, and the record contained letters from over 125 members
    of Congress to other transportation department officials.                              
    Id.
        In
    holding     that     the    congressional       pressure        was    insufficient           to
    invalidate D.O.T.'s adjudication, the D.C. Circuit noted that "
    "the    proper      focus     is   not    on    the     content       of    congressional
    communications in the abstract, but rather upon the relation
    between the communications and the adjudicator's decision-making
    process.'      "        
    Id.
        (citation        omitted).             There,      as    here,
    "congressional input neither created an appearance of impropriety
    nor actually affected the outcome."                    
    Id.
        As discussed in Section
    IV.B of this opinion, it is clear that the Corps' decision not to
    complete an environmental impact statement was based on the merits
    of   this    case.         Furthermore,     the    legal       issue       raised      in    the
    controversial memorandum—whether to circulate a draft environmental
    assessment for public comment—is irrelevant.                           Even if such a
    recommendation had been made and withdrawn, there is no                                 legal
    requirement that an environmental assessment be circulated publicly
    and, in fact, they rarely are.                 Thus, the district court did not
    abuse its discretion when it disallowed discovery on this issue.
    V. CONCLUSION
    Based upon the foregoing, we hold that the Corps and the
    F.W.S. did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in any of their
    decisions in this case, and that the district court did not abuse
    its discretion in disallowing discovery on the issue involving the
    memorandum     from   Senator     Graham.        Accordingly,      we    affirm      the
    district   court's      grant    of   summary     judgment    in    favor       of   the
    Defendants.      Nevertheless,        we   are   remanding    the       case    to   the
    district court to enable the court to resolve a motion pending
    before it.17 In light of the limited purpose of this remand, we see
    no need to assign this case to a different judge on remand.
    Accordingly, the Plaintiff's request for reassignment is denied.
    See   United   States    v.     Torkington,      
    874 F.2d 1441
    ,      1447    (11th
    17
    As we understand it, currently there is a motion pending
    in the district court to delete the first footnote in its October
    12, 1995 Order. We remand this case for the limited purpose of
    enabling the district court to resolve this motion. We are
    disturbed by the language contained in the disputed footnote.
    See District Court Order at 1 n. 1. As discussed above, the
    Plaintiffs requested at oral argument that they be permitted to
    take discovery on the issue of whether Senator Bob Graham had
    improperly intervened on behalf of the County. This request was
    supported by a memorandum the Plaintiffs presented that stated
    that Senator Graham was "working to see if" the Justice
    Department would withdraw a recommendation that an environmental
    assessment be publicly circulated. The district court engaged in
    a harsh rebuke of the Plaintiffs' counsel for even making this
    discovery request, calling it a "defamation of Senator Graham"
    and indicating that counsel would be held in contempt if she
    continued. Our careful review of the record persuades us that
    this language was unwarranted and completely unnecessary to the
    district court's disposition of this case. The Plaintiffs'
    counsel was wholly within her rights in this case to request
    discovery on the issue of Senator Graham's involvement. Because
    there is a motion pending before the district court, we direct
    the district court to take a second look at the footnote and
    consider deleting it.
    Cir.1989) (identifying elements to be considered in determining
    whether to reassign a case to a different judge).
    AFFIRMED and REMANDED.