Chastin Betron Moore v. Gregory McLaughlin ( 2014 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-12664
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:13-cv-00093-MTT-MSH
CHASTIN BETRON MOORE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GREGORY MCLAUGHLIN,
JAMES HINTON,
CLAUDIA HALL,
COLBERT,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
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(June 13, 2014)
Before HULL, MARCUS, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Chastin Betron Moore, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to state a claim upon which
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relief may be granted. Moore alleged that the Defendants 1 stole packages mailed
to him, created an illegal policy that segregated inmates could not receive
packages, unjustly denied his grievances and ignored his complaints, and denied
him options for returning packages that were available to other prisoners. He
argues that this conduct violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UNDHR”).
The district court dismissed Moore’s complaint for failure to state a claim, citing
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3204 (1984). On appeal,
Moore argues that his right to procedural due process was violated because he was
denied a postdeprivation remedy when his grievances were denied.
We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim
de novo, taking the allegations in the complaint as true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437
F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). We may affirm the district court’s decision on
any ground supported by the record. Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072,
1088 n.21 (11th Cir. 2007). A complaint is properly dismissed for failure to state a
claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S. Ct. 910, 920 (2007).
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Moore files his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against the following defendants at Macon
State Prison in their individual capacities: Gregory McLaughlin, Warden; James Hinton, Deputy
Warden of Security; Claudia Hall, mailroom employee; and “Colbert”, mailroom employee
(collectively “Defendants”).
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We construe pro se pleadings liberally, and hold such pleadings to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Our duty to liberally
construe a plaintiff’s complaint is not the equivalent of a duty to re-write it for the
plaintiff.” Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam).
I.
First, Moore argues that his procedural due process claim is not barred
because he was denied a suitable post deprivation remedy when his grievances
about the stolen packages were denied. “[T]o prevail on a civil rights action under
[42 U.S.C.] § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a federal right by
a person acting under color of state law.” Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d
1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). However, “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of
property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a
meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at
533, 104 S. Ct. at 3204. The state’s action is not complete “until and unless it
provides or refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy.” Id.Georgia provides a civil cause of action for the wrongful conversion of
personal property, and we have held that this cause of action constitutes a suitable
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postdeprivation remedy for procedural due process violations. O.C.G.A. § 51-10-
1; Lindsey v. Storey, 936 F.2d 554, 561 (11th Cir. 1991). Because Moore has a
suitable post deprivation remedy available under Georgia law, the state’s action is
not complete. See Palmer, 468 U.S. at 533, 104 S. Ct. at 3204. Moore did not
state in his complaint or brief that he has attempted to pursue a civil action based
upon the incident, nor did he indicate that such action was denied or unavailable to
him. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing
Moore’s procedural due process claim regarding the stolen packages, and affirm.
II.
Second, Moore argues that the Defendants failed to respond appropriately to
his grievances, which we construe as another procedural due process claim. A 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process requires “(1) a
deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state
action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d
1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). An inmate has no constitutionally-protected liberty
interest in access to prison grievance procedures. Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d
1171, 1177 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Here, because Moore had no constitutionally protected liberty interest in
access to the prison’s grievance procedure, he cannot base a § 1983 claim on the
Defendants’ response to his grievances. See Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1232; Bingham,
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564 F.3d at 1177. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in
dismissing Moore’s procedural due process claim regarding the denial of his
grievances, and affirm.
III.
Third, Moore contends that the Defendants violated his equal protection
rights by maintaining a policy that inmates in administrative segregation could not
receive packages, and by prohibiting him from returning packages to senders while
in segregation, an option available to other segregated inmates. “To establish an
equal protection claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated
with other prisoners who received more favorable treatment; and (2) his
discriminatory treatment was based on some constitutionally-protected interest. . .”
Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946–47 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
In his complaint, Moore did not allege that his discriminatory treatment was
based upon any constitutionally-protected interest. Instead, he compared his
treatment to that of prisoners in the general population and other prisoners in
administrative segregation. Accordingly, although the district court did not
address the issue, we thus affirm the dismissal of Moore’s equal protection claim.
See Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1088 n.21 (“This Court may affirm on any ground
supported by the record.”).
IV.
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Fourth, Moore claims that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the Defendants
deprived him of the basic human need of clothes, failed to appropriately respond to
his complaints, and because he could not receive or return packages while in
administrative segregation.
We will not consider Moore’s argument that the Defendants violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by depriving him of a basic human need, because he
raises this argument for the first time on appeal. See Access Now, Inc., v. SW
Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This Court has repeatedly
held that an issue not raised in the district court and raised for the first time in an
appeal will not be considered by this court.” (internal quotations omitted)).
Further, the Eighth Amendment does not authorize judicial reconsideration of
every governmental action affecting a prisoner’s interests, and, after incarceration,
only the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084 (1986)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In his complaint, Moore did not allege that he
suffered any pain as a result of Defendants’ actions, or that these actions involved
the infliction of pain. Accordingly, although the district court did not address the
issue, we affirm the dismissal of Moore’s cruel and unusual punishment claim.
V.
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Finally, Moore claims that the Defendants’ theft of his packages and failure
to respond appropriately to his grievances subjected him to torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment in violation of the UNDHR. Section 1983
provides a cause of action based on “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, in
order to prevail in a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that he was
deprived of a federal right. Griffin, 261 F.3d at 1303. The rights secured by the
UNDHR are not federal rights. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734,
124 S.Ct. 2739, 2767, (2004) (“[The UDHR] does not of its own force impose
obligations as a matter of international law.”). Accordingly, Moore could not base
his § 1983 action on the violation of UNDHR rights. Therefore, although the
district court did not address the issue, we affirm the dismissal of Moore’s
UNDHR claim.
Upon careful review of Moore’s complaint, the district court order, and
consideration of Moore’s brief on appeal, we conclude that Moore’s complaint
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the above reasons,
we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Moore’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.
AFFIRMED.
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