Greg F. Colbourne v. Ocwen , 550 F. App'x 687 ( 2013 )


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  •            Case: 12-14722   Date Filed: 10/29/2013   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ___________________________
    No. 12-14722
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ___________________________
    D. C. Docket Nos. 6:10-cv-01813-TJC; 6:10-bk-00983-ABB
    In Re: GREG F. COLBOURNE,
    Debtor.
    ______________________________
    GREG F. COLBOURNE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    OCWEN,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ______________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _______________________________
    (October 29, 2013)
    Case: 12-14722      Date Filed: 10/29/2013      Page: 2 of 7
    Before MARTIN, FAY, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Greg F. Colbourne appeals the district court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy
    court’s denial of Colbourne’s motions to value the claims of Deutsche Bank;
    claims asserted through Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”). 1 In his motions,
    Colbourne sought to cram down Ocwen’s first-priority mortgage liens on two
    investment properties, pursuant to 
    11 U.S.C. §§ 506
    (a) and 1325(a)(5). No
    reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
    In August 2009, Colbourne filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case in which he
    listed both Ocwen claims. Colbourne received a discharge. The Chapter 7 case
    was closed as a “no asset” case in December 2009.
    Colbourne filed this Chapter 13 bankruptcy case in January 2010. In his
    schedules, Colbourne listed Ocwen’s mortgage liens: (1) a first-priority lien in the
    amount of $374,000 on Colbourne’s Hopewell Drive property, which property is
    valued at $125,000; and (2) a first-priority lien in the amount of $226,800 on
    Colbourne’s Grasmere Parkway property, which property is valued at $70,000.
    1
    On appeal, Colbourne does not challenge the bankruptcy court’s denial of Colbourne’s motion
    to value a claim filed by Wells Fargo Dealer Services, f/k/a Wachovia Dealer Services, Inc.
    2
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    Colbourne then filed motions to value and cram down Ocwen’s claims based on
    the current appraised values of the properties, both of which were substantially less
    than the amounts outstanding on the mortgages.
    The bankruptcy court denied Colbourne’s motions. The bankruptcy court
    concluded that, because Colbourne was ineligible to receive a Chapter 13
    discharge -- pursuant to 
    11 U.S.C. § 1328
    (f)(1)2 -- based on his recent Chapter 7
    discharge, he was precluded from cramming down Ocwen’s claims. 3 The district
    court affirmed.
    Colbourne argues that the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that, because
    Colbourne was ineligible to receive a discharge under Chapter 13, he may not cram
    down Ocwen’s mortgage liens.
    When the district court affirms the bankruptcy court’s order, we review only
    the bankruptcy court’s decision on appeal.4 Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mosley,
    2
    Section 1328(f)(1) provides that “the court shall not grant a discharge of all debts provided for
    in the plan or disallowed under section 502, if the debtor has received a discharge . . . in a case
    filed under chapter 7 . . . of this title during the 4-year period preceding the date of the order for
    relief under this chapter . . . .” 
    11 U.S.C. § 1328
    (f)(1).
    3
    The bankruptcy court later confirmed Colbourne’s Chapter 13 plan. Although the plan
    payments to Ocwen were calculated based on the proposed crammed down values, the
    bankruptcy court ordered Colbourne to pay all disposable income into the estate until this appeal
    was resolved. The bankruptcy court also ordered Colbourne to file a motion to modify the
    confirmed plan to pay Ocwen’s claims in full if his appeal was unsuccessful.
    4
    The district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of Colbourne’s motions is a
    final and appealable order. See In re Donovan, 
    532 F.3d 1134
    , 1136 (11th Cir. 2008); T&B
    Scottdale Contractors v. United States, 
    866 F.2d 1372
    , 1375 (11th Cir. 1989). The district court
    concluded definitively that Colbourne was not permitted to cram down Ocwen’s claims.
    3
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    494 F.3d 1320
    , 1324 (11th Cir. 2007). And we review the bankruptcy court’s legal
    conclusions de novo. Hemar Ins. Corp. of Am. v. Cox, 
    338 F.3d 1238
    , 1241 (11th
    Cir. 2003).
    “Chapter 13 debtors enjoy ‘broad power to modify the rights of the holders
    of secured claims.’” In re Paschen, 
    296 F.3d 1203
    , 1205 (11th Cir. 2002).
    “Section 1325(a)(5) is recognized as the source of a Chapter 13 debtor’s authority
    to bifurcate secured claims and to ‘strip down’ the value of the claim to an amount
    equal to the value of the collateral.” 
    Id. at 1206
    .
    “Section 1325(a)(5) specifies the conditions under which Chapter 13 plans
    must address ‘allowed secured claims’ 5 if the plans are to be confirmed . . . .” 
    Id. at 1205-06
    . In pertinent part, section 1325(a)(5) requires Chapter 13 plans to
    provide that the holder of “each allowed secured claim . . . retain the lien securing
    such claim until the earlier of . . . the payment of the underlying debt determined
    under nonbankruptcy law; or . . . discharge under section 1328.” 
    11 U.S.C. § 1325
    (a)(5)(B)(i)(I).
    Although the bankruptcy court must continue to oversee the administration of Colbourne’s
    bankruptcy estate -- including modification of the confirmed plan in accordance with the district
    court’s ruling -- the district court’s order fully resolved the issue and left the bankruptcy court
    with no discretion in implementation.
    5
    The term “allowed secured claim” refers to section 506(a), which provides that “[a]n allowed
    claim . . . secured by a lien on property . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such
    creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property, . . . and is an unsecured claim to the
    extent that the value of such creditor’s interest . . . is less than the amount of such allowed
    claim.” 
    11 U.S.C. § 506
    (a).
    4
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    Although Ocwen’s claims are undersecured, that Ocwen is a “holder” of two
    “allowed secured claims” for purposes of section 1325(a)(5) is undisputed.
    Other courts have explained that, when a “creditor’s claim is bifurcated into
    a secured component and an unsecured component, [section 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I)]
    makes clear that the creditor may not be forced to release its lien upon payment of
    only the secured component.” In re Lilly, 
    378 B.R. 232
    , 235 (Bankr. Ct. C.D. Ill.
    2007). Thus, where a debtor is ineligible for a discharge -- as Colbourne was in
    this case -- the creditor retains its lien “until the entire amount of the debt,
    calculated without regard to the modifications permitted in bankruptcy, is paid.”
    
    Id. at 236
    .
    Absent a discharge, “any modifications to a creditor’s rights imposed in the
    plan are not permanent and have no binding effect once the term of the plan ends.”
    Id.; see also In re Jarvis, 
    390 B.R. 600
    , 605-06 (Bankr. Ct. C.D. Ill. 2008) (“A no-
    discharge Chapter 13 case may not . . . result in a permanent modification of a
    creditor’s rights where such modification has traditionally only been achieved
    through a discharge and where such modification is not binding if a case is
    dismissed or converted.”).
    Several courts -- including the Middle District of Florida -- have followed
    the reasoning in In re Lilly and In re Jarvis in concluding that debtors ineligible for
    discharge may not modify a secured creditor’s rights through cram down or strip
    5
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    off. See, e.g., In re Pierre, 
    468 B.R. 419
    , 423-24, n.19 (Bankr. Ct. M.D. Fla. 2012)
    (collecting cases and explaining that debtors who are ineligible for Chapter 13
    discharge are unable to cram down a partially secured lien on investment
    property); In re Judd, 
    66 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1620
    , 6 (Bankr. Ct. M.D.
    Fla. 2011) (denying Chapter 13 debtor’s motion to strip off a partially secured
    second-priority mortgage lien on an investment property when the debtor was
    ineligible for a Chapter 13 discharge).
    We are persuaded by the reasoning in these decisions. 6 Thus, because
    Colbourne is ineligible for discharge under section 1328, he is unable to modify
    permanently Ocwen’s claims through a cram down. See In re Lilly, 
    378 B.R. at 236
    .
    Colbourne also argues that, although he is ineligible for a Chapter 13
    discharge, the Bankruptcy Code does not preclude him from filing for, or from
    receiving, Chapter 13 relief. Although Colbourne’s argument may be correct as a
    matter of law, the bankruptcy court -- in fact -- made no ruling that Colbourne was
    ineligible for filing a Chapter 13 case or that Colbourne was ineligible for all forms
    of Chapter 13 relief. Instead, after denying Colbourne’s motions to value, the
    6
    We acknowledge that courts have approached differently the issue of lien-stripping in “Chapter
    20” cases. Because the majority of cases that permit lien-stripping, including each of the cases
    cited by Colbourne in his appellate brief, involve the stripping off of wholly unsecured second-
    priority liens on principal residences -- not the cram down of undersecured first-priority liens on
    investment property -- we see their guidance less applicable to the facts of this appeal.
    6
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    bankruptcy court confirmed Colbourne’s Chapter 13 plan pending resolution of
    this appeal. Thus, although Colbourne is unable to cram down Ocwen’s claims, he
    has already filed for (and benefited from) other forms of Chapter 13 relief.
    We see no reversible error. Colbourne’s motions were denied properly.
    AFFIRMED.
    7