United States v. Christopher Henderson ( 2013 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-16240
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20468-JAL-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER HENDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(December 20, 2013)
Before WILSON, ANDERSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Christopher Henderson appeals his mandatory minimum 120-month
sentence, imposed after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute 5 or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
Henderson asserts the district court (1) clearly erred in applying a two-level
enhancement based on his possession of a firearm, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1); (2) erroneously determined he was ineligible for safety-valve relief,
pursuant to § 5C1.2, because he possessed a firearm in connection with the
offense; and (3) clearly erred in denying a reduction based on his minor role in the
offense under § 3B1.2(b). After review, 1 we affirm Henderson’s sentence.
Firearm Enhancement
Section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level
increase, “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1). “The enhancement should be applied if the weapon was present,
unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.
For example, the enhancement would not be applied if the defendant, arrested at
the defendant’s residence, had an unloaded hunting rifle in the closet.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1, comment. (n.3(A)) (Nov. 2011). The government has the initial burden
of showing that “the firearm was present at the site of the charged conduct or . . .
1
“We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings related to the imposition
of sentencing enhancements.” United States v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007)
(quotations omitted). The district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to those facts
is reviewed de novo. United States v. Pham, 463 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2006).
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that the defendant possessed a firearm during conduct associated with the offense
of conviction.” United States v. Stallings, 463 F.3d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 2006).
However, the government need not prove the firearm was used to facilitate the
offense. United States v. Audain, 254 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001). “If the
government is successful in meeting this initial burden, then the evidentiary burden
shifts to the defendant, who must demonstrate that a connection between the
weapon and the offense was ‘clearly improbable.’” Stallings, 463 F.3d at 1220;
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (n.3(A)) (Nov. 2011).
The facts in Henderson’s PSI2 show Henderson and his codefendants
traveled to Miami in two cars. Codefendants Steven Lamar Cook and Michael
Chavous negotiated a deal to purchase five kilograms of cocaine in exchange for
$65,000 cash. After Cook and Chavous were arrested, Henderson drove to meet
someone at a gas station and then proceeded to the warehouse where the drug deal
was taking place. At the warehouse, Henderson spoke with Cook about the drug
transaction, and Henderson was arrested. Thereafter, a search of Henderson’s car
revealed a loaded pistol. This evidence shows the firearm was present at the site of
the charged conduct. Moreover, it is probable the cocaine would have been
2
Henderson objected to the two-level increase for possession of a firearm, but did not
object to any of the factual statements in the PSI. Because Henderson did not object to any
factual statements in the PSI, he admitted those facts for consideration during sentencing. See
United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining a defendant admits
facts for consideration during sentencing if he fails to object to those factual allegations
contained in the PSI).
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transported in the car, which contained a firearm, after the purchase of cocaine was
completed because, as Henderson admitted in his acceptance-of-responsibility
statement in the PSI, his job was to assist in the transportation of the drugs back
home. Because this evidence met the Government’s initial burden of showing
Henderson possessed a firearm during conduct associated with the offense,
Henderson then had the burden of demonstrating it was “clearly improbable” the
firearm was connected to the offense. See Stallings, 463 F.3d at 1220.
Henderson offered no evidence, other than a proffer in which he argued the
gun was always in the vehicle and he always traveled with a gun for his personal
protection, to show a connection between the firearm and the offense was “clearly
improbable.” This, alone, was insufficient to show a clear improbability. See
United States v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 847 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding a defendant
failed to show a connection between a firearm and an offense involving 300
kilograms of cocaine hidden inside and outside of a warehouse was “clearly
improbable” where the firearm was in a closed office in the warehouse, the
defendant was outside of the warehouse, and the defendant only had the firearm
because of his job as a security guard). Thus, the district court did not clearly err
in applying a two-level enhancement based on Henderson’s possession of a
firearm, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).
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Safety-Valve Relief
The defendant has the burden of proving that he meets the safety-valve
eligibility requirements under § 5C1.2. United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 1553, 1557
(11th Cir. 1997). The district court must impose a sentence within the guideline
range, without regard to any statutory minimum sentence, if the court finds that the
defendant meets a list of criteria, including that the defendant did not “possess a
firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in
connection with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
In United States v. Carillo-Ayala, we held a defendant is not precluded from
arguing he did not possess a firearm “in connection with” his offense under
§ 5C1.2, even though he received a firearm enhancement pursuant to
§ 2D1.1(b)(1). 713 F.3d 82, 90-91 (11th Cir. 2013). We reasoned § 5C1.2’s “in
connection with” requirement is a different standard that could be satisfied by
showing that the firearm (1) was in close proximity to drugs, or (2) facilitated, or
had the potential to facilitate, the offense. Id. at 91-93.
Although Henderson is not precluded from arguing he did not possess a
firearm in connection with the offense based on the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement for
possession of a firearm, the evidence demonstrates the firearm had the potential to
facilitate the offense. See Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 93. The firearm was located
in the van Henderson drove to the drug deal. Even if Henderson originally drove
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to Miami with the gun and without knowledge that he was going to transport drugs,
he became aware of the drug transaction at the time he drove to the ongoing drug
deal. Moreover, had the cocaine purchase been successful, Henderson likely
would have driven the purchased cocaine in the van containing the firearm. As
such, the gun had the potential to facilitate the offense. Accordingly, Henderson
was ineligible for any benefit under the safety-valve provision.
Minor-Role Reduction
If the district court properly imposes a statutory mandatory minimum
sentence that is greater than a defendant’s Guidelines range, any error in the
Guidelines calculations is harmless. United States v. Chirino-Alvarez, 615 F.3d
1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 2010). Henderson’s Guidelines range was 108 to 135
months’ imprisonment, but he was subject to a 10-year (120-month) statutory
mandatory minimum. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii). Accordingly,
Henderson’s Guidelines range became 120 to 135 months’ imprisonment, and the
district court sentenced Henderson to the mandatory minimum of 120 months’
imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c)(2). Therefore, because Henderson was
sentenced to the mandatory minimum, any error in the Guidelines calculations was
harmless, and we need not address Henderson’s argument regarding the minor-role
reduction.
AFFIRMED.
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