United States v. George Arthur Farmer , 553 F. App'x 901 ( 2014 )


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  •            Case: 12-16031   Date Filed: 01/23/2014   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-16031
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 8:12-cr-00064-SCB-TGW-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    GEORGE ARTHUR FARMER,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (January 23, 2014)
    Before HULL, MARCUS and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 12-16031     Date Filed: 01/23/2014     Page: 2 of 6
    George Arthur Farmer appeals his conviction for possession with intent to
    distribute 5 grams or more of methamphetamine actual and 50 grams of
    methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii). He
    raises two issues on appeal, which we address in turn. After review, we affirm
    Farmer’s conviction.
    I. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
    Farmer first contends the district court erred in denying his motion to
    suppress because the warrantless search of the motorcycle he was driving, after he
    was placed in a nearby patrol car, was not justifiable as a search incident to arrest
    or as an inventory search. Farmer does not address in his initial brief, however, the
    district court’s determination that he lacked standing to challenge the
    constitutionality of the search because he was driving a stolen motorcycle and had
    no driver’s license.
    When a defendant fails to offer argument on an issue, that issue is
    abandoned. United States v. Cunningham, 
    161 F.3d 1343
    , 1344 (11th Cir. 1998).
    Furthermore, issues not raised in a party’s initial brief, but later raised in a reply
    brief, are also abandoned. United States v. Magluta, 
    418 F.3d 1166
    , 1185-86 (11th
    Cir. 2005).
    Because Farmer did not raise any challenge to the district court’s threshold
    determination that he lacked standing to challenge the search of the motorcycle
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    until his reply brief, he has abandoned the issue on appeal. Accordingly, we do not
    reach his arguments about the constitutionality of the search.
    II. PRIOR CONVICTIONS
    Second, Farmer asserts the district court erred when it admitted evidence of
    his two prior Florida convictions for felony possession of methamphetamine,
    pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, to prove knowledge and
    intent. He contends that admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence unfairly tipped the
    scales in favor of a guilty verdict.
    “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a
    person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
    accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, the evidence
    may be admissible for other purposes, including intent, knowledge, absence of
    mistake, or lack of accident. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). To be admissible, Rule
    404(b) evidence (1) must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s
    character, (2) must be proven sufficiently to allow a jury to find that the defendant
    committed the extrinsic act, and (3) must possess probative value that is not
    substantially outweighed by undue prejudice under Rule 403. United States v.
    Sanders, 
    668 F.3d 1298
    , 1314 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted).
    Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a “court may
    exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
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    danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. In reviewing the third prong of
    Rule 404(b) admissibility under Rule 403, “we look at the evidence in a light most
    favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its
    undue prejudicial impact.” United States v. Edouard, 
    485 F.3d 1324
    , 1344 n.8
    (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion 1 in admitting evidence of
    Farmer’s two prior methamphetamine convictions. Farmer placed his intent and
    knowledge in issue by pleading not guilty to the offense charged under 
    21 U.S.C. §841
    (a), which required the Government to prove that he knowingly or
    intentionally possessed methamphetamine. See United States v. Delgado, 
    56 F.3d 1357
    , 1365 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding when a defendant pleads not guilty and
    presents a “mere presence” defense, intent becomes a material issue that the
    government may prove with qualifying Rule 404(b) evidence). Farmer’s prior
    state-court convictions under § 893.13, Florida Statutes, for possession of
    methamphetamine had a similar “knowledge” element to the federal offense charge
    under § 841(a). See 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1); State v. Adkins, 
    96 So. 3d 412
    , 415-16
    (Fla. 2012) (determining that § 893.13, Fla. Stat., includes, as an element of
    offenses related to the sale, manufacture, delivery, and possession of controlled
    substances, “the element of knowledge of the presence of the substance”). Thus,
    1
    We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United
    States v. Perez-Oliveros, 
    479 F.3d 779
    , 783 (11th Cir. 2007).
    4
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    the prior convictions were relevant to Farmer’s criminal intent in the § 841(a)
    charge. See Delgado, 
    56 F.3d at 1365-66
     (explaining where the state of mind
    required for an extrinsic offense is the same as the charged offense, the extrinsic
    offense is relevant to the defendant’s intent in the charged offense). The prior
    convictions for possession of methamphetamine established a logical connection to
    Farmer’s knowledge that methamphetamine was present in the motorcycle in this
    case. See United States v. Jernigan, 
    341 F.3d 1273
    , 1281-82 (11th Cir. 2003)
    (holding a prior conviction for possessing contraband establishes a logical
    connection that the defendant knowingly did so on a subsequent occasion).
    Farmer’s argument that admitting evidence of his prior convictions was
    unfairly prejudicial relies on his assertion that Deputy Craig Lariz’s trial testimony
    was contradicted by photographic evidence in the case and the Government
    presented little other evidence of intent at trial, and thus admitting evidence of
    prior convictions unfairly tipped the scales in favor of a conviction. Even
    accepting Farmer’s argument that Lariz’s testimony was contradicted by
    photographic evidence, this is the type of case where Rule 404(b) evidence would
    have been necessary to prove intent and obtain a conviction. See United States v.
    Calderon, 
    127 F.3d 1314
    , 1332 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating where proof of extrinsic
    acts is necessary to prove intent and to obtain a conviction, such evidence may be
    admitted). Moreover, in addition to Lariz’s testimony regarding the scuffle, there
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    was other evidence of intent and knowledge introduced at trial, such as the large
    amount of cash present on Farmer’s person when he was stopped and the presence
    of his red flip phone in the same compartment as the methamphetamine. The
    district court took steps to minimize the prejudicial impact of the introduction of
    the convictions for methamphetamine possession by giving the jury a limiting
    instruction, the substance of which Farmer does not contest. See United States v.
    Brown, 
    665 F.3d 1239
    , 1247 (11th Cir. 2011) (giving a limiting jury instruction on
    the proper use of Rule 404(b) evidence can minimize the evidence’s prejudicial
    impact). Because the prior convictions were relevant and their probative value was
    not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the court did not
    abuse its discretion in determining that evidence of the prior convictions was
    admissible. Accordingly, we affirm Farmer’s conviction.
    AFFIRMED.
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