DeWayne Carroll v. City of Stone Mountain ( 2013 )

Case: 12-15120 Date Filed: 11/25/2013 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-15120
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D. C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-02775-SCJ
DEWAYNE CARROLL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF STONE MOUNTAIN,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(November 25, 2013)
Before WILSON, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges and MIDDLEBROOKS,∗ District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:
∗ Honorable Donald M. Middlebrooks, United States District Judge for the Southern
District of Florida, sitting by designation.
Case: 12-15120 Date Filed: 11/25/2013 Page: 2 of 4
Appellant DeWayne Carroll, a former police officer who suffered an injury
while on duty and was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, appeals
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his former employer, the City of
Stone Mountain, Georgia (“the City”), in Carroll’s employment discrimination
complaint brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. §12112(a). In his complaint, Carroll alleged that the City failed to provide
him a reasonable accommodation for his disabilities when it disregarded his
doctor’s note extending his medical leave and terminated his employment for job
abandonment when he did not report for work.
On appeal, Carroll argues that the district court erred in finding that there
was no genuine issue of material fact that he failed to notify the City of his need
for additional medical leave as an accommodation for his injury. He asserts that he
was not required to personally notify the City of his need for medical leave and
that it was reasonable for him to assume that this information was given to the City
through his doctor and the workers’ compensation insurance carrier, through which
the City had received all previous updates about Carroll’s work status.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment on an ADA
claim. Holly v. Clairson Industries, L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2007).
We may affirm a grant of summary judgment “if there exists any adequate ground
for doing so, regardless of whether it is the one on which the district court relied.”
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Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 (11th Cir. 1993).
Assuming, arguendo, that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to the City based on Carroll’s failure to notify it of his need for
additional medical leave, we nevertheless affirm the grant of summary judgment
on different grounds. See id. at 1117. We conclude from the record that Carroll
was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA because he did not and could not
establish that he could have performed the essential functions of his job, either
with or without reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Although a
leave of absence can be a reasonable accommodation, Carroll’s requested
accommodations in this case were not reasonable. Carroll asserted in the district
court that the City should have honored his request for a short-term leave of
absence to cure his disabilities, and that he would have been able to return to work
had the City accommodated his request. However, the record is clear that Carroll
would not have been able to perform the essential functions of a police officer, or
even those of the light duty work that the City offered, at the end of his requested
leave of absence. Indeed, Carroll conceded in his deposition that there was no
accommodation that the City could have provided at the time of his termination
that would have allowed him to return to work in any capacity. Furthermore, to the
extent that Carroll requested a longer period of time in which to recover, the City’s
refusal to grant this request was not a violation of the ADA because there was “no
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Case: 12-15120 Date Filed: 11/25/2013 Page: 4 of 4
temporal limit on the advocated grace period,” and he was asserting only that “he
deserve[d] sufficient time to ameliorate his conditions.” Wood v. Green, 323 F.3d
1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d
1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 1997)).
We are aware of the hardship and frustration experienced by Carroll
resulting from his injury and his termination by the City. But the ADA does not
cover those who cannot “perform the essential functions of their jobs presently or
in the immediate future.” Wood, 323 F.3d at 1314. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City.
AFFIRMED.
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