Marco Island Cable v. Comcast Cablevision of the South, Inc. , 312 F. App'x 211 ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT           FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT  OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    FEBRUARY 13, 2009
    No. 07-12886
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    ________________________                CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 04-00026-CV-FTM-29-DNF
    MARCO ISLAND CABLE,
    a Florida Corporation,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    COMCAST CABLEVISION OF THE SOUTH, INC.,
    a Colorado Corporation,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (February 13, 2009)
    Before BLACK, PRYOR and COX, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    I. BACKGROUND
    This is a dispute between competitor providers of cable services to Multiple
    Dwelling Units (MDUs) on Marco Island. Marco Island Cable (“Marco”) sued
    Comcast Cablevision of the South (“Comcast”), alleging that Comcast engaged in
    anti-competitive behavior which damaged Marco’s business. After several of
    Marco’s claims were dismissed on Comcast’s motion for summary judgment, the case
    went to trial. The evidence at trial focused on Marco’s allegation that Comcast’s
    assertion of ownership rights in the cable wiring within Marco Island MDUs violated
    the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, 
    Fla. Stat. § 501.201
     et seq.
    (“the Act”).
    At trial, Comcast moved for judgment as a matter of law. The court denied the
    motion and submitted the case to the jury. The jury awarded Marco over $3.2
    million. Post-trial, Comcast again moved for judgment as a matter of law. The court
    denied that motion but granted Comcast’s alternative motion for a new trial. Later,
    on Marco’s motion, the district court remitted the judgment to $800,000, in lieu of
    granting a new trial.
    Comcast appeals the judgment, arguing only that the district court erred in
    denying its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Comcast does not seek
    review of the denial of its motion for a new trial.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant or denial of a renewed
    motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.
    2
    Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 
    369 F.3d 1189
    , 1192 (11th Cir. 2004)
    (citing Thosteson v. United States, 
    331 F.3d 1294
    , 1298 (11th Cir. 2003)). “Under
    Rule 50, a court should render judgment as a matter of law when there is no legally
    sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.”
    
    Id.
     (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50). “Where, as here, a defendant’s motion for directed
    verdict is denied by the district court, and the jury returns a verdict adverse to the
    defendant, the reviewing court cannot concern itself with any question of conflict in
    the evidence, but is required to assume that all conflicts have been resolved by the
    jury in favor of the plaintiff.” Russell v. Baccus, 
    707 F.2d 1289
    , 1292 (11th Cir.
    1983) (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Schreffler, 
    376 F.2d 397
    , 399 (5th Cir. 1967)).
    III. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
    Comcast makes three arguments: (1) Marco did not present any evidence that
    Comcast’s actions violated the Act; (2) Marco did not present any evidence that
    Comcast’s actions proximately caused Marco’s injury; and (3) Marco did not present
    any competent evidence of damages. (Appellant’s Br. at 24-28.) Marco originally
    filed a notice of cross-appeal but has abandoned that cross-appeal and now defends
    the judgment.
    3
    IV. DISCUSSION
    The jury’s liability verdict was a general one, finding only that Marco
    established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Comcast violated the Act. (R.29
    at 2098-99.) Therefore, we will uphold that verdict if any of Marco’s theories of
    liability is supported by sufficient evidence. Cabello v. Fernández-Larios, 
    402 F.3d 1148
    , 1160 (11th Cir. 2005).
    A review of the trial record reflects sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
    conclude that Comcast violated the Act by asserting ownership of inside wiring in
    Marco Island MDUs in the manner that it did and despite the fact that Comcast may
    not have owned the inside wiring. Evidence was presented that Comcast did not pay
    personal property taxes on the inside wiring, as it should have if it, in fact, owned that
    wiring. Marco also offered evidence that Comcast intimidated customers into
    contracting with Comcast by: deceptively omitting key operative language when
    quoting from its contracts in letters sent to the MDUs asserting ownership of the
    wiring; seeking to grossly overcharge the MDUs and their occupants who may have
    wanted to purchase the wiring; misleading customers about their access to the wiring
    and the necessity for its removal should they choose another cable provider; invoking
    inapplicable FCC regulations in support of Comcast’s asserted rights to the wiring;
    4
    and sending a crew out to remove interior wiring from an MDU, an act that would
    cause significant damage, without the MDU occupants’ permission.
    Given this evidence, several theories support the jury’s verdict. The jury could
    have concluded that Comcast violated the Act by dishonestly asserting that it owned
    the inside wiring. The jury could have concluded that Comcast violated the Act by
    knowingly misrepresenting its rights to charge MDU owners for the inside wiring or
    its rights to remove that wiring. And, the jury could have concluded that Comcast
    violated the Act by using the deceptive and bullying conduct we have described to
    induce the MDUs into contracting with Comcast.
    A reasonable jury also could have found that these actions by Comcast
    proximately caused Marco damage. Comcast argues that Marco failed to present
    evidence tying Comcast’s actions to Marco’s damages. But, Comcast’s arguments
    ignore the evidence that Comcast’s illegal actions affected the MDU cable market on
    Marco Island as a whole, not just those particular MDUs with which Comcast had
    interactions about the wiring in their individual buildings. Indeed, Comcast intended
    to affect the purchasing decisions of the whole MDU community on Marco Island.
    Testimony at trial (by Comcast’s own employee) was that Comcast intended for
    members of the Marco Island MDU ownership and management community to be
    made aware of its “new policies” and, that in addition to taking the actions listed
    5
    above, Comcast representatives communicated with members of the MDU
    community through an industry association, in an effort to make that community as
    a whole aware of Comcast’s position that it would not “relinquish” the wiring
    ownership rights that Comcast asserted. (R.26 at 1173-75.)
    And, Marco’s owner testified that Comcast’s actions did, in fact, affect his
    business. He testified that, given the historical performance of his business and what
    he knew of the Marco Island market, he would have expected to receive invitations
    to bid on eight to ten MDU contracts per year but, after Comcast took the actions it
    did (again, actions that the jury found illegal), he received no such requests. (R.26
    at 1303.) Marco’s damages expert testified that Marco’s business stopped expanding
    in 2003 “because of the necessity to deal with the business tactics and methodologies
    of the new Comcast that had come into the area.” (R.27 at 1537.) And, Comcast itself
    admits that Marco’s damages expert testified that Marco’s business diminished in
    value “as a result of Comcast practices.”1 Appellant’s Br. at 21 (citing R.27 at 1545).
    1
    Comcast argues that this evidence was improperly admitted as it was evidence of an
    incorrect measure of damages under the statute, it was speculative, and Comcast was not given
    sufficient notice of Marco’s damages expert’s opinion. But, Comcast has not properly presented for
    review the propriety of the district court’s admission of evidence or the propriety of the court’s
    charge to the jury. These are arguments more properly made in an appeal of a denial of a motion for
    new trial. Comcast challenges only the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter
    of law. And, denial of the new trial motion was proper if there was proof of damage in any amount,
    caused by Comcast’s illegal actions. Of course, there was such proof. Comcast’s arguments
    themselves – challenging the admission of some of that evidence – demonstrate that.
    6
    (See also R.27 at 1559 (expert testimony that Marco “[was] plateauing as a result of
    Comcast’s actions.”))
    V. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    AFFIRMED.
    7