United States v. Willie J. Berry ( 2009 )


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  •                                                          [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT            FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-14992               FEBRUARY 18, 2009
    Non-Argument Calendar           THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 02-00020-CR-3-RV-MD
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    WILLIE J. BERRY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (February 18, 2009)
    Before BLACK, BARKETT and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Willie James Berry, who was convicted of a crack cocaine offense, appeals
    pro se the district court’s denial of his 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) motion for
    modification of sentence. Berry argues that the district court erred in applying the
    policy statements of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 in a mandatory fashion, as United States v.
    Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 
    125 S.Ct. 738
    , 
    160 L.Ed.2d 621
     (2005), rendered the
    Sentencing Guidelines advisory only. Berry argues that the district court,
    therefore, had authority to reduce his sentence even though he was held responsible
    for too great a quantity of crack cocaine and was sentenced pursuant to a statutory
    mandatory minimum. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
    I.
    Berry pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack
    cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1). He was held accountable for 16
    kilograms of crack cocaine. Initially, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, the
    statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for his offense, pursuant to 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A). Later, however, the district court reduced his sentence to
    240 months’ imprisonment, pursuant to the government’s Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b)
    substantial assistance motion. On March 19, 2008, Berry filed a motion for
    modification of sentence, pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), citing Amendment 706 to the
    Guidelines. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that Amendment
    2
    706 did not affect Berry’s guideline imprisonment range.
    II.
    We review de novo “the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the
    scope of its authority under the [Guidelines].” United States v. Moore, 
    541 F.3d 1323
    , 1326 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, McFadden v. United States, (U.S. Jan.
    12, 2009) (No. 08-7610). Pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), when an already-incarcerated
    defendant’s sentence was determined using a guideline imprisonment range that
    retroactive amendments to the Guidelines have reduced, the district court may
    reduce the sentence, after considering the factors set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)
    and if such a reduction would be consistent with the policy statements issued by
    the Sentencing Commission. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). Pursuant to § 1B1.10, a
    reduction is not consistent with its policy statements, if the retroactive amendment
    in question does not have the effect of lowering defendant’s applicable guideline
    imprisonment range. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). In a recent case, United States
    v. Jones, 
    548 F.3d 1366
    , 1369 (11th Cir. 2008), we held that Amendment 706 did
    not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline imprisonment range of a
    defendant who was held responsible for more than 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine.
    We explained:
    Under Amendment 706 , the guidelines now provide a base offense
    level of 36 for defendants who are responsible for at least 1.5
    3
    kilograms but less than 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. However, a
    base offense level of 38 still applies to defendants responsible for 4.5
    kilograms or more. Accordingly, the distinction between 12 and 50
    kilograms of crack cocaine that did not matter in 1994 still does not
    matter in 2008, and the base offense level for that quantity range has
    not decreased.
    
    Id.
     (internal citations omitted).
    III.
    The district court did not err in determining that Berry was not eligible for a
    reduction. See Moore, 
    541 F.3d at 1326
    . Berry was not sentenced using a
    guideline imprisonment range that retroactive amendments to the Guidelines have
    reduced. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). Amendment 706 did not alter Berry’s base
    offense level because he was held responsible for 16 kilograms of crack cocaine.
    See Jones, 
    548 F.3d at 1369
    . Berry’s arguments concerning the mandatory
    application of § 1B1.10 do not affect this conclusion. Berry suggests that the
    district court had the discretion not to follow § 1B1.10’s instruction that a
    reduction is inconsistent with the Commission’s policies, and, therefore, should not
    be made, if Amendment 706 does not actually lower the applicable guideline
    imprisonment range. However, the controlling statute, § 3582(c)(2), which Berry
    does not argue is advisory, itself instructs that the reduction is limited to “a
    defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a
    sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
    4
    Commission.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). Given that Amendment 706 did not lower
    his base offense level, Berry was not sentenced to a range that was subsequently
    lowered, as required by the controlling statute. Likewise, Berry’s arguments
    concerning the application of the statutory mandatory minimum do not alter the
    conclusion that he was not eligible for a reduction, as the existence of a statutory
    mandatory minimum merely was an alternative reason to deny Berry’s
    § 3582(c)(2) motion.1 Accordingly, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    To the extent that Berry suggests that Booker gave the district court authority to re-open
    his sentencing proceedings, his argument is without merit. See Moreno v. United States, 
    421 F.3d 1217
     (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that, when the defendant was denied a § 3582(c)(2)
    reduction pursuant to an Amendment, Booker could not serve as the sole basis to re-open
    proceedings pursuant to § 3582(c)); United States v. Jones, 
    548 F.3d 1366
     (11th Cir. 2008)
    (holding that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked authority to reduce the
    defendant’s sentence because Amendment 706 did not lower the defendant’s base offense level
    and because Booker was not a retroactively applicable amendment to the Guidelines).
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-14992

Judges: Black, Barkett, Fay

Filed Date: 2/18/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024