Monica R. Clyburn v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration , 555 F. App'x 892 ( 2014 )


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  •             Case: 13-12214   Date Filed: 02/07/2014   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-12214
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 8:12-cv-00280-JSM-TBM
    MONICA R. CLYBURN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY
    ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY
    ADMINISTRATION,                                           Defendant-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (February 7, 2014)
    Before CARNES, Chief Judge, HULL, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 13-12214     Date Filed: 02/07/2014    Page: 2 of 5
    Monica Clyburn appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the
    Administrative Law Judge’s denial of supplemental social security income
    benefits. She contends that the ALJ gave improper weight to her treating
    physician’s silence about her residual functional capacity. She also challenges an
    adverse credibility finding regarding her assertions about the intensity, persistence,
    and limiting effects of her symptoms, and she argues that the ALJ erred by failing
    to address an affidavit from her sister. Finally, she challenges a vocational expert’s
    testimony given in response to a hypothetical question that she asserts was
    incomplete.
    I.
    When the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review, we
    review the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision. Doughty v.
    Apfel, 
    245 F.3d 1274
    , 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). We review de novo the legal
    conclusions and consider the factual findings conclusive if supported by substantial
    evidence. Lewis v. Barnhart, 
    285 F.3d 1329
    , 1330 (11th Cir. 2002). “Substantial
    evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
    person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Winschel v. Comm’r of
    Soc. Sec., 
    631 F.3d 1176
    , 1178 (11th Cir. 2011).
    II.
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    Case: 13-12214     Date Filed: 02/07/2014    Page: 3 of 5
    Clyburn first contends that, in making a residual functional capacity finding,
    the ALJ gave improper weight to her treating physician Dr. Torres’ silence
    regarding Clyburn’s functional capacity. The ALJ noted that “Dr. Torres did not
    offer any limitations or restrictions on the claimant’s activities of daily living and
    his opinion was given great weight.”
    When a doctor’s silence about a claimant’s ability to work is subject to
    competing inferences, we have stated that no inference should be drawn from that
    silence. See Lamb v. Bowen, 
    847 F.2d 698
    , 703 (11th Cir. 1988). Contrary to
    Clyburn’s contentions, however, the ALJ did not base his residual functional
    capacity determination merely on Dr. Torres’ silence with respect to Clyburn’s
    functional limitations. The ALJ also considered Dr. Torres’ findings about
    Clyburn’s lack of a history of swelling or progressive joint deformity, his
    conclusion that Clyburn’s clinical course was atypical for rheumatoid arthritis, and
    his conclusion that he was unable to diagnose rheumatoid arthritis based on his
    observations. Furthermore, the ALJ observed that in her own testimony Clyburn
    “reluctantly admitted” that she was able to engage in certain “activities of daily
    living,” which provided additional support for the residual functional capacity
    finding that the ALJ made. Regardless of how the ALJ interpreted Dr. Torres’
    silence about Clyburn’s functional capacity, substantial evidence, including
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    Case: 13-12214     Date Filed: 02/07/2014    Page: 4 of 5
    Clyburn’s own testimony and the medical evidence in the record, supports the
    ALJ’s the residual functional capacity determination.
    III.
    Clyburn contends that the ALJ erred by concluding that her assertions about
    the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not credible.
    As a general rule, “credibility determinations are for the ALJ.” Wilson v. Heckler,
    
    734 F.2d 513
    , 517 (11th Cir. 1984). “After considering a claimant’s complaints of
    pain, the ALJ may reject them as not creditable, and that determination will be
    reviewed for substantial evidence.” Marbury v. Sullivan, 
    957 F.2d 837
    , 839 (11th
    Cir. 1992). If the ALJ discredits subjective testimony, he must explicitly and
    adequately articulate his reasons. 
    Id. The ALJ
    specifically and adequately articulated his reasons for the adverse
    credibility determination in this case, and substantial evidence supports that
    determination. The ALJ found inconsistencies in Clyburn’s testimony. For
    example, she testified on direct examination that she could not lift a gallon of milk,
    but when questioned by the ALJ admitted that she could lift her 26-pound baby, “if
    she has to.” She also testified that she was unable to drive after knee surgery but
    that she was in a car accident one month after the surgery. She stated that was able
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    to drive even though she was not supposed to be driving, and the ALJ found that
    her testimony called into question whether Clyburn was ignoring her physicians’
    advice. The ALJ found that these and other inconsistencies diminished Clyburn’s
    “overall credibility.” Although Clyburn attempts to qualify her testimony and
    rebut the ALJ’s interpretation of it, the record establishes that substantial evidence
    supports the ALJ’s credibility determination.
    Nor did the ALJ err by not explicitly discussing statements contained in an
    affidavit by Clyburn’s sister. Because the ALJ expressly rejected as not credible
    Clyburn’s testimony about the severity of her pain and the extent of her limitations,
    he impliedly rejected the statements in the affidavit as well. See Allen v.
    Schweiker, 
    642 F.2d 799
    , 801 (5th Cir. 1981).
    As for the hypothetical question that the ALJ posed to the vocational expert,
    the ALJ was not required to include findings that he properly rejected as
    unsupported. See Crawford v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 
    363 F.3d 1155
    , 1161 (11th Cir.
    2004). The ALJ’s hypothetical question adequately accounted for Clyburn’s
    impairments. Furthermore, the expert testified that Clyburn could perform her past
    relevant work, and Clyburn failed to demonstrate otherwise.
    AFFIRMED.
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