United States v. Lawrence Smith ( 2008 )


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  •                                                           [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    OCT 16, 2008
    No. 08-10515                 THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 07-00019-CR-FTM-29-DNF
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    LAWRENCE SMITH,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (October 16, 2008)
    Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Lawrence Smith appeals his 235-month sentence, imposed
    following his conviction for possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of
    crack cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii). On appeal,
    Smith argues that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence in light of
    the factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) and because the court strictly applied the career
    offender provision in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
    We review the final sentence imposed by the district court for
    reasonableness. United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 264, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    , 767,
    
    160 L. Ed. 2d 621
     (2005); United States v. Crawford, 
    407 F.3d 1174
    , 1179 (11th
    Cir. 2005). Specifically, the district court must impose a sentence that is both
    procedurally and substantively reasonable. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. ___,
    ___, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 597, 
    169 L. Ed. 2d 445
     (2007). A sentence may be
    procedurally unreasonable if the district court improperly calculates the guidelines
    range, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory rather than advisory, fails to
    consider the appropriate statutory factors, selects a sentence based on clearly
    erroneous facts, or fails to explain adequately the chosen sentence. After an
    appellate court has determined that the sentence is procedurally sound, Gall directs
    that the appellate court review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under
    an abuse-of-discretion standard. 
    Id.
     The review for substantive reasonableness
    involves examining the totality of the circumstances, including an inquiry into
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    whether the statutory factors in § 3553(a) support the sentence in question. Id. at
    ___, 
    128 S. Ct. at 597-600
    .
    In its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, the district court does not need
    to discuss or state each factor explicitly. United States v. Scott, 
    426 F.3d 1324
    ,
    1329 (11th Cir. 2005). Instead, an acknowledgment by the district court that it has
    considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will suffice. Id. at
    1330. We will defer to the judgment of the district court in the weight given to the
    § 3553(a) factors unless the district court has made “a clear error of judgment” and
    has imposed “a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated
    by the facts of the case.” United States v. McBride, 
    511 F.3d 1293
    , 1297-98 (11th
    Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).
    Pursuant to § 3553(a), the sentencing court shall impose a sentence
    “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in
    paragraph (2) of this subsection,” namely to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
    promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal
    conduct, protect the public from future crimes of the defendant, and provide the
    defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical care. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2). The sentencing court must also consider the following factors
    in determining a particular sentence: the nature and circumstances of the offense
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    and the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences
    available, the guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing
    Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to
    provide restitution to victims. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(1), (3)-(7).
    The Supreme Court has held that, in reviewing sentences for reasonableness
    under § 3553(a), a federal appellate court may apply a presumption of
    reasonableness to a district court sentence imposed within the guidelines range.
    Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. ___, ___, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
    , 2462, 
    168 L. Ed. 2d 203
    (2007). Nevertheless, we do not apply a presumption of reasonableness to a
    sentence that is within the properly calculated guidelines range. See United States
    v. Campbell, 
    491 F.3d 1306
    , 1313-14 & n.8 (11th Cir. 2007). Instead, we
    ordinarily expect a sentence within the guidelines range to be reasonable, and the
    appellant has the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of
    the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Talley, 
    431 F.3d 784
    , 788
    (11th Cir. 2005).
    We conclude from the record that Smith cannot show that his sentence was
    unreasonable because he did not challenge the calculation of his guideline range
    and the district court properly considered all the factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) and
    imposed a sentence at the lowest point in his guideline range that was supported by
    4
    the § 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, we affirm Smith’s sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
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