Case: 18-12820 Date Filed: 05/15/2019 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-12820
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:18-cv-00595-SDM-CPT
DAVID STANLEY VAUGHAN,
Petitioner–Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents–Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(May 15, 2019)
Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 18-12820 Date Filed: 05/15/2019 Page: 2 of 4
David Vaughan, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s dismissal as untimely of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. He argues that the 2018 Florida state court order amending his original
1997 judgment of conviction constituted a new judgment that reset the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) one-year statute of
limitations. He asserts that what matters for the purposes of the AEDPA’s timing
requirements is whether a new piece of paper labelled “judgment” was issued by
the state court, and he characterizes his amended and re-recorded state-court
judgment as such a piece of paper.
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal as untimely of a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. Damren v. Florida,
776 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2015).
The AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations for filing a § 2254 petition
that begins to run from the latest of four possible events, including, in relevant part,
the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A). The final judgment in a criminal case means the sentence.
Burton v. Stewart,
549 U.S. 147, 156 (2007). Accordingly, we have held that the
“AEDPA’s statute of limitations begins to run when the judgment pursuant to
which the petitioner is in custody, which is based on both the conviction and the
sentence the petitioner is serving, is final.” Ferreira v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
494 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007). “[T]he judgment to which AEDPA refers is
2
Case: 18-12820 Date Filed: 05/15/2019 Page: 3 of 4
the underlying conviction and most recent sentence that authorizes the petitioner’s
current detention.”
Id. at 1292.
In Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., the petitioner was sentenced to
two consecutive life sentences, an additional 311 months’ imprisonment, and
chemical castration, for burglary, aggravated kidnapping of a child, and 2 counts of
capital sexual battery.
849 F.3d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). After
filing an unsuccessful § 2254 petition, the petitioner filed a Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800
motion to correct his sentence in a Florida state court, challenging the portion of
his sentence that required chemical castration.
Id. at 1324. The Florida court
granted the motion and issued an order stating that the petitioner would not have to
undergo chemical castration.
Id. Thereafter, the petitioner filed another § 2254
petition challenging his convictions, which the district court dismissed as second or
successive.
Id.
Sitting en banc, we affirmed the district court’s dismissal, concluding that
the § 2254 petition was second or successive because the Florida court’s grant of
the Rule 3.800 motion did not create a “new judgment.”
Id. at 1325–26. We
reasoned that a “judgment” for purposes of § 2244 is the judgment authorizing the
prisoner’s confinement, and the amended order, while prohibiting chemical
castration, did not address the petitioner’s term of imprisonment that had been
imposed by the initial criminal judgment.
Id. at 1326. We emphasized that the
3
Case: 18-12820 Date Filed: 05/15/2019 Page: 4 of 4
state court did not change the petitioner’s term of imprisonment, impose a new
sentence, or enter a corrected sentence and a new judgment when it granted the
Rule 3.800 motion.
Id. In short, the relevant question is not whether the sentence
has been changed, but whether there has been the issuance of a new judgment
authorizing the prisoner’s confinement.
Id. at 1326–27.
The district court did not err in dismissing Vaughan’s petition. The state
court order amending his original 1997 judgment of conviction did not constitute a
new judgment that reset the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations for filing a
§ 2254 petition because he remained in custody pursuant to the original judgment
and his term of imprisonment was not altered by the amendment.
AFFIRMED.
4
