Lalani v. United States ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-15239 FEB 26, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket Nos. 06-02474-CV-JTC-1
& 02-00155-CR-JTC
AMZAD LALANI,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
No. 07-15359
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket Nos. 06-02475-CV-JTC-1
& 02-00155-CR-6-1
WENDY LALANI,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(February 26, 2009)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Amzad Lalani and Wendy Lalani (collectively “the Petitioners”), proceeding
with separate counsel in this consolidated appeal, challenge the district court’s
denial of their motions to vacate their sentences, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The Petitioners alleged that their shared trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective because, after they instructed him to pursue a plea agreement, he
erroneously advised them that a plea agreement was not in their best interests. The
Petitioners further alleged that had their counsel pursued a plea agreement, they
would have obtained a plea offer from the government, and they would have pled
guilty and received a lesser sentence, as did other co-defendants. The district court
found that because the Petitioners maintained their innocence after being
convicted, they could not show prejudice, i.e., that they would have pled guilty but
for counsel’s advice.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
2
After a jury trial, the Petitioners were convicted of one count of conspiring
to the interstate transport of stolen goods, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and 137
counts of the interstate transportation of stolen goods, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2314. Amzad was sentenced to 121 months’, and Wendy was sentenced to 63
months’ imprisonment.
Early on in his case, Amzad Lalani instructed trial counsel to pursue a plea
agreement for himself and his wife Wendy Lalani. Amzad also requested that trial
counsel inform him of the exposure he faced by proceeding to trial. In response,
trial counsel told Amzad a plea agreement was “not necessary because he was
going to win the case.” A plea agreement ostensibly may have been an option for
them - other co-conspirators entered into plea agreements,1 although it is not clear
by how much their sentences would have been reduced.
Amzad Lalani and Wendy Lalani filed separate motions to vacate their
sentences, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court issued separate orders
addressing their motions. For both Amzad and Wendy, the district court assumed
that they instructed counsel to pursue a plea agreement and that counsel advised
them that a plea was unnecessary because they would win at trial. Nevertheless,
1
Six of the Movants’ co-conspirators pled guilty with the benefit of a plea agreement.
(CM/ECF for the U.S. District Ct. for the N.D. of Georgia, No. 1:02-cr-00155, docket entries
231, 235, 236, 259, 313, 315).
3
the district court found that neither could show prejudice because their “post-
conviction-stance[s]” that they were innocent showed that neither could
demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability he or she would have pled
guilty.
Both Petitioners filed notices of appeal and motions for certificates of
appealability (“COA”). The district court denied their motions in a single order.
We issued a certificate of appealability on the following issue: “Whether the
district court erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to
pursue a plea agreement after the appellants requested that counsel do so, in light
of the fact that no evidentiary hearing was held. See Finch v. Vaughn, 67 F.3d
909, 916 (11th Cir. 1995).”
II. Standard of Review
In a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding, we review the district court’s findings of
fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Devine v. United States, 520
F.3d 1286, 1287 (11th Cir. 2008). “A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo.” Id. Denial of an
evidentiary hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Aron v. United States, 291
F.3d 708, 714 n.5 (11th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, we may affirm on alternative
4
grounds. McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001).
The district court “shall” hold an evidentiary hearing on a habeas petition
“[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). “[I]f the petitioner
alleges facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief, then the district court should
order an evidentiary hearing and rule on the merits of his claim.” Aron, 291 F.3d
at 714-15 (quotation omitted). Yet the “district court is not required to hold an
evidentiary hearing where the petitioner’s allegations are affirmatively contradicted
by the record, or the claims are patently frivolous.” Id. at 715.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must establish
two things: (1) ‘counsel’s performance was deficient,’ meaning it ‘fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness’; and (2) ‘the deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant.’” Gordon v. United States, 518 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 2064 (1984)). If a petitioner fails to show deficient performance, the court
need not go on to determine whether there was prejudice, and vice-versa.
Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000).
The Supreme Court has held that “the two-part Strickland v. Washington test
applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.”
5
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985). “The failure of an
attorney to inform his client of the relevant law clearly satisfies the first prong of
the Strickland analysis as such an omission cannot be said to fall within the wide
range of professionally competent assistance demanded by the Sixth Amendment.”
Finch v. Vaughn, 67 F.3d 909, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (quotations and ellipses
omitted). The prejudice inquiry in the context of guilty pleas, “focuses on whether
counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea
process.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370. To show prejudice after a
rejected plea, an individual must “establish a reasonable probability that, absent
counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance, he would have accepted the plea
agreement.” Diaz v. United States, 930 F.2d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1991); accord
Coulter v. Herring, 60 F.3d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995).
IV. Discussion
The district court stated that the Petitioners could not show that they would
have pled guilty because they asserted post-conviction arguments that they were
innocent and that the evidence in their trial was insufficient to convict them.
The Sixth Circuit has specifically addressed whether a petitioner maintaining
his innocence prevents him from showing that there was a reasonable probability
that he would have pled guilty if informed of the government’s plea offer. Griffin
v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 2003). In Griffin, the petitioner
6
alleged that his counsel was ineffective for not informing him of the government’s
plea offer. Id. at 734. The government argued that the record showed that the
petitioner would not have pled guilty if he had known about the offer because he
maintained his innocence throughout the trial and sentencing. Id. at 738. The
Sixth Circuit held that the petitioner’s “repeated declarations of innocence do not
prove, as the government claims, that he would not have accepted a guilty plea.”
Id. (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 33, 91 S. Ct. 160, 165 (1970)
(“reasons other than the fact that he is guilty may induce a defendant to so plead,
. . . and he must be permitted to judge for himself in this respect” (quotation
omitted))). The court went on to state the following:
Defendants must claim innocence right up to the point of
accepting a guilty plea, or they would lose their ability to
make any deal with the government. It does not make
sense to say that a defendant must admit guilt prior to
accepting a deal on a guilty plea. It therefore does not
make sense to say that a defendant’s protestations of
innocence belie his later claim that he would have
accepted a guilty plea. Furthermore, a defendant must be
entitled to maintain his innocence throughout trial under
the Fifth Amendment. Finally, Griffin could have
possibly entered an Alford plea even while protesting his
innocence. These declarations of innocence are therefore
not dispositive on the question of whether Griffin would
have accepted the government’s plea offer.
Id.In this case, the Petitioners challenged their convictions, in part, on the basis
7
that they were innocent. The district court held that because they maintained their
innocence after their trial they could not show prejudice. We find the Sixth
Circuit’s opinion in Griffin persuasive with respect to the prejudice prong of
Strickland. Furthermore, because the Petitioner’s protestations of innocence after
their trial do not prevent the Petitioners from showing prejudice, as was held in
Griffin, there is sufficient subjective evidence in the record to warrant an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the
Petitioners would have accepted a plea offer had their counsel successfully pursued
a plea offer from the government.
Also, the petitioners, like Griffin, have presented a potentially meritorious
claim on the deficient performance prong of Strickland, but the district court did
not address the deficiency prong and we leave it to the district court in the first
instance to decide the utility of hearing evidence on that issue.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is VACATED
and the case is REMANDED for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
Strickland test is met in light of Griffin .
VACATED AND REMANDED
8