United States v. Schearean Jean Means , 316 F. App'x 889 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-13790 FEB 17, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 95-00129-CR-JHH-TMP
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SCHEAREAN JEAN MEANS,
a.k.a. Jean,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(February 17, 2009)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Schearean Jean Means, a federal prisoner convicted of a crack cocaine
offense, appeals pro se from the district court’s denial of her 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2) motion for reduction of sentence based on an amendment to U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1 that lowered the base offense levels applicable to crack cocaine offenses.
Means was originally sentenced, under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), to the mandatory
minimum of life imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute 50 or more
grams of crack cocaine, with two or more prior felony drug convictions. On
appeal, Means argues that the district court erroneously denied her 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) motion for a two-level reduction in her base offense level. After
careful review, we affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for sentence reduction
pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Moreno, 421
F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). We review “de novo the district
court’s legal conclusions regarding the scope of its authority under the Sentencing
Guidelines,” as well as “questions of statutory interpretation.” United States v.
Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied (No. 08-7610) (U.S.
Jan. 12, 2009).
A district court may modify a term of imprisonment in the case of a
defendant who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing
range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). This authority is limited to those guideline amendments
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listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c), including Amendment 706, that “have the effect of
lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.10(a)(2),
(c) (2008). Amendment 706, which reduced the offense levels in crack cocaine
cases calculated pursuant to § 2D1.1(c) by two levels, became effective November
1, 2007. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706 (2007). The Amendment was made
retroactive as of March 3, 2008, by incorporation into U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c). See
U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 713 (2008).
Although the retroactive effect of Amendment 706 allows a defendant
whose guideline imprisonment range was calculated in accordance with § 2D1.1 to
seek a reduction in her sentence, a defendant whose original sentence was based on
something other than § 2D1.1 is precluded from receiving a sentence reduction,
since the amendment does not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline
range. Moore, 541 F.3d at 1327-28; see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). This occurs,
for example, where the defendant was sentenced to a statutory mandatory
minimum sentence. See Moore, 541 F.3d at 1327-28 (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10,
comment. (n.1(A)) (noting that the operation of another guideline or statutory
provision, such as “a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment,” would
prevent the crack cocaine amendment from having the effect of lowering the
defendant’s applicable guideline range).
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When a sentence is being reconsidered pursuant to a § 3582(c)(2) motion,
the district court first must recalculate the sentence under the amended guidelines,
then it must “decide whether, in its discretion, it will elect to impose the newly
calculated sentence under the amended guidelines or retain the original sentence.”
United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780-81 (11th Cir. 2000). If a defendant is
not eligible, such as when an amendment is not applicable or does not actually
lower the guidelines range, the district court is not required to engage in this two-
step analysis. See Moore, 541 F.3d at 1328-29; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, comment.
(n.1(A)) (“Eligibility for consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is triggered
only by an amendment listed in subsection (c) that lowers the applicable guideline
range.”). Title 21 Section 841(b)(1)(A) states that if the defendant is convicted of a
violation involving 50 grams or more of crack cocaine “after two or more prior
convictions for a felony drug offense have become final, such person shall be
sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
Here, Means was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment, under
§ 841(b)(1)(A), since she was responsible for more then 50 grams of crack cocaine,
and had four prior felony drug convictions. Because Means was sentenced to an
applicable statutory mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment, resulting in a
sentence that ultimately was based on something other than the offense level
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calculation under § 2D1.1, she was precluded from receiving a sentence reduction
under § 3582. See Moore, 541 F.3d at 1327-28. Accordingly, we likewise do not
reach any of Moore’s challenges to her sentence, and affirm the district court’s
denial of her § 3582(c)(2) motion.
AFFIRMED.
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