Christopher Bowden v. Robert Stokely ( 2014 )


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  •                Case: 13-14320         Date Filed: 08/14/2014   Page: 1 of 8
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-14320
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:12-cv-00652-UAMH-JRK
    CHRISTOPHER BOWDEN,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ROBERT STOKELY,
    in his individual capacity,
    WARREN HALL,
    in his individual capacity,
    Defendants-Appellants,
    PAMELA SMITH,
    in her individual capacity, et al.,
    Defendants.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (August 14, 2014)
    Case: 13-14320       Date Filed: 08/14/2014       Page: 2 of 8
    Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Christopher Bowden, a Florida state inmate, filed an action under 42 U.S.C.
    § 1983 against correctional officers Robert Stokely and Warren Hall.1 Relevant to
    this appeal, Bowden’s Amended Complaint alleges that Stokely and Hall used
    excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
    Constitution. After discovery, Stokely and Hall moved for summary judgment.
    The magistrate judge found there were two contradictory stories of the physical
    altercation and recommended denying the motion. Based on that conclusion and
    our precedent that “a defense of qualified immunity is not available in cases
    alleging excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment,” Skrtich v.
    Thorton, 
    280 F.3d 1295
    , 1301 (11th Cir. 2002), the magistrate judge also
    recommended denying Stokely and Hall qualified immunity. The district court
    adopted the report and recommendation as its order. Stokely and Hall then filed
    this interlocutory appeal.2 Because we agree with the district court that there is a
    material dispute of fact that precludes summary judgment, we affirm.
    1
    During the proceedings below, Bowden named additional defendants who are not at issue in
    this appeal. There is also some confusion about the proper spelling of Stokely’s name. We use
    the spelling as it appears in the caption.
    2
    Bowden challenges this Court’s jurisdiction to review the district court’s summary judgment
    ruling. However, this Court has jurisdiction over final orders denying qualified immunity. See
    Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
    472 U.S. 511
    , 530, 
    105 S. Ct. 2806
    , 2817 (1985) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291).
    In this case, our analysis of the availability of qualified immunity depends on whether a
    2
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    I.
    The parties agree to some extent on what took place on November 6, 2011,
    at the Reception Medical Center of the Florida Department of Corrections. On
    Bowden’s way to eat, he and Stokely had a verbal exchange about Bowden’s
    compliance with the facility’s shaving rules. Shortly after the exchange, Stokely or
    Hall called Bowden to the officer’s station. While Bowden, Stokely, and Hall
    were together in the officer’s station, a physical altercation ensued. Only those
    three were in the officer’s station, which does not have a security camera. During
    the altercation, Stokely and Hall used force against Bowden. Stokely took Bowden
    to the ground. Hall sprayed Bowden with chemical agents. At some point
    Bowden was handcuffed. Bowden sustained a laceration on his head. The parties
    dispute who started the altercation and the amount of force Stokely and Hall used.
    II.
    “We review de novo a district court’s ruling on summary judgment,
    applying the same legal standards as the district court.” 
    Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1299
    .
    Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidence before the court
    demonstrates that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    reasonable jury could find excessive force that violates the Eighth Amendment. See 
    Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1301
    .
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    A.
    In Eighth Amendment excessive force cases, the “core judicial inquiry” is
    “not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather whether force
    was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously
    and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 
    559 U.S. 34
    , 37, 
    130 S. Ct. 1175
    , 1178 (2010) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted) (concluding that a
    gratuitous beating by prison guards, even without injuries requiring medical
    attention, violated a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights). In determining whether
    the force was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, courts consider:
    “a) the need for the application of force; b) the relationship between the need and
    the amount of force that was used; c) the extent of the injury inflicted upon the
    prisoner; d) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates; and e) any
    efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Fennell v. Gilstrap,
    
    559 F.3d 1212
    , 1217 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). “When considering these
    factors, we give a wide range of deference to prison officials acting to preserve
    discipline and security, including when considering decisions made at the scene of
    a disturbance.” 
    Id. (quotation marks
    omitted).
    Under Bowden’s version of the events, we agree with the district court that a
    reasonable jury could conclude that Stokely and Hall applied force maliciously and
    sadistically, rather than in a good-faith effort to restore or maintain order. If the
    4
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    jury believes Bowden, he did nothing to cause a disturbance, present a threat to
    security or order, or threaten the safety of staff or other inmates. Cf. Danley v.
    Allen, 
    540 F.3d 1298
    , 1308 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Danley created a disturbance by
    failing to obey orders, and the jailers’ initial use of pepper spray was a reasonable
    response to that threat.”). As a result, there would have been no need for the use of
    force, much less for the amount of force used, especially if, according to Bowden’s
    version, the use of force continued after he was handcuffed and being held down
    on his stomach. See 
    id. at 1309
    (“Once a prisoner has stopped resisting there is no
    longer a need for force, so the use of force thereafter is disproportionate to the
    need.”).
    While the defendants argue that Bowden’s injuries are de minimis, the
    Supreme Court has regularly admonished courts that require a significant injury
    threshold for stating an excessive force claim. See 
    Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38
    , 130 S.
    Ct. at 1178–79 (“An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his
    ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune
    to escape without serious injury.”); accord Hudson v. McMillian, 
    503 U.S. 1
    , 9,
    
    112 S. Ct. 995
    , 1000 (1992). Bowden’s testimony is that he was the victim of an
    unprovoked attack in circumstances that did not present a risk of creating a
    disturbance or harming staff or other inmates. This version of the events could
    support an excessive force claim despite the lack of serious injuries.
    5
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    Although Stokely and Hall dispute Bowden’s version of events, at this stage
    we are required to view the facts in the light most favorable to Bowden and draw
    all reasonable inferences from those facts in his favor. See Skop v. City of Atlanta,
    
    485 F.3d 1130
    , 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). Credibility determinations are
    impermissible at the summary judgment stage of a case. Moorman v.
    UnumProvident Corp., 
    464 F.3d 1260
    , 1266 n.1 (11th Cir. 2006). As a result, we
    cannot resolve disputed evidence in Stokely and Hall’s favor where Bowden’s
    evidence is based on his personal observations and not blatantly contradicted by
    other evidence in the record. See Miller v. Harget, 
    458 F.3d 1251
    , 1256 (11th Cir.
    2006) (“Even if the district court believes that the evidence presented by one side
    is of doubtful veracity, it is not proper to grant summary judgment on the basis of
    credibility choices.”).
    Lastly, Stokely and Hall challenge Bowden’s version of the facts as an
    improper attack on the prison’s disciplinary report, in which Bowden was charged
    and found guilty of attempted battery on a correctional officer. 3 However the case
    they rely on, O’Bryant v. Finch, 
    637 F.3d 1207
    (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam),
    involved a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, in which O’Bryant
    claimed a correctional officer brought a disciplinary action against him in
    3
    Bowden’s lawsuit does not involve the deprivation of good time credits, nor the validity of
    Bowden’s conviction or sentence, claims that would be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
    , 
    114 S. Ct. 2364
    (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 
    520 U.S. 641
    , 
    117 S. Ct. 1584
    (1997).
    6
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    retaliation for O’Bryant’s grievance filings. 
    Id. at 1211.
    In contrast, Bowden has
    not argued the disciplinary report was retaliatory or challenged whether he
    received due process. Nor have defendants offered authority under Florida law
    that the findings of the disciplinary report should have preclusive effect over
    Bowden’s Eighth Amendment claim. Cf. Cook v. State, 
    921 So. 2d 631
    , 635 (Fla.
    2d DCA 2005) (“Differences in the burden of proof or persuasion between the
    initial proceeding and the subsequent proceeding may also affect whether the
    doctrine of collateral estoppel will be applied.”).
    B.
    Because the district court did not err in finding a material dispute of fact as
    to Bowden’s Eighth Amendment claim, it did not err in denying qualified
    immunity. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, if the defendant establishes
    that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the alleged
    excessive force occurred, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
    defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. 
    Skop, 485 F.3d at 1136
    –37. To
    defeat qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show both that a constitutional violation
    occurred and that the constitutional right violated was clearly established. 
    Fennell, 559 F.3d at 1216
    . In Eighth Amendment excessive force cases, however, “the
    subjective element required to establish [the constitutional violation] is so extreme
    that every conceivable set of circumstances in which this constitutional violation
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    occurs is clearly established to be a violation of the Constitution.” Johnson v.
    Breeden, 
    280 F.3d 1308
    , 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2002).
    Here, because a reasonable jury could find Stokely and Hall violated
    Bowden’s Eighth Amendment rights, Stokely and Hall are not entitled to qualified
    immunity. While we agree with defendants that there is no per se rule barring
    qualified immunity in Eighth Amendment cases, where the plaintiff has
    sufficiently alleged or shown a material dispute of fact as to an excessive force
    claim, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is not appropriate. See
    
    Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1301
    .
    III.
    Because there is a material dispute of fact as to the events that underlie
    Bowden’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, the district court properly
    denied summary judgment and defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity. The
    district court’s order is therefore AFFIRMED.
    8