United States v. Jajuanis Armstrong ( 2018 )


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  •            Case: 17-14569   Date Filed: 05/23/2018   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-14569
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cr-00007-RWS-JCF-3
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JAJUANIS ARMSTRONG,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (May 23, 2018)
    Before JULIE CARNES, HULL, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
    Case: 17-14569     Date Filed: 05/23/2018    Page: 2 of 5
    PER CURIAM:
    Jajuanis Armstrong appeals his 96-month sentence for stealing firearms, in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(u), 924(i), and 2. He contends that the sentence is
    procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the district court did not
    consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors or adequately explain its reason for
    imposing an upward variance. We see no reversible error.
    We review the reasonableness of a sentence, even when it is outside of the
    guideline range, under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
    States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007). A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if
    the sentencing court fails to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. 
    Id. We however
    do not require a district court to state on the record that it has explicitly
    considered each of the § 3553(a) factors; we will consider it sufficient where the
    district court acknowledges that it considered the defendant’s arguments and the
    § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Dorman, 
    488 F.3d 936
    , 938 (11th Cir. 2007).
    In sentencing a defendant, the district court “should set forth enough to satisfy the
    appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
    basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United
    States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356 (2007). The district court must explain its decision to
    impose a variance from the Guidelines, providing a justification that is
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    “sufficiently compelling to support the degree of variance.” United States v. Irey,
    
    612 F.3d 1160
    , 1196 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted).
    After reviewing for procedural reasonableness, we consider the substantive
    reasonableness of a sentence. 
    Gall, 552 U.S. at 51
    . In reviewing a district court’s
    sentence for substantive reasonableness, we examine the totality of the
    circumstances to determine whether the statutory factors in § 3553(a) support the
    sentence in question. United States v. Gonzalez, 
    550 F.3d 1319
    , 1324 (11th Cir.
    2008). A sentence may be substantively unreasonable if a district court
    unjustifiably relied on a § 3553(a) factor or failed altogether to consider pertinent
    § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Sarras, 
    575 F.3d 1191
    , 1219 (11th Cir. 2009).
    The district court’s sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than
    necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the need
    for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to promote respect for
    the law, the need for adequate deterrence, the need to protect the public, and the
    need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical
    care, or other correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The district court
    should also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and history and
    characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the guideline
    range, pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid
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    unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims.
    
    Id. § 3553(a)(1),
    (3)–(7).
    The party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of showing that the
    sentence is unreasonable in the light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors.
    United States v. Tome, 
    611 F.3d 1371
    , 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). The weight given to
    any specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district
    court. United States v. Clay, 
    483 F.3d 739
    , 743 (11th Cir. 2007). As such, the
    district court need not specifically address every mitigating factor raised by the
    defendant for the sentence to be substantively reasonable. United States v. Snipes,
    
    611 F.3d 855
    , 873 (11th Cir. 2010). We will not remand for resentencing unless
    left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
    error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by imposing a sentence outside
    of the range of reasonable sentences based upon the facts of the case. United
    States v. Croteau, 
    819 F.3d 1293
    , 1309 (11th Cir. 2016). That we may reasonably
    conclude a different sentence is appropriate is insufficient for reversal. 
    Gall, 552 U.S. at 51
    .
    Armstrong’s sentence is procedurally reasonable. The district court was not
    required to analyze the sequence in which he received his state and federal
    sentences, but rather, the § 3553(a) factors, which the court considered and
    addressed. The district court also explained its decision to vary upwards, based on
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    the need to punish Armstrong appropriately, given the seriousness of his offense
    and history, while also allowing him access to rehabilitative programs. See 
    Irey, 612 F.3d at 1196
    .
    Armstrong’s sentence is substantively reasonable because the § 3553(a)
    factors support his sentence. See 
    Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324
    . Though Armstrong
    argues that his sentence is unreasonable given his personal characteristics and
    asserted sentencing disparity, these things are both issues that the district court
    specifically considered. The district court was entitled to afford great weight to
    Armstrong’s history and characteristics. Regardless of the timing of his state and
    federal cases, Armstrong does not dispute the violent nature of those offenses. See
    
    Clay, 483 F.3d at 743
    . The district court used its discretion in weighing the
    § 3553(a) factors, and the sentence is not outside the range of reasonable sentences
    given the facts of the case. See 
    Croteau, 819 F.3d at 1309
    .
    AFFIRMED.
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