Alvin Seigler v. Torrence O. Philipp ( 2018 )


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  •           Case: 17-10782    Date Filed: 05/24/2018    Page: 1 of 8
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-10782
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 8:16-cv-01456-MSS-JSS
    ALVIN SEIGER,
    by and through his Attorney-In-Fact and Next Friend Marsha Seiger,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    TORRENCE O. PHILIPP,
    WEST END PUB, LLC,
    a.k.a. West End Pub,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (May 24, 2018)
    Case: 17-10782       Date Filed: 05/24/2018      Page: 2 of 8
    Before TJOFLAT and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and UNGARO, *
    District Judge.
    UNGARO, District Judge:
    Plaintiff-Appellant, Alvin Seiger, appeals from an order denying his
    motion for leave to file a second amended complaint following the dismissal
    of his first amended complaint with prejudice. For the reasons discussed
    below, we reverse.
    Background
    In June, 2016, Plaintiff, Mr. Seiger, a disabled individual, through his
    wife and next friend, Mrs. Seiger, sued the West End Pub, LLC, and its
    owner, Torrence Philipp, for violating Title III of the Americans with
    Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Mr. Seiger requires a wheelchair to ambulate,
    and he alleged that the Pub was not wheelchair accessible. Mr. Seiger also
    suffers from dementia, and Mrs. Seiger holds his durable power of attorney.
    The district court dismissed Mr. Seiger’s initial complaint without
    prejudice because he failed to allege that he had knowledge of the premises
    or an intent to return there. Before entering the order of dismissal, the court
    required Mr. Seiger to answer interrogatories. One of them asked Mr. Seiger
    to describe the nature of his disability. His wife responded that her husband
    *
    Honorable Ursula Ungaro, United States District Judge for the Southern District of
    Florida, sitting by designation.
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    “has a neurological disorder that renders him with physical and mental
    disabilities . . . . A doctor has rendered him incompetent to handle his legal
    affairs.” Additionally, the Court requested that Mrs. Seiger file documents
    establishing her legal status as Mr. Seiger’s Next Friend. In response, she
    filed a note from Mr. Seiger’s doctor stating that he was “not competent to
    handle any personal affairs.”
    The court then held a hearing on the motion to dismiss where Mrs.
    Seiger testified that she understood the doctor’s note to mean that Mr. Seiger
    was incompetent to handle his legal affairs, but was competent to handle
    other matters. Mrs. Seiger elaborated, “I wouldn’t even [use the] term
    mentally incompetent. He’s—he knows everybody, he knows me, he knows
    where he is and what he is, he is just forgetful. That’s the kind of dementia
    he has.”
    After the hearing, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of
    standing because it did not allege that Mr. Seiger had knowledge of the
    premises or an intent to return. The court explained that Mrs. Seiger could
    not aver the personal knowledge and intent of Mr. Seiger even though she
    holds his durable power of attorney. The court allowed Mr. Seiger to file an
    amended complaint based on the personal knowledge of Mr. Seiger. But the
    district court directed that if Mr. Seiger were to file an amended complaint,
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    he would also need to simultaneously file updated answers to the court’s
    interrogatories.
    In accordance with the court’s directive, Mr. Seiger filed updated
    answers to the court’s interrogatories that were substantially similar to the
    first responses, but this time, Mr. Seiger signed the responses on his own
    behalf. Mr. Seiger also filed an amended complaint. In the amended
    complaint, Mr. Seiger alleged that he intended to return to the Pub. But he
    also alleged that Mrs. Seiger must “undertake all decisions on [his] behalf.”
    The court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint
    with prejudice, explaining that “[t]he likelihood of Mr. Seiger visiting the
    Subject Premises is not dependent on Mr. Seiger’s own intention, but rather,
    is wholly dependent on Mrs. Seiger’s will.”
    While the motion to dismiss was pending, Mr. Seiger moved for leave
    to amend, and he included a proposed second amended complaint. In it, Mr.
    Seiger contradicted the first amended complaint and alleged that Mrs. Seiger
    made “some decisions on [his] behalf, but not all.” The second amended
    complaint also alleged “[d]espite [Mr. Seiger’s] disabilities, on most
    occasions, he is still able to articulate his views and thoughts, speak fluidly,
    and formulate/express intent to, inter alia, visit an establishment.” In the
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    same order dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice, the court
    denied the motion to amend, stating:
    Plaintiff’s Motion to File A Second Amended Complaint, (Dkt.
    34), to allege facts directly contrary to facts alleged twice
    before is DENIED. Notably, in support of the demand to allow
    Plaintiff to proceed through a Next Friend and Attorney-In-Fact
    in this matter, Plaintiff filed a doctor’s note that Plaintiff
    described as ‘indicating Alvin Seiger’s incompetency’ in which
    the doctor expressly states that Plaintiff is ‘not competent to
    handle any personal affairs.’ (Dkt. 22, Ex 1)
    Mr. Seiger now appeals that order. He does not argue that the district
    court erred in dismissing the amended complaint, but only that it abused its
    discretion in denying leave to amend.
    Discussion
    We review a district court’s denial of a motion to file an amended
    complaint for abuse of discretion. Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De
    Nemours & Co., 
    341 F.3d 1292
    , 1300 (11th Cir. 2003). Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 15 provides that district courts “should freely give leave
    when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But the court’s
    discretion to deny leave is not unfettered. Rather, the court should consider
    factors such as “‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
    movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
    allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
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    amendment, and futility of amendment.’” Equity Lifestyle Properties, Inc. v.
    Fla. Mowing And Landscape Serv., Inc., 
    556 F.3d 1232
    , 1241 (11th Cir.
    2009) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 
    371 U.S. 178
    , 182 (1962)).
    Here, the district court did not base its denial of leave to amend on
    any of these factors. Instead, the district court denied leave to amend for
    two reasons. First, it found the second amended complaint contradicted the
    previous two complaints. And second, it pointed to the doctor’s note, which
    stated that Mr. Seiger was incompetent to handle any personal affairs.
    Neither suffices as a basis for denial of leave to amend.
    As to the first, the Federal Rules do not prohibit contradictory
    pleadings. “As a general matter, an amended pleading supersedes the former
    pleading; the original pleading is abandoned by the amendment, and is no
    longer a part of the pleader’s averments against his adversary.” Pintado v.
    Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, 
    501 F.3d 1241
    , 1243 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation
    omitted) (alteration accepted).
    Here, the proposed second amended complaint did not incorporate by
    reference the earlier complaints. It would have superseded the previous
    complaints and rendered null their contradictory allegations. The district
    court thus abused its discretion by denying leave to amend on the basis that
    the complaints contradicted each other.
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    As to the second reason—the doctor’s note—it does not provide a
    basis to deny leave to amend where, as here, the district court did not
    determine that amendment was futile. The court did not, for example,
    determine, as a factual matter, that Mr. Seiger lacked standing and dismiss
    pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Although the court
    heard evidence about Mr. Seiger’s mental capacity, it neither weighed the
    evidence nor made any findings of fact. Rather, it decided the motion to
    dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and so appears to have concluded that Mr.
    Seiger lacked standing as a matter of law based solely on the allegations in
    the amended complaint.
    In the second amended complaint, Mr. Seiger alleged that he was able
    to form the intent to return to the Pub and that he, in fact, intends to return to
    the Pub. These allegations are sufficient to establish standing. See, e.g.,
    Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 
    733 F.3d 1323
    , 1336 (11th Cir. 2013)
    (“a plaintiff seeking an injunction under Title III either must ‘have attempted
    to return’ to the non-compliant building or at least ‘intend to do so in the
    future.’”) (quoting Shotz v. Cates, 
    256 F.3d 1077
    , 1081 (11th Cir. 2001)).
    Therefore, the court abused its discretion in denying leave to file the second
    amended complaint.
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    For these reasons, we reverse the denial of the motion to amend and
    remand with instructions to vacate the dismissal with prejudice1 and grant
    leave to file the proposed second amended complaint.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    1
    Although we necessarily reverse the dismissal to permit leave to amend, we
    would reverse the dismissal regardless because it was made with prejudice, and
    dismissals for lack of standing are jurisdictional and thus usually made without prejudice.
    McGee v. Solicitor Gen. of Richmond Cty., Ga., 
    727 F.3d 1322
    , 1326 (11th Cir. 2013)
    (per curiam) (“Typically, where standing is lacking, a court must dismiss the plaintiff’s
    claim without prejudice.”).
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