Patrick Connolly v. United States , 568 F. App'x 770 ( 2014 )

Case: 13-10774 Date Filed: 06/10/2014 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-10774
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket Nos. 6:11-cv-00385-MSS-GJK,
6:09-cr-00047-MSS-GJK-1
PATRICK CONNOLLY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(June 10, 2014)
Before PRYOR, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Patrick Connolly, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his 360-month sentence,
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imposed after he pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of children, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e). We granted a certificate of appealability
(“COA”) on the issue of whether Connolly received ineffective assistance of
counsel when his trial counsel allegedly forced him to enter a guilty plea. On
appeal, Connolly argues that his attorney coerced him into pleading guilty by
making “threats” that he would receive a life sentence and never see his wife and
child again if he did not plead guilty. 1
We review a district court’s legal conclusions in a § 2255 proceeding
de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d
1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a
mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo. Gordon v. United States,
518 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2008). Pro se pleadings are liberally construed.
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must establish
two things: (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient,” meaning it “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To satisfy the deficient-performance
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Connolly also contends that the district court abused its discretion in summarily denying
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without an evidentiary hearing, but we decline to
reach that issue because it is outside the scope of the COA. See Murray v. United States, 145
F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 1998).
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prong, the defendant must show that counsel made errors so serious that he was not
functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687, 104
S.Ct. at 2064. The defendant must rebut the strong presumption that his counsel’s
conduct fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689, 104
S.Ct. at 2065. A defendant may satisfy the prejudice prong by showing “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).
The Supreme Court has determined that a defendant’s representations at a
plea hearing “constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral
proceedings.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 52
L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). This is because “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a
strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory
allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are
contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.” Id. at 74, 97 S.Ct.
at 1629. We have concluded that “[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty relying upon
his counsel’s best professional judgment, he cannot later argue that his plea was
due to coercion by counsel.” United States v. Lagrone, 727 F.2d 1037, 1038 (11th
Cir. 1984).
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Connolly’s conclusory allegations of coercion by his attorney have failed to
rebut the strong presumptions that his attorney’s advice fell within the range of
reasonable professional conduct and that Connolly’s sworn statements in his plea
agreement and at his change-of-plea hearing were true.
Upon review of the entire record on appeal, and after consideration of the
parties’ appellate briefs, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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