Delvin Lenter Williams v. Commr. Richard Allen ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 16, 2009
No. 08-14268 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-02283-CV-BE-S
DELVIN LENTER WILLIAMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER RICHARD ALLEN,
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(April 16, 2009)
Before DUBINA, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Delvin Lenter Williams appeals the denial of his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . We granted a certificate
of appealability to resolve whether, in light of Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144(11th Cir. 2008), the district court erred by relying solely on the state appellate
court’s findings, in lieu of reviewing the state trial records, to determine that:
(1) the trial court’s admission of the victim’s out-of-court statements did not result
in a denial of due process; (2) the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s
motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) trial counsel did not render ineffective
assistance in regard to his investigation of the credibility of two state witnesses and
his statements during closing argument; and (4) appellate counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Williams argues that the district court violated Ferguson because it did not
consider the state court trial transcripts before evaluating these claims for habeas
relief. He also contends that he should receive an evidentiary hearing.
We review a district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief de novo. Gamble
v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 450 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th Cir. 2006). The scope of
review is limited to the issue specified in the COA. See Murray v. United States,
145 F.3d 1249, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 1998) (addressing a § 2255 motion).
As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
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(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) forbids a federal court from granting habeas
relief on claims that were previously adjudicated on the merits by a state court
unless the adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court’s decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if the
state court (1) arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme
Court on a question of law; or (2) decides a case differently than the Supreme
Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Ventura v. Att’y Gen., Fla.,
419 F.3d 1269, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 2005). A state court’s decision is an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if the state court
unreasonably applies the established law to the facts of a case. Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 407–08, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1520, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000).
Additionally, “[f]actual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision
adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will
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not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the
evidence presented in the state-court proceeding, § 2254(d)(2).” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 324, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1033, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003).
We recently held in Ferguson that, despite the presumption of correctness
given to the state court’s factual determinations, where the appellant raised
fact-intensive self-representation claims that required the state court to ensure that
the appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and to
determine whether standby counsel substantially interfered with tactical decisions
or the questioning of witnesses, “the absence of the trial record precluded the
district court from conducting a meaningful review of the trial court decision.”
Ferguson, 527 F.3d at 1149. Accordingly, we held that “[t]o review the actions of
a state trial court with respect to self-representation claims, federal habeas courts
must examine the state trial court record, rather than rely solely on the state
appellate court’s findings as to what the trial record contains.” Id. In an
explanatory footnote, we clarified that we “[were] simply holding that in order to
conduct a meaningful review of the state court rulings, federal courts must have the
opportunity of reviewing the trial transcripts and state court records underlying
those rulings.” Id. at 1149 n.4.
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I.
Although a federal court reviewing a state prisoner’s habeas petition may not
“reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions,” Estelle v. McGuire
502 U.S. 62, 67–68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991), it may review
state evidentiary rulings to determine whether the rulings violated the petitioner’s
due process rights. Felker v. Turpin, 83 F.3d 1303, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 1996). In
such instances, the inquiry is limited to determining whether evidentiary errors
“‘so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law.’” Id. (quoting
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 228, 62 S. Ct. 280, 286, 86 L. Ed. 166(1941)). The determination of whether an evidentiary error is of such magnitude as
to deny fundamental fairness is to be made in light of the evidence as a whole. Id.
at 1312.
In this case, the state admits that it did not file the trial transcripts, and the
record does not indicate that the transcripts were filed. The district court could not
have meaningfully reviewed whether the admission of the victim’s out-of-court
statement testimony so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of
law without reviewing the state trial transcripts.
II.
In reviewing allegations of the sufficiency of evidence, we ask “whether,
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after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789,
61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). In weighing the sufficiency of the evidence, “[i]t is not
required that the evidence rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Martin v. State of Alabama, 730 F.2d 721, 724 (11th Cir.
1984). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(f), where a petitioner challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence used to support the state court’s factual determinations,
the petitioner normally bears the burden of providing the district court with the
relevant portions of the state trial record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(f); Ferguson, 527 F.3d
at 1147. Nevertheless, if the petitioner “because of indigency or other reason is
unable to produce such part of the record, then the State shall produce such part of
the record and the Federal court shall direct the State to do so.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(f).
Here, despite the fact that the magistrate judge ordered the state to file the
relevant trial record, the state did not file the trial transcripts. Although the district
court stated that it conducted an “independent review of the record” to determine
that the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to deny the judgment of acquittal
motion, the district court could not have conducted a meaningful review without
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the trial transcripts.
III.
The Sixth Amendment provides that a criminal defendant shall have the
right to “the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. Amend. VI. To
prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that (1) counsel’s
performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80
L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The standards applicable to claims of ineffectiveness against
trial counsel apply equally to claims against appellate counsel. Johnson v.
Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001).
Here, too, we conclude that the district court needed the trial transcripts to
resolve whether it was reasonable for the state court to conclude that trial counsel
had (1) thoroughly questioned the credibility of the witnesses and (2) not admitted
during closing argument that he failed to investigate, because these conclusions
were fact-based. Further, the district court needed the trial record to determine
whether it was reasonable for the state to conclude that the appellate counsel could
not have filed a timely motion for a new trial or brought claims of ineffective
assistance on appeal.
Thus, we vacate the dismissal of Williams’s petition for a writ of habeas
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corpus to the extent that it presents issues about the admission of a victim’s
out-of-court statement, whether the trial court erroneously denied the judgment of
acquittal motion, whether trial counsel was ineffective in challenging the
credibility of two state witnesses and during closing argument, and whether
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. Further, on remand, we instruct the district court to
make explicit its consideration of the trial record. We decline to express an
opinion about whether Williams is entitled to prevail on the merits of his petition
and whether he should receive an evidentiary hearing because these issues are
outside the scope of the COA.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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