Willene Lawson-James v. City of Atlanta , 485 F. App'x 374 ( 2012 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-15154
Non-Argument Calendar
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D. C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-00833-HTW
WILLENE LAWSON-JAMES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF ATLANTA,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(July 30, 2012)
Before BARKETT, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Willene Lawson-James, an African-American female now proceeding pro
se, appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
City of Atlanta (“the City”) in her employment discrimination suit under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and the
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Lawson-James argues that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment as to her Title VII claims, because she met
her burden of establishing that the City’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
hiring two white males to fill positions in a newly created department, instead of
promoting her, were pretextual. She further argues that the court erred in granting
summary judgment as to her claim under the Equal Pay Act, because she did
present evidence establishing a prima facie case of disparate pay, and, moreover,
she presented evidence to dispute the City’s affirmative defense that it had
legitimate reasons unrelated to gender to explain the disparity between her pay and
that awarded to the two male hirees.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that a court shall grant
summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same legal standard used by the district court, and drawing all factual inferences in
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a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (11th Cir. 2001). “No genuine issue of
material fact exists if a party has failed to ‘make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element . . . on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.’” Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d
1178, 1186-87 (11th Cir. 2011) (modification in original) (quoting Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986)).
When a magistrate judge notifies a party of her right to object to the
magistrate’s factual findings, a party’s failure to object prohibits an attack on
appeal of the factual findings adopted by the district court except on grounds of
plain error or manifest injustice. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hallmark Builders,
Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993). We generally will not consider an
argument raised for the first time on appeal. Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1526
(11th Cir. 1994).
I. TITLE VII CLAIMS
Under Title VII, it is illegal for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire . . . any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual” because of such
individual’s race, color, or sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In a
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failure-to-promote case, if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination and the defendant “articulates some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason” for the allegedly discriminatory actions, the plaintiff may then attack the
defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason “either directly by persuading the
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly
by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”
Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty, Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir.
2006) (quotations omitted). The plaintiff must show both that the defendant’s
explanation is false and that discrimination was the real reason. Id. When an
employer has presented evidence that the person promoted had superior
qualifications to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff attempts to establish pretext by
challenging that reason and establishing that the plaintiff had superior
qualifications, the “plaintiff must show that the disparities between the successful
applicant’s and her own qualifications were of such weight and significance that
no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the
candidate selected over the plaintiff.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Here, Lawson-James did not object to the magistrate judge’s report, and we
do not find that any of its factual findings rise to the level of plain error or
manifest injustice. The district court properly granted summary judgment because
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the City produced undisputed evidence that other candidates were promoted over
Lawson-James because of their higher level of education and extensive
background in governmental real estate management. Lawson-James failed to
show either that the City’s explanations for its hiring decisions were false or that
discrimination was the real reason for them. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s ruling granting summary judgment as to Lawson-James’s Title VII failure-
to-promote claims.
II. EQUAL PAY ACT CLAIM
To establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, a party must show
that “the employer paid employees of opposite genders different wages for equal
work for jobs which require equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are
performed under similar working conditions.” Steger v. Gen. Electric Co., 318
F.3d 1066, 1077-78 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted). “Once the plaintiff
presents a prima facie case, the employer may avoid liability by proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the pay differences are based on . . . any other
factor other than sex.” Id. at 1078. If the employer meets this burden, “the
plaintiff must rebut the explanation by showing with affirmative evidence that it is
pretextual or offered as a post-event justification for a gender-based differential.”
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Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 954 (11th Cir. 1995).
We agree with the district court that Lawson-James failed to establish a
prima facie case for her equal pay claim. She did not show that her job required
equal skill, effort, and responsibility as the other jobs at issue, or that she
performed it under similar working conditions. The district court also was correct
in determining that, even if Lawson-James had made out a prima facie case for
unequal pay, she failed to present evidence disputing the City’s proof that it had
legitimate reasons unrelated to gender that explained the pay disparity—that is,
that the employees were compensated at a rate commensurate with their
experience, education, and knowledge. Thus, we find no basis for reversing the
district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Lawson-James’s Equal Pay Act
claim.
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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