Dudley Barrington Mitchell v. United States , 321 F. App'x 866 ( 2009 )


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    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT            FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-13747                     MAR 23, 2009
    Non-Argument Calendar              THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket Nos. 07-01066-CV-T-30-MAP
    05-00479-CR-T-3
    DUDLEY BARRINGTON MITCHELL,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (March 23, 2009)
    Before BIRCH, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Dudley Mitchell appeals the district court’s denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. We granted Mitchell’s motion
    for a certificate of appealability (COA) for the following issues:
    (1) whether the district court addressed only the issue of whether
    counsel was ineffective for advising Mitchell to plead guilty to the
    crime of illegal reentry, and failed to address the issue of whether
    counsel was ineffective for misadvising Mitchell regarding the length
    of the sentence he was facing;
    (2) whether in light of Clisby v. Jones, 
    960 F.2d 925
    , 936 (11th Cir.
    1992) (en banc), the district court was required to address all of the
    claims raised Mitchell’s motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    ; and
    (3) if so, whether the district court’s order should be vacated and
    remanded because it failed to address all of the claim’s raised in
    Mitchell’s § 2255 motion.
    Mitchell argues that the district court failed to resolve one of two claims
    articulated in his § 2255 motion and contends that we must vacate and remand to
    the district court for consideration of the remaining claim. He specifically argues
    that the district failed to address whether Mitchell’s trial counsel was
    constitutionally ineffective for misadvising Mitchell regarding the length of the
    sentence he was facing. The government responds that Mitchell abandoned this
    argument based on the testimony he gave at the evidentiary hearing concerning the
    advice his trial counsel gave him regarding potential sentences.
    When reviewing the district court’s denial of § 2255 motion, we review
    findings of fact for clear error and questions of law de novo. Lynn v. United
    2
    States, 
    365 F.3d 1225
    , 1232 (11th Cir. 2004). The scope of review is limited to
    the issues specified in the COA. Murray v. United States, 
    145 F.3d 1249
    , 1250
    (11th Cir. 1998).
    In Clisby, we exercised our supervisory powers over the district courts and
    instructed them “to resolve all claims for relief raised in a petition for writ of
    habeas corpus pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     (1988), regardless whether the habeas
    relief is granted or denied.” 
    960 F.2d at 936
    . We defined a “claim for relief” as
    “any allegation of a constitutional violation.” 
    Id.
     “An allegation of one
    constitutional violation and an allegation of another constitutional violation
    constitute two distinct claims for relief, even if both allegations arise from the same
    alleged set of operative facts.” 
    Id.
     When a district court fails to address all of the
    claims in a habeas petition, we “will vacate the district court’s judgment without
    prejudice and remand the case for consideration of all remaining claims.” 
    Id. at 938
    .
    The district court failed to address, in violation of Clisby, Mitchell’s claim
    that his trial counsel was ineffective for misadvising him regarding the length of
    his potential sentence, and we disagree with the government that Mitchell
    abandoned this claim. He raised this claim in his memorandum in support of his §
    2255 motion and answered questions about it at his evidentiary hearing, thereby
    3
    not indicating a clear intent to abandon this claim. See Pollack v. Birmingham
    Trust Nat’l Bank, 
    650 F.2d 807
    , 811 (5th Cir. 1981).1
    Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the remaining claim for
    consideration by the district court.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    1
    The decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered before October 1, 1981 are binding
    on this circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1207 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc).
    4