USCA11 Case: 22-12119 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12119
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
HAYWOOD JACKSON MIZELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00569-ECM-SMD
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12119
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Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Haywood Mizell appeals the district court’s order granting
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s and PHH Mortgage Corporation’s mo-
tions to dismiss his pro se complaint alleging wrongful foreclosure
of two properties. We reverse.
Mizell’s claims appear to revolve around two foreclosure
sales—one by each defendant. Wells Fargo foreclosed on a loan
obtained by Mizell’s wife. PHH foreclosed on a loan obtained by
Mizell’s daughter and son-in-law. Both loans were secured by
properties located in Ozark, Alabama, and each property was sold
at a foreclosure sale. In his complaint, Mizell alleged that Wells
Fargo and PHH weren’t entitled to the proceeds of these sales.
Both defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the district
court lacked jurisdiction because Mizell’s claims were barred by the
Rooker–Feldman1 doctrine and that Mizell failed to state a claim.
A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation. Upon
finding that Mizell’s claims were inextricably intertwined with final
judgments from state court involving the same parties and
1
Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals
v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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22-12119 Opinion of the Court 3
properties, the magistrate judge recommended that the district
court dismiss Mizell’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Rooker–Feldman. Mizell objected to the report and recom-
mendation but raised no arguments about the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine. The district court adopted the report and recommenda-
tion and dismissed Mizell’s claims with prejudice on the sole basis
that Rooker–Feldman stripped the district court of its subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. Mizell timely appealed.
On appeal, Mizell reiterates the arguments from his com-
plaint but doesn’t challenge the district court’s dismissal of his com-
plaint for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker–Feldman. The defend-
ants argue primarily that—as a result of Mizell’s failure to address
the district court’s sole reason for dismissing his complaint, coupled
with his failure to object to the report and recommendation on -
Rooker–Feldman grounds—Mizell has waived any challenge to the
district court’s dismissal. Indeed, issues not briefed on appeal by a
pro se litigant ordinarily are deemed abandoned. Timson v.
Sampson,
518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). And, under the rules
of this court, a party who fails to object to a magistrate judge’s find-
ings contained in a report and recommendation generally “waives
the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
But “[t]he Rooker–Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional.”
Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
611 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.
2010). And “arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction can-
not be waived.” First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla. v. Hall, 123 F.3d
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12119
1374, 1378 n.7 (11th Cir. 1997). So, notwithstanding the deficien-
cies of Mizell’s briefs, we’re compelled to review de novo the dis-
trict court’s determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Behr v. Campbell,
8 F.4th
1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2021).
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars district courts from re-
viewing or rejecting state court judgments rendered before the dis-
trict court litigation began. Id. at 1210. The scope of the doctrine
is narrow, confined to “cases brought by state-court losers com-
plaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered be-
fore the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Rooker–Feldman “does not prioritize form over substance,” mean-
ing that it bars all appeals of state court judgments in district courts
whether the plaintiff admits to filing a direct appeal or tries to call
the appeal something else. Behr, 8 F.4th at 1211. The injury to the
plaintiff must be caused by the judgment itself. Id. The question
isn’t whether the whole complaint seems to challenge a previous
state court judgment, but whether the resolution of each individual
claim requires review and rejection of a state court judgment. Id.
at 1213. In Behr, we warned that “district courts should keep one
thing in mind when Rooker–Feldman is raised: it will almost never
apply.” Id. at 1212.
As the district court itself acknowledged, “[t]he injuries
about which [Mizell] complains were caused by the underlying
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22-12119 Opinion of the Court 5
foreclosure actions”—not by the state court judgments that upheld
those actions. We also note that Mizell didn’t invite the district
court to review and reject those judgments in his complaint. In-
stead, he challenged the defendants’ power to conduct the nonju-
dicial foreclosure sales and their entitlement to the proceeds.
Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction over Mizell’s claims
and erred in applying Rooker–Feldman.
The defendants ask us to affirm the district court’s order on
a number of alternative grounds, which were raised in their mo-
tions to dismiss. But because the district court gave only one rea-
son for dismissing Mizell’s complaint—the Rooker–Feldman doc-
trine—we defer to the district court to decide in the first instance
whether any or all of these grounds merit dismissal. See Behr, 8
F.4th at 1214.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
