USCA11 Case: 22-13702 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/31/2023 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13702
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID L. JONES, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 4:12-cr-00020-MW-MAF-1
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13702 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/31/2023 Page: 2 of 4
2 Opinion of the Court 22-13702
Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
David Jones, Jr. appeals the revocation of his supervised re-
lease. See
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). On appeal, Jones argues that the
District Court abused its discretion in revoking his supervised re-
lease based on its findings that he violated the conditions of his
supervised release as alleged in Violations 3 and 4 in the probation
officer’s petition. He also argues that even if he had committed
those violations, he did not do so willfully.
In 2012, Jones was charged with two counts involving co-
caine possession and distribution,
21 U.S.C. § 846, in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Jones
pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to Count One, which
was for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than
five hundred grams of cocaine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846.
In August 2012, Jones was adjudicated guilty on Count One
and sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment, supervised release
for eight years following the term of imprisonment, and a fine. In
August 2015, Jones admitted to five violations of his supervised
release, so the conditions of supervised release were modified,
and he was confined to home detention for six months. In March
2018, Jones admitted to seven violations of his supervised release,
so the conditions were modified a second time and he was again
confined to home detention, this time for two months. In March
USCA11 Case: 22-13702 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/31/2023 Page: 3 of 4
22-13702 Opinion of the Court 3
2022, Jones admitted to one violation of his supervised release, so
the conditions were modified for a third time, requiring comple-
tion of community service hours.
Finally, on October 26, 2022, Jones admitted to one viola-
tion of his supervised release and denied four other alleged viola-
tions, for which the District Court revoked Jones’s supervised re-
lease and sentenced him to three months’ imprisonment. Specifi-
cally, Jones admitted to unlawfully possessing or using a con-
trolled substance in violation of his supervised release (Violation
1). Though he denied the allegations, the District Court also
found that Jones failed to follow instructions of the probation of-
ficer (Violation 3) and failed to notify the probation officer of any
change in residence (Violation 4).
At the revocation hearing, before the Court accepted
Jones’s admission as to Violation 1 for testing positive for cocaine
and marijuana use, the Court informed Jones that for that viola-
tion alone, he faced a maximum penalty of two years in prison
and a guideline range of five to eleven months’ imprisonment.
Jones did not object to the Court’s findings of fact or the sentence
imposed.
We review a district court’s revocation of supervised re-
lease for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Cunningham,
607 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010). A court may revoke a de-
fendant’s term of supervised release and impose a prison sentence
when it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defend-
ant violated a condition of his supervised release. Id.; 18 U.S.C.
USCA11 Case: 22-13702 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/31/2023 Page: 4 of 4
4 Opinion of the Court 22-13702
§ 3583(e)(3). The preponderance of the evidence standard re-
quires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is
more probable than its nonexistence. United States v. Almedina,
686 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012).
The district court only needs to find one violation of a su-
pervised release condition to support a revocation. See United
States v. Vandergrift,
754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014) (deter-
mining that a district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking
the defendant’s supervised release, despite his argument that he
did not commit two of the five alleged violations of the terms of
his supervised release, because he pled guilty to the other alleged
violations). The district court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s
supervised release is supported adequately by one alleged viola-
tion, so a possible error in consideration of other allegations is
harmless. United States v. Brown,
656 F.2d 1204, 1207 (5th Cir.
Unit A Sept. 1981).
Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in re-
voking Jones’s supervised release because he admitted to commit-
ting Violation 1, which carried a guideline range term of impris-
onment above his three-month sentence. The District Court only
needed to find one violation to support the revocation, so any
possible error in consideration of the other allegations was harm-
less.
AFFIRMED.
