USCA11 Case: 21-12177 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2023 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-12177
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LYNDEN GARFIELD LORFILS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:02-cr-60155-WPD-1
____________________
USCA11 Case: 21-12177 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2023 Page: 2 of 9
2 Opinion of the Court 21-12177
Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lynden Lorfils, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court
for the Southern District of Florida’s denial of his motion for com-
passionate release under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as modified by
§ 603(b) of the First Step Act of 2018,
Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194
(the “First Step Act”). He argues that the District Court did not
properly consider his arguments showing that extraordinary and
compelling circumstances warranted relief and did not properly
consider the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Finding no
abuse of discretion, we affirm the District Court’s denial of the mo-
tion.
I.
In September 2002, a grand jury sitting in the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida indicted Lorfils on five counts: three counts of bank
robbery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2113 (Counts 1, 2, and 4), and
two counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence, in viola-
tion of
18 U.S.C. § 924 (Counts 3, 5). Lorfils pled guilty to Counts
2, 3, 4, and 5. The District Court sentenced him to a total of 421
months’ imprisonment—37 months each for Counts 2 and 4,
served concurrently to each other; 84 months for Count 3 to run
consecutively to Counts 2 and 4; and 300 months for Count 5, to
run consecutively to Count 3.
USCA11 Case: 21-12177 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2023 Page: 3 of 9
21-12177 Opinion of the Court 3
Lorfils, pro se, filed a motion for compassionate release in
June 2021. He purported to have met § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion
requirement, because more than thirty days had lapsed since the
warden received Lorfils’s request for compassionate release. He
claimed he suffered “from a variety of ailments that [would] ulti-
mately lead to his death should he contract COVID-19.” Mot. for
Compassionate Release, Doc. 60 at 1. Namely, Lorfils alleged that
he was a 42-year old black male suffering from morbid obesity and
hypertension. According to Lorfils, the Bureau of Prisons (the
“BOP”) had failed to properly treat him and bring his blood pres-
sure within the appropriate range, and he was unable to perform
self-care both because of COVID quarantine limitations and his
obesity. Further, the motion argued that “black people are being
hospitalized, ventilated, and dying at rates far in excess of white
people.” Id. at 8.
With respect to § 3582(c), Lorfils argued that his COVID-19
comorbidities (obesity, hypertension, and race), the realities of im-
prisonment, and the BOP’s inability to treat his ailments demon-
strated extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying compas-
sionate release.
Lorfils also argued that compassionate release was war-
ranted because if he was sentenced today, he would likely only be
sentenced to 205 months’ imprisonment. When Lorfils was origi-
nally sentenced, a conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) required a
mandatory 25-year sentence for each additional § 924(c) convic-
tion, even within the same indictment. The First Step Act removed
USCA11 Case: 21-12177 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2023 Page: 4 of 9
4 Opinion of the Court 21-12177
this enhancement unless the defendant had a prior conviction un-
der § 924(c). Because Lorfils did not have a prior conviction under
§ 924(c), he would not have been subject to the enhancement.
The only evidence Lorfils provided in support of his motion
were two prescriptions for blood pressure medications prescribed
by the prison’s doctor. He also attached a copy of his individual-
ized needs plan, which shows the education courses he had taken,
his current work assignments, and his discipline history.
The District Court, without requiring a response from the
Government, denied Lorfils’s motion. The Court stated that it had
considered the § 3553(a) factors and the applicable policy state-
ments, as required by § 3582(c)(1)(A), and did not find morbid obe-
sity and hypertension to be extraordinary and compelling reasons
for relief. 1 The Court further found that COVID-19 conditions at
the prison were not extraordinary or compelling reasons justifying
release. Finally, with respect to Lorfils’s First Step Act argument,
the District Court held that, under United States v. Bryant,
996 F.3d
1243 (11th Cir. 2021), a change in law was not an extraordinary and
compelling basis for relief, but stated that Lorfils could seek
1 The Court noted that Lorfils provided no documentation on these condi-
tions other than two prescriptions, but that even if he had properly docu-
mented the conditions, “the requested relief would not promote respect for
the law or act as a deterrent.” Ord. Den. Mot. for Compassionate Release,
Doc. 61 at 1–2.
USCA11 Case: 21-12177 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2023 Page: 5 of 9
21-12177 Opinion of the Court 5
permission from this Court to file a successive collateral attack.
Lorfils timely appealed.
On appeal, Lorfils argues that the District Court abused its
discretion because it did not consider U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 or address
the relevant § 3553(a) factors when it denied his motion for com-
passionate release. He also argues that this Court erred when it
held in Bryant that § 1B1.13’s definition of “extraordinary and com-
pelling” was binding. He implores this Court to overturn that rul-
ing, which would allow the District Court to consider his First Step
Act argument because it would not be bound by Bryant’s definition
of extraordinary and compelling reasons.
The Government does not dispute that Lorfils met the ex-
haustion requirement of § 3582(c)(1)(A), but argues that Lorfils
failed to meet his burden of showing that “extraordinary and com-
pelling” reasons, as defined by § 1B1.13, existed for his release. The
Government argues that the District Court was not obligated to
consider the § 3553(a) factors because one of the requirements for
release—extraordinary and compelling reasons—was lacking. Fur-
ther, the Government argues that the District Court properly de-
clined to consider the First Step Act argument because it was
bound by this Court’s decision in Bryant.
II.
We review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s
18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion under an abuse of discretion standard.
United States v. Harris,
989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). A district
USCA11 Case: 21-12177 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2023 Page: 6 of 9
6 Opinion of the Court 21-12177
court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal stand-
ard or makes a clear error of judgment. Diveroli v. United States,
803 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2015).
Generally, district courts lack the inherent authority to mod-
ify a term of imprisonment but may do so within § 3582(c)’s provi-
sions.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); Dillon v. United States,
560 U.S. 817,
819,
130 S. Ct. 2683, 2687 (2010). As amended by § 603(b) of the
First Step Act, § 3582(c)(1)(A) now provides, in relevant part, that:
[t]he court, upon motion of the Director of the [BOP],
or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant
has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal
a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defend-
ant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of
such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facil-
ity, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of im-
prisonment . . . after considering the factors set forth
in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to the extent that they are ap-
plicable if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compel-
ling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that
such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commis-
sion . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Put simply, one a motion is properly
made under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a defendant must meet three criteria o
be eligible for a sentence reduction: (1) the sentence reduction is
supported by the §3553(a) factors; (2) extraordinary and compelling
USCA11 Case: 21-12177 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2023 Page: 7 of 9
21-12177 Opinion of the Court 7
reasons warrant such a reduction; and (3) a reduction is consistent
with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements.
Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides the ap-
plicable policy statement for § 3582(c)(1)(A). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
The application notes to § 1B1.13 list four categories of extraordi-
nary and compelling reasons that could justify a reduced sentence:
(A) the defendant’s medical condition, (B) his age, (C) his family
circumstances, and (D) other reasons. Id. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)–
(D). The defendant’s medical condition qualifies as an extraordi-
nary and compelling reason for compassionate release if he is “suf-
fering from a serious mental or physical condition . . . that substan-
tially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care
within the environment of a correctional facility and from which
he or she is not expected to recover.” Id., cmt. n.1(A). Moreover,
in addition to determining that extraordinary and compelling rea-
sons warrant a reduction, the district court must also determine
that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of others or the
community, as provided in
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
Id. § 1B1.13(2).
In United States v. Bryant, we held that § 1B1.13 “is an ap-
plicable policy statement that governs all motions under Section
3582(c)(1)(A), including those filed by defendants.”
996 F. 3d 1243,
1262 (11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied,
142 S. Ct. 583 (2021). Likewise,
we held that, following the enactment of the First Step Act,
§ 1B1.13 continued to constrain a district court’s ability to evaluate
whether extraordinary and compelling reasons were present and
that “Application Note 1(D) does not grant discretion to courts to
USCA11 Case: 21-12177 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2023 Page: 8 of 9
8 Opinion of the Court 21-12177
develop ‘other reasons’ that might justify a reduction in a defend-
ant’s sentence.” Id. at 1248.
“Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court must find that all necessary
conditions are satisfied before it grants a reduction.” United States
v. Tinker,
14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, the
absence of any one of the necessary conditions—support in the
§ 3553(a) factors, extraordinary and compelling reasons, and adher-
ence to § 1B1.13’s policy statement—forecloses a sentence reduc-
tion. Id. at 1237‑38. Additionally, nothing on the face of
18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a court to conduct the compassionate re-
lease analysis in any particular order.
Id. at 1240. If one of the com-
passionate-release conditions is missing, the District Court need
not address the others. See
id. at 1238 (“Because at least one of the
compassionate-release conditions was not satisfied, it can-
not . . . have been error for the district court to skip assessment of
another condition.”).
Under the prior panel precedent rule, we are bound by prior
published decisions that have not been overruled by the Supreme
Court or this Court en banc. United States v. Romo-Villalobos,
674
F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2012).
Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion because
Lorfils did not provide evidence to establish that he suffered from
a serious medical condition that substantially diminished his ability
to provide self‑care within the prison. He only supported this ar-
gument by attaching two prescriptions for hypertension medica-
tions, as well as citing general information about race and COVID.
USCA11 Case: 21-12177 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/23/2023 Page: 9 of 9
21-12177 Opinion of the Court 9
The Court also correctly found that precedent precluded it
from considering a change in sentencing law as an extraordinary
and compelling basis for granting relief. Both this Court and the
District Court are bound by Bryant, which holds that § 1B1.13 is an
“applicable, binding policy statement for all Section 3582(c)(1)(A)
motions,” 996 F.3d at 1262, and Application Note 1(D) to § 1B1.13
“does not grant discretion to the courts to develop ‘other reasons’
that might justify a reduction in a defendant’s sentence.” Id. at
1248.
Because the Court correctly found that Lorfils did not show
extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate
release, it was not required to address the § 3553(a) factors. But,
even though it was not required to do so, the District Court did
address § 3553(a). The Court’s order stated that Lorfils had robbed
12 banks, which points to the nature and circumstances of the of-
fense (§ 3553(a)(1) and § 3553(a)(2)(A)). It also found that compas-
sionate relief would not promote respect for the law (§
3553(a)(2)(A)), and would not act as a deterrent (§ 3553(a)(2)(B)).
In short, the District Court did not abuse its discretion. We
therefore affirm the District Court’s denial of compassionate re-
lease.
AFFIRMED.
