United States v. Alexis Blanco , 322 F. App'x 916 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-14605 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 13, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-20308-CR-PCH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALEXIS BLANCO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 13, 2009)
Before BLACK, CARNES and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Alexis Blanco appeals his conviction for possession with intent to distribute
3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetimine (“MDMA” or “ecstasy”), in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Blanco contends that the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from him after law
enforcement officers arrested him without a warrant. Blanco argues that the
officers did not have probable cause for the warrantless arrest.
We review “a district court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress
under a mixed standard of review, reviewing the district court's findings of fact
under the clearly erroneous standard and the district court's application of law to
those facts de novo.” United States v. Desir, 257 F.3d 1233, 1235–36 (11th Cir.
2001).
“Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, an arresting officer may,
without a warrant, search a person validly arrested. In turn, the Constitution
permits an officer to arrest a suspect without a warrant if there is probable cause to
believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense.” United States
v. Lyons, 403 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal citations, quotation
marks, and alteration omitted). “‘Probable cause’ to justify an arrest means facts
and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances
shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
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offense.” United States v. Mancini, 802 F.2d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir 1986) (internal
quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted).
The officers had probable cause to arrest Blanco. The officers learned about
Blanco from Alexandra Cannaday. Cannaday had been arrested earlier that day in
possession of type of methamphetamine commonly known as crystal meth.
Cannaday offered to cooperate with the officers by leading them her supplier,
Blanco. She said that Blanco owed her an ounce of crystal meth. In the presence
of the officers, Cannaday called Blanco and arranged to meet him that afternoon.
The officers accompanied Cannaday to the arranged meeting place. Blanco was
there. He approached Cannaday’s car and got inside, at which point officers
approached the car and arrested Blanco.1
Cannaday had no reason to lie about Blanco under these circumstances and
she had reasons to tell the truth. See United States v. Foree, 43 F.3d 1572, 1576
(noting that a “controlled surveillance operation” is a situation in which the
informant “is unlikely to lie”). Just as in Foree, if Cannaday had been lying about
Blanco, her “lies would likely be discovered in short order and favors falsely
curried would dissipate rapidly.” Id. Cannaday would only have gotten herself
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The officers decided not to wait until Blanco delivered the drugs. It is the department’s
policy, based on safety concerns, not to put an officer in a position where someone is sitting
behind them.
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into deeper trouble by lying about Blanco. Under these circumstances, the officers
had probable cause to arrest Blanco because it was reasonable to believe that he
was in possession of crystal meth. See Lyons, 403 F.3d at 1253.
The fact that it turned out that Blanco did not have any crystal meth but
instead was in possession of 49 pills of ecstasy does not matter. See id. at 1254.
What matters is that the officers had probable cause to make the arrest. The search
pursuant to that arrest was legal and the district court did not err in denying
Blanco’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
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