United States v. Jerry Shuler ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    APRIL 15, 2009
    No. 08-16570                   THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                   CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 06-80081-CR-DTKH
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JERRY SHULER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (April 15, 2009)
    Before CARNES, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Jerry Shuler, a federal prisoner convicted of crack cocaine offenses, appeals
    the district court’s denial of his pro se 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) motion for a reduced
    sentence. After review, we affirm.1
    Under § 3582(c)(2), a district court may modify an already incarcerated
    defendant’s term of imprisonment if the defendant’s sentence was “based on a
    sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
    Commission pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 994
    (o).” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). However,
    “[w]here a retroactively applicable guideline amendment reduces a defendant’s
    base offense level, but does not alter the sentencing range upon which his or her
    sentence was based, § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a reduction in sentence.”
    United States v. Moore, 
    541 F.3d 1323
    , 1330 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 965
     (2009); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). Thus, a reduction is not
    authorized if an applicable amendment does not lower a defendant’s applicable
    guidelines range “because of the operation of another guideline or statutory
    provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment).” U.S.S.G.
    § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A). Shuler’s § 3582(c)(2) motion was based on Amendment
    706 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which reduced the base offense levels in
    U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) applicable to crack cocaine offenses.
    The district court did not err in concluding that Shuler was ineligible for a §
    3582(c)(2) reduction. At his original sentencing, Shuler’s initial guidelines range,
    1
    “We review de novo a district court’s conclusions about the scope of its legal authority
    under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2).” United States v. James, 
    548 F.3d 983
    , 984 (11th Cir. 2008).
    2
    based on § 2D1.1(c)’s drug quantity table, was 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment.
    However, because Shuler was subject to a statutory mandatory minimum sentence
    of 120 months’ imprisonment, pursuant to 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A), Shuler’s
    guidelines range became 120 to 121 months. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c). The
    district court imposed the statutory mandatory minimum 120-month sentence.
    Shuler’s 120-month sentence was not based on the amount of crack cocaine
    attributed to him under § 2D1.1(c) to calculate his base offense level, but rather
    upon the statutory mandatory minimum. See United States v. Williams, 
    549 F.3d 1337
    , 1339-40 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a defendant sentenced to a
    statutory mandatory minimum sentence is not eligible for a sentence reduction
    based on Amendment 706 because Amendment 706 had no effect on the statutory
    mandatory minimum sentence).2 Thus, even though Amendment 706 lowered the
    base offense level for Shuler’s crack cocaine offense by two levels, it did not lower
    Shuler’s ultimate sentencing range by virtue of the statutory mandatory minimum.
    Because Amendment 706 had no effect on Shuler’s sentencing range, Shuler was
    not eligible for a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction.
    AFFIRMED.
    2
    Shuler concedes that Williams is binding precedent, but raises this issue to preserve it
    for further review. See Cargill v. Turpin, 
    120 F.3d 1366
    , 1386 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that
    we are bound by our prior panel precedent unless it is overturned by the Supreme Court or this
    Court sitting en banc).
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-16570

Judges: Carnes, Hull, Per Curiam, Wilson

Filed Date: 4/15/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024