USCA11 Case: 22-11871 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 01/31/2023 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11871
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CARLOS A. URENA,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cr-00048-RH-MAF-1
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-11871 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 01/31/2023 Page: 2 of 7
2 Opinion of the Court 22-11871
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Urena appeals his two concurrent sentences of 87
months’ imprisonment as substantively unreasonable, arguing that
the district court abused its discretion by not properly considering
all mitigating factors. After close review of the record, we affirm.
I.
Urena was convicted on two counts: possession of firearms
and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2) (Count 1), and possession of an unregistered
short-barreled rifle, in violation of
26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871
(Count 2). Both convictions carried a statutory maximum term of
120 months’ imprisonment. Urena pled guilty to both.
The probation office prepared a presentence investigation
report (PSI). The PSI revealed that, despite Urena’s status as a con-
victed felon who could not legally possess firearms, searches of his
home, car, and business uncovered a total of sixteen firearms, am-
munition, firearm components, manufacturing tools, and 5.27
grams of methamphetamine. Important for the present appeal, the
PSI also tabulated Urena’s criminal history, which consisted of nu-
merous offenses committed as a juvenile and as an adult. The latter
included a slew of convictions for driving under the influence, pos-
session of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia, and driv-
ing with a suspended license. Also significant, the PSI noted that
Urena was on pretrial release for a charge of child abuse when
USCA11 Case: 22-11871 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 01/31/2023 Page: 3 of 7
22-11871 Opinion of the Court 3
police arrested him for the illegal possession of ammunition by a
felon. Urena was convicted of both charges, and while on proba-
tion for those crimes, he committed the present offense.
The PSI also mentioned other relevant factors, including
that Urena had a positive relationship with his mother, sister; and
two children; operated his own (now shuttered) automotive ser-
vice business; and owned his home outright, although he lived
with his mother to help care for his ailing grandfather. In addition,
the PSI included details about Urena’s history with substance
abuse, including his first encounters with alcohol around age thir-
teen, daily use of marijuana (though he recently obtained a medical
marijuana card), and daily use of methamphetamine.
Taking all of this into account, the PSI calculated a total of-
fense level of 21 and a criminal history category of V, which re-
sulted in an imprisonment guideline range of 70–87 months.
II.
The district court imposed a sentence at the top of the guide-
line range: 87 months’ imprisonment for each Count, running con-
currently. In doing so, the district court noted its appreciation of
Urena’s family’s showing of continued support. The district court
also stated its belief that Urena was “a bright and able person,” “ran
his own business successfully,” and “obviously has the ability to be
successful in a legitimate economy.” The district court further ex-
pressed its skepticism about the severity of some of Urena’s driving
convictions and noted that it had confidence that he would start
abiding by the requirement to not possess firearms.
USCA11 Case: 22-11871 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 01/31/2023 Page: 4 of 7
4 Opinion of the Court 22-11871
Nonetheless, the district court took particular issue with
Urena’s “terrible criminal history,” noting his “consistent pat-
tern . . . of disregarding the laws.” The district court highlighted
Urena’s repeated disrespect of laws that require active licenses to
operate vehicles, multiple instances of driving under the influence,
child abuse, and battery. The district court also expressed its con-
cern that Urena, as a convicted felon, continued to possess and
build firearms despite understanding those activities’ illegality.
While the district court understood the desire to own a firearm for
protection—especially given Urena’s claim that he collected fire-
arms after his mother’s home was burglarized—it found Urena’s
sixteen firearms to be excessive.
The district court concluded by noting that it had taken into
account all of the factors it was required to consider under
18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), and while it did not plan to talk through each fac-
tor on the record, it would “be happy to address any specific factor
that either side” requested it to address.
III.
We review the substantive reasonableness of a district
court’s sentencing decision for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United
States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A district court abuses its discretion
when it “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that
were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an im-
proper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judg-
ment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612
USCA11 Case: 22-11871 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 01/31/2023 Page: 5 of 7
22-11871 Opinion of the Court
5
F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omit-
ted).
Yet, we do not reverse a district court simply because we
might have weighed the § 3553(a) factors differently or levied a dif-
ferent sentence. See Gall,
552 U.S. at 51; Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189.
Indeed, given a district court’s greater familiarity with the facts of
each case, we give its sentencing determinations due deference.
See United States v. Shabazz,
887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018).
Further, while a district court is required to consider each § 3553(a)
factor, the applicable guideline range, and the unique facts of a case,
it is “not required to explicitly address each of the § 3553(a) factors
or all of the mitigating evidence.” United States v. Taylor,
997 F.3d
1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2021). Nor must a district court give all of the
sentencing factors equal weight when it calculates a sentence.
Id.
“Rather, an acknowledgment that the district court has considered
the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will suffice.”
Id. at 1354–55 (cleaned up).
For these reasons, it is rare that we find a sentence to be sub-
stantively unreasonable. United States v. Dixon,
901 F.3d 1322,
1351 (11th Cir. 2018). And it is rarer still when a sentence is within
the applicable guideline range and well below the statutory maxi-
mum penalty, both of which indicate—albeit not conclusively—
reasonableness. See United States v. Delva,
922 F.3d 1228, 1257
(11th Cir. 2019).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion. Urena
argues that the district court failed to give proper consideration to
USCA11 Case: 22-11871 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 01/31/2023 Page: 6 of 7
6 Opinion of the Court 22-11871
the mitigating evidence that he presented. However, as noted
above, a district court is not required to explicitly address all of the
mitigating evidence, Taylor, 997 F.3d at 1354, and here, the district
court still made note of the evidence that it found salient, including
Urena’s supportive family, clear intelligence, successful business,
and personal assurances that he would follow the law. And while
the district court did not individually discuss each § 3553(a) factor,
it stated that it had considered all of the factors and provided the
parties an opportunity to ask questions about any specific one. On
this record, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion by failing to consider relevant factors that were due sig-
nificant weight. See id. at 1354–55 (noting that the record need
only show that the district court considered a defendant’s argu-
ments and the § 3553(a) factors).
Nor can we conclude that the district court gave significant
weight to improper or irrelevant factors, or that it committed a
clear error of judgment when it considered the proper factors. In
addition to referencing the mitigating evidence mentioned above,
the district court also highlighted the importance of using the sen-
tencing guidelines as a tool to avoid unjust sentencing disparities.
Yet, the district court determined that this case warranted placing
particular emphasis on Urena’s criminal history, his evident disre-
gard of the law, and the concerning nature of illegally owning and
building sixteen firearms. These considerations do not appear to
be irrelevant or improper. To the contrary, they seem quite appro-
priate. Given the significant deference we give to the district court
USCA11 Case: 22-11871 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 01/31/2023 Page: 7 of 7
22-11871 Opinion of the Court 7
in weighing the evidence and sentencing factors, Shabazz,
887 F.3d
at 1224, we cannot conclude it abused its discretion on these
grounds either.
IV.
Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission de-
veloped statutes and guidelines to cabin a sentencing court’s discre-
tion, and, consequently, sentences well beneath those statutes and
within those guidelines provide indicia of reasonableness. Delva,
922 F.3d at 1257. Here, the district court handed down a sentence
that was thirty-three months less than the statutory maximum and
within the sentencing guidelines, and it provided its reasons for do-
ing so. While Urena argues that the district court did not give all
of the sentencing factors their proper weight, it is not the role of
this court to reweigh the mitigating evidence on our own scale, nor
is it the role of this court to require a district court to recite every
piece of mitigating evidence. Rather, our function is to ensure that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a truly
unreasonable sentence. On the record before us, we conclude that
the indicia of reasonableness in this case are not misleading, and
the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Urena’s
sentence.
AFFIRMED.
