United States v. Mitnee Markette Jones , 489 F. App'x 364 ( 2012 )

Case: 10-15231 Date Filed: 09/10/2012 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_____________________________
No. 10-15231
Non-Argument Calendar
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D. C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00134-JOF-JFK-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MITNEE MARKETTE JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(September 10, 2012)
Before HULL, EDMONDSON, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 10-15231 Date Filed: 09/10/2012 Page: 2 of 5
Mitnee Jones appeals her conviction for engaging in misleading conduct with
the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a federal law enforcement
officer about the possible commission of a federal offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b)(3), for which she was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment.1 No
reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
Jones worked as a senior officer at the Fulton County Jail in Atlanta, Georgia.
When an inmate refused to stop banging and kicking on his cell door, Jones and two
other officers entered the inmate’s cell to calm him down. Although the exact details
are unclear, the officers used physical force against the inmate; and the inmate died
shortly thereafter.
Following the inmate’s death, a lieutenant instructed Jones and three other
officers to prepare incident reports. According to two witnesses, Jones -- who was
the highest ranking officer involved in the incident -- instructed the other officers to
get their stories straight and suggested, either explicitly or implicitly, that the officers
omit from their reports that they had had a physical encounter with the inmate before
his death. Jones was later convicted based on the misleading information contained
in her incident report.
1
Jones was also convicted of making a false statement to a federal agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001, and obstructing, influencing, or impeding a federal grand jury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1503. She does not challenge these convictions on appeal.
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On appeal, Jones first argues that the district court violated Garrity v. New
Jersey, 87 S. Ct. 616 (1967), by admitting her incident report into evidence at trial.
In Garrity, the United States Supreme Court concluded that, absent a knowing and
voluntary waiver, incriminating statements made by law enforcement officers under
threat of termination for remaining silent are inadmissible in later criminal
proceedings. 87 S. Ct. at 620.
But we have concluded that, “[a]lthough an accused may not be forced to
choose between incriminating [her]self and losing [her] job under Garrity, neither
Garrity nor the Fifth Amendment prohibits prosecution and punishment for false
statements or other crimes committed during the making of Garrity-protected
statements.” United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1243 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis
in original). “Giving a false statement is an independent criminal act that occurs
when the individual makes the false statement; it is separate from the events to which
the statement relates, the matter being investigated.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Because Jones was prosecuted for making misleading statements in her incident
report -- not for the conduct described in her report -- she is unentitled to protection
under Garrity or the Fifth Amendment. Thus, the district court’s admission of Jones’s
incident report was proper.
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Jones next argues that insufficient evidence exists to support her conviction.
In particular, Jones asserts that nothing evidences that she knew that federal
authorities would investigate the incident or that her incident report would be
transferred to federal officers.2
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Id. at 1253. To prove that
Jones violated section 1512(b)(3), the government must show that she “knowingly
and willingly (1) engaged in misleading conduct toward another person, (2) with
intent to hinder, delay or prevent the communication of information to a federal law
enforcement officer . . . , (3) about the commission or the possible commission of a
federal crime.” See id. On appeal, Jones does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence proving that she engaged in misleading conduct or that the information she
provided was pertinent to a federal crime. Thus, we need only address the “intent”
element of her offense.
Jones acknowledges that, under this Court’s current law, the government is not
required to prove that the defendant knew that her misleading information pertained
to a federal offense. See id. at 1252; see also United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 1273,
2
Contrary to Jones’s assertions, the record establishes that, during a recent training course, Jones
had been taught that excessive use of force investigations were performed by federal authorities.
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Case: 10-15231 Date Filed: 09/10/2012 Page: 5 of 5
1285 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that section 1512(b)(3) “does not require a specific
intent to mislead federal officials”). Instead, the government need only show that
“the misleading information is likely to be transferred to a federal agent.” See Veal,
153 F.3d at 1251 (emphasis in original). Because we are bound by our prior
precedent, we decline Jones’s invitation to adopt a different approach used in two
other circuits. See Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating
that “we are bound by the holdings of earlier panels unless and until they are clearly
overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court”).
Although Jones suggests that she was aware only that her statements would
mislead state officials, there existed “the possibility or likelihood that [her] false and
misleading information would be transferred to federal authorities irrespective of the
government authority represented by the initial investigators.” See Veal, 153 F.3d
at 1251-52 (emphasis in original). Thus, sufficient evidence exists to support Jones’s
conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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