USCA11 Case: 21-13995 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13995
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RICARDO AMAUI MONTAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-00273-LMM-CMS-2
____________________
USCA11 Case: 21-13995 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023 Page: 2 of 5
2 Opinion of the Court 21-13995
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ricardo Montas appeals the 120-month prison sentence he
received for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute at least
500 grams of methamphetamine. He argues that the district court
committed procedural errors at sentencing and imposed a substan-
tively unreasonable sentence. The government has filed a motion
to dismiss Montas’s appeal, based on the sentence appeal waiver in
his plea agreement. We now grant that motion because Montas’s
appeal waiver is enforceable and bars his challenge.
We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo.
United States v. Johnson,
541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). A
sentence appeal waiver will be enforced if it was made knowingly
and voluntarily. United States v. Bushert,
997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th
Cir. 1993). To establish that the waiver was made knowingly and
voluntarily, the government must show either that (1) the district
court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver dur-
ing the plea colloquy; or (2) the record makes clear that the defend-
ant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver.
Id.
Here, the government has shown both.
In Montas’s plea agreement, a section titled and underlined,
“Limited Waiver of Appeal,” stated that Montas expressly waived
his right to appeal or collaterally attack his convictions or sentences
“on any ground,” except that he could “file a direct appeal of an
USCA11 Case: 21-13995 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023 Page: 3 of 5
21-13995 Opinion of the Court 3
upward departure or upward variance above the sentencing guide-
line range as calculated by the [d]istrict [c]ourt,” raise claims re-
garding his counsel’s ineffective assistance, or file a cross-appeal if
the government initiated a direct appeal. Another section of the
agreement stated that there were “no other agreements, promises,
representations, or understandings between [Montas] and the
[g]overnment.”
Appended to the plea agreement was a statement signed by
Montas confirming that he had read the agreement, carefully re-
viewed each part with his attorney, understood the terms and con-
ditions therein, and voluntarily agreed to those terms and condi-
tions. He confirmed that he understood the appeal waiver and the
narrow exceptions in which he could appeal. And Montas indi-
cated that no one had threatened or forced him to plead guilty.
The district court also specifically questioned Montas about
the appeal waiver during the plea colloquy. After the government
summarized the plea agreement and read the terms of the appeal
waiver into the record, the court emphasized that Montas would
be “giving up [his] rights to appeal in almost all circumstances,” in-
cluding “most of [his] right to appeal [his] sentence.” Addressing
Montas, the court stated, “[A]bsent the very limited circumstances
in which you have reserved your right to appeal, you will not be
able to contest the sentence even if it’s wrong or you’re unhappy
with it.” Montas confirmed his understanding, and Montas’s coun-
sel stated that he had discussed the appeal waiver with his client.
Montas also said that he had sufficient time to discuss the case with
USCA11 Case: 21-13995 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023 Page: 4 of 5
4 Opinion of the Court 21-13995
his attorney and had no other questions before pleading guilty.
The district court accepted Montas’s guilty plea, finding it “know-
ingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.”
At sentencing, the district court calculated a guideline im-
prisonment range of 168 to 210 months and heard arguments as to
a reasonable sentence. The government asked for a sentence of
151 months, which it asserted was justified in part by Montas’s flee-
ing the country to avoid facing charges in this case. Montas re-
sponded that there was no evidence he left the country to avoid
prosecution, and he argued he should receive a similar sentence as
a codefendant to avoid unwarranted disparities. The district court
sentenced Montas to 120 months, explaining that the sentence took
into account “the circumstances of you not immediately facing
what you knew were some serious federal charges, that you took
a gamble that you could avoid them, and there are consequences
for that.”
Montas argues that the district court procedurally and sub-
stantively erred by relying in part on an “erroneous conclusion that
[he] fled the United States to avoid prosecution.” But the appeal
waiver precludes this challenge, even assuming it has merit, be-
cause it does not fall into any of the exceptions set forth in the ap-
peal waiver. See United States v. Howle,
166 F.3d 1166, 1169 (11th
Cir. 1999) (“A waiver of the right to appeal includes a waiver of the
right to appeal difficult or debatable legal issues.”). The waiver is
enforceable because the district court specifically questioned Mon-
tas about the waiver during the plea colloquy, and the record
USCA11 Case: 21-13995 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023 Page: 5 of 5
21-13995 Opinion of the Court 5
otherwise shows that he understood the full significance of the ap-
peal wavier. See Bushert,
997 F.2d at 1351.
We there GRANT the government’s motion to dismiss.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
