USCA11 Case: 22-12002 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 02/02/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12002
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ONEIL JOHNSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cv-80399-WPD
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12002
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Oneil Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his pro se
28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, which he purport-
edly had filed in March 2021, but which was not discovered by the
district court until November 2021, 1 and the denial of his subse-
quent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion. On appeal,
Johnson argues that his pro se petition, which was filed shortly after
the filing of a counseled petition, was not successive because the
counseled petition was frivolous.
Generally, a party forfeits a claim on appeal by failing to
“plainly and prominently” raise that claim in his initial brief.
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir.
2014). “When an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal
one of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment,
he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and
it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.”
Id. at 680.
1 After locating Johnson’s pro se § 2254 petition, the court found that, had the
petition been received in March—when Johnson handed it to prison officials
for mailing—it would have stricken the petition as an unauthorized pro se fil-
ing because Johnson was still represented by counsel at the time he attempted
to file it. The court further noted that, had the court determined the pro se
§ 2254 petition to be filed when it was located in November, it would have
been dismissed as successive and untimely, and that the claims were procedur-
ally barred and unexhausted. The court also found that Johnson was not en-
titled to relief on the merits.
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22-12002 Opinion of the Court 3
However, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard
than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263
(11th Cir. 1998).
Generally, appeals from § 2254 proceedings require a certif-
icate of appealability (“COA”), but “no COA is necessary to appeal
the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of a successive
habeas petition because such orders are not ‘a final order in a ha-
beas corpus proceeding.’ Instead, we may review such a dismissal
as a ‘final decision’ under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Osbourne v. Sec’y,
Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
968 F.3d 1261, 1264 n.3 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted) (quoting Hubbard v. Campbell,
379 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th
Cir. 2004)). “The key inquiry into whether an order is ‘final’ for [28
U.S.C.] § 2253 purposes is whether it is an order ‘that disposes of
the merits in a habeas corpus proceeding.’” Jackson v. United
States,
875 F.3d 1089, 1090 (11th Cir. 2017) (alteration adopted)
(quoting Harbison v. Bell,
556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009)).
“Under the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s court fil-
ing is deemed filed on the date it is delivered to prison authorities
for mailing.” Jeffries v. United States,
748 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir.
2014) (quoting United States v. Glover,
686 F.3d 1203, 1205 (11th
Cir. 2012)). Absent contrary evidence, such as prison logs or other
records, we assume that a prisoner delivered a filing to prison au-
thorities on the day when the prisoner signed it. Washington v.
United States,
243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). The govern-
ment bears the burden of proving that the filing was delivered to
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12002
prison authorities on a date other than when the prisoner signed it.
Jeffries,
748 F.3d at 1314.
As to representation by counsel, an individual does not have
a right to hybrid representation. Cross v. United States,
893 F.2d
1287, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 1990). Additionally, the Local Rules and
Procedures of the Southern District of Florida provide, in part,
“[w]hen a party has appeared by attorney, the party cannot there-
after appear or act on the party’s own behalf in the action or pro-
ceeding, or take any step therein, unless an order of substitution
shall first have been made by the Court, after notice to the attorney
of such party, and to the opposite party.” S.D. Fla. Local R.
11.1(d)(4).
“It is the law of this [C]ircuit that the right to counsel and
the right to proceed pro se exist in the alternative and the decision
to permit a defendant to proceed in a hybrid fashion rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court.” United States v. LaChance,
817
F.2d 1491, 1498 (11th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court likewise has
held that the right to proceed pro se, recognized by Faretta v. Cal-
ifornia,
422 U.S. 806 (1975), does not require a trial judge to permit
hybrid representation. McKaskle v. Wiggins,
465 U.S. 168, 183
(1984).
Here, in light of Johnson’s pro se status, we liberally con-
strue his arguments on appeal, despite him abandoning in his ap-
pellate brief some of the grounds on which the district court based
its dismissal. Regardless of the other bases for its dismissal, we con-
clude that the district court did not err in dismissing Johnson’s pro
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22-12002 Opinion of the Court 5
se § 2254 petition because it had not permitted hybrid representa-
tion, and accordingly, his pro se petition was an unauthorized filing
after his retained counsel had filed a § 2254 petition just nineteen
days prior. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
